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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with how people understand and remember spatial information derived 
from verbal descriptions. The thesis distinguishes between three different ways of representing 
spatial information in working memory. The first way is to represent the surface form of the 
source from which the spatial information is derived (the language of a description). The second 
is to represent the structure of the situation derived from that source (a spatial mental model). 
The third is to represent the perceptual characteristics of the situation from a particular 
perspective (a visual image). Considerable evidence exists that people construct and manipulate 
spatial mental models in working memory. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the claim 
that mental models are represented in long-term memory. An outline of the spatial mental 
modeling processes required to understand a simple spatial description is proposed. It is proposed 
that spatial mental modeling is comprised of three processing stages. Firstly, comprehension 
processes are required to access the linguistic meaning of information presented in spatial 
description. Secondly, construction processes are required to build up a representation of the 
spatial structure of the situation derived from the language of the description. Thirdly, 
consultation processes are required to monitor construction and to access information from the 
spatial mental model. Nine experiments are reported which investigate evidence for and 
against the view that people remember the construction and consultation of a spatial mental 
model. In the final chapter this evidence is reviewed and a 'sketch' of a processing theory of 
memory for spatial descriptions is proposed. It is argued that memory for a spatial mental model 
is a product of the interaction between construction and consultation processes over a period of 
time rather than a simple 'copy' of a completed working memory spatial mental model. 
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Chapter 1- Representation, memory and space 
Mental representations denote or stand for entities, concepts and relationships in the world 
around us. In order to understand the world we need to construct a representing world which is a 
simplification, and sometimes a distortion, of the 'real' represented world (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Newell, 1990; Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). Stephen Palmer (1978) has stressed 
the importance of the relationship between how things are represented and what procedures are 
able to act upon those representations. Drawing upon this idea it is possible to distinguish 
between a number of different high-level representations; representations of verbally 
expressible propositions, representations of structural relations of real or imagined situations and 
representations of the perceptual characteristics of situations. Using terminology proposed by 
Philip Johnson-Laird (1983) these would correspond to linguistic propositions, mental models 
and images. A particularly important distinction proposed here is between images which 
preserve structural relations among parts of the image (and which thus imply the existence of a 
mental model) and those which do not (and hence do not imply the existence of a mental model - 
merely the experience of perceptual or affective imagery). This issue is explored further in 
section 1.4. Spatial relations are one of the most fundamental, if not the most fundamental, 
example of the structural relations that the human mind is capable of representing and 
understanding. Mental models of the structure of spatial situations are referred to as spatial 
mental models. People need to be able to construct spatial mental models in order to understand 
their physical environment and to interact with it. This can be demonstrated by looking at the 
way spatial representations and particularly spatial mental models are used in human cognition 
(such a functional approach is described in section 1.2). 
There is considerable evidence that spatial mental models are constructed and 
manipulated in working memory (this evidence is reviewed in Chapter 2). The purpose of this 
thesis is to investigate whether spatial mental models are represented in long-term memory. 
Later in this chapter the aspects of representation and memory raised in the previous paragraph 
are discussed in more detail. The purpose of this discussion is to show how high-level working 
memory representations can support qualitatively different kinds of processing. These 
qualitative differences make it possible to distinguish between different forms of representation 
and also influence what information is retained in long-term memory. The durability and 
accessibility of memory traces in long-term memory is greatly influenced by encoding processes in 
working memory; for example by the overlap between information encoded onto the memory trace 
and information present in the retrieval context (see sections 1.6.1 and 1.6.2). For this reason (and 
because of the intimate relationship between representation and process discussed later in this 
chapter) investigating the representation of spatial mental models in long-term memory requires 
an understanding of the representation of mental models in working memory and of the processes 
which act upon them. 
Chapter 1 introduces a functional approach to representation and memory, with 
particular attention on the role of spatial representation in cognition. Chapter 2 will discuss the 
representation of mental models in working memory and review evidence of their retention in 
long-term memory. Chapter 2 concludes with a proposal of an outline of how spatial mental 
models are constructed and manipulated in working memory. Chapters 3,4 and 5 present 
empirical evidence about long-term memory for spatial information derived from verbal 
descriptions. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the research presented in earlier chapters 
and presents a 'sketch' of a theory of long-term memory for spatial mental models. Chapter 6 
ends with a discussion of some of the important issues raised by the thesis and presents some 
conclusions based on the empirical and theoretical work presented here. 
1.1 A functional approach to representing, understanding and 
remembering spatial situations 
What kind of properties does our understanding of and memory for spatial situations require of 
the way we represent spatial information? The most important property is the capacity to 
preserve the spatial structure present in the world. Consider three different ways in which 
people construct external representations of spatial situations. One way would be to write a 
description of the spatial situation made up of sentences such as "The chair is to the left of the 
desk". A second way would be to draw a picture, or better still take a photograph, of the spatial 
situation. A third way would be to draw a diagram or make a scale model of the situation. All 
three of these ways are common methods of recording spatial information in everyday life, and 
each has advantages and disadvantages. Verbal descriptions can be very economical. There is no 
need to describe every possible spatial relation present in the situation, certain key relations 
between objects or places can often suffice to reconstruct or capture the relevant details of the 
situation. By the same token verbal descriptions also carry a degree of uncertainty. For example. 
if someone says that "The chair is to the left of the desk" it is unclear whether the chair is one 
inch to the left or one yard to the left. A picture or photograph does not have this problem of 
uncertainty. Picture and photographs, however, capture the spatial characteristics only 
indirectly. What they really preserve are perceptual characteristics of the situation from a 
particular perspective. Deriving spatial relations from a picture or photograph is not always 
easy, because of this problem of perspective. The problem of perspective can be avoided if a 
diagram or scale model is employed. A diagram or scale model in some sense preserves the 
spatial structure of the situation it represents (Craik, 1943). At the same time, though, other 
information may be lost. Typically, diagrams and scale models don't preserve much in the way of 
perceptual detail. Often they are at a level of abstraction which ignores surface features such as 
colour or texture. Diagrams, and particularly scale models, also tend to be difficult to construct. 
There are strong similarities between these three ways of constructing external 
representations of space and the tripartite distinction between linguistic propositions, images 
and mental models adopted elsewhere in this thesis (Johnson-Laird, 1983). It is not proposed 
that the use of these kinds of external representation provides direct evidence of this distinction 
in the way people represent spatial situations in working memory or long-term memory. The way 
people use and interact with external representation to some extent 'maps out' the possible ways 
of representing their physical environment. Any theory of mental representation must be able to 
account for the whole range of ways people interact with their environment. What this probably 
means is that people make use of a number of different forms of spatial representation for a 
variety of different purposes. Further evidence for this is provided by looking at the different 
purposes for which spatial information is required. The role of spatial representation in 
cognition is illustrated with respect to four major areas of psychological research in the 
following section. 
1.2 The role of representation in cognition 
Work on representation has fallen primarily into one of four broad areas: perception, action, 
language and reasoning (Kosslyn, 1984). In the following four sections the function of 
representation in each of these areas is illustrated with examples taken from the literature in 
experimental psychology and cognitive science. The emphasis, in each example, is on spatial 
representation, because this is the focus of this thesis and because studies of spatial 
representation have provided the most striking evidence that people take advantage of 
multiple forms of representation. 
3 
1.2.1 Perception 
A fundamental problem in perception is the question of how people are able to recognize a three- 
dimensional object from a two-dimensional visual image (Marr, 1980; 1982; Roth & Frisby, 1986). 
One way of accomplishing this is for people to store information about the three-dimensional 
structure of an object in long-term memory and to compare new patterns against this stored 
representation. Structural descriptions are modality free, abstract representations of the 
information necessary to construct the original object (Palmer, 1975; 1978). Reed (1974) has 
provided evidence that pattern recognition involves structural descriptions rather than visual 
images or fixed templates. Reed presented subjects with two geometrical patterns in sequence. 
Subjects were asked to decide whether the second pattern formed part of the first pattern. 
Repeating a whole pattern resulted in the greatest number of correct responses. There were also 
very large differences in accuracy for different parts of the original pattern. Some parts were 
almost six times harder to recognize than others. This is not consistent with the use of a fixed 
template for recognition -a template should not show marked differences in recognition for 
different parts of the patterns (Reed, 1974; Roth & Frisby, 1986). Reed obtained similar results 
for long 5 second retention intervals as for short 1.5 second intervals which he argued would 
preclude subjects from scanning a visual image. They are consistent with a representation made 
up of parts and relations between parts. 
The importance of Reed's findings are that they stress the importance of structural 
information in perception and representation. A similar, but weaker, point of view can be found in 
work by Shepard and Cooper on mental rotation (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Metzler, 
1971). The 'images' described by Shepard "are highly abstract and schematic in comparison to a 
concrete perceptual image but preserve enough of the essential structure to permit accurate 
comparisons in their experiments" (Reed, 1974). Structural descriptions are usually considered to 
be propositional representations, however this is not necessarily the case (Reed, 1974; Roth & 
Frisby, 1986). Any representation which preserves the structure of the original object and which 
supports perceptual processes which can be used to generate two-dimensional views or recognize 
an object can be considered as a structural description. For example an architects' scale model of a 
house could be considered a structural description just as much as a set of equations encoded in a 
computer design program (Palmer, 1978; Tversky, 1991). There is a crucial distinction between 
representation of abstract structure and representations of concrete, perceptual characteristics. 
Perception requires both, but without a structural representation it is difficult to account for the 
recognition of familiar objects from unfamiliar views or perspectives (Johnson-Laird, 1989; Marr, 
1982; Roth & Frisby, 1986). 
4 
1.2.2 Action 
Representational accounts of action are an important area in which cognitive psychology has 
challenged behaviourism. For example, Tolman (1932; 1948) argued that stimulus-response 
accounts were inadequate to explain rats ability to generalize action from dry to water-filled 
mazes. He argued that navigation requires the retention of knowledge in the form of a cognitive 
map which is independent of the precise motor behaviour of an organism. Despite importance of 
representational issues to an understanding of action it is a much neglected area of cognitive 
psychology (Kelso, 1982; Rosenbaum, 1984). One partial exception has been the study of 
navigation in animals and in humans. Navigation requires the coordination of spatial 
representations with the external, physical environment. Of particular interest are the 
differences in spatial representations acquired from actual navigation in an environment and 
those acquired from other sources. Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1982) compared spatial 
knowledge acquired from learning a map (survey knowledge) or from navigation (route 
knowledge). They tested spatial memory of the Rand Corporation building. Subjects who had 
learned from a floor plan of the building were better at judgements of relative location and 
straight-line distance. Subjects who learned the layout of the building from actual navigation 
were better at estimating route distances and orienting themselves relative to unseen locations. 
With further experience of navigation the advantages for map learning subjects on location and 
distance memory tests disappeared. 
Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth took this as evidence for the representation of two types of 
spatial information: survey and procedural knowledge. Map learning provides survey 
knowledge of global spatial relations in the form of visual or spatial images. Navigation 
supports the learning of procedural knowledge of specific routes. This procedural knowledge is 
sequential and may be based on location specific views of the environment. It can be consulted by 
'mentally simulating' navigation along the route. They also found that subjects who had 
considerable experience navigating the building demonstrated accurate survey knowledge almost 
as if they could see through the walls of the building. What is particularly fascinating about 
this study is the way people are able to integrate procedural, route knowledge over a period of 
time in such a way that it can mimic or even exceed accurate survey knowledge. Thorndyke and 
Hayes-Roth describe it as possessing the characteristics of a three-dimensional model of the 
environment. This representation can only be the result of combining or integrating route 
knowledge learned on different occasions. This in turn implies that individual routes are, to some 
extent, able to preserve the spatial structure of the environment. Experiments with small-scale 
spatial situations have shown similar results, with route learning culminating in an integrated 
representation of an environment (Levine, Jankovic, & Palij, 1982). It appears that flexible, 
detailed structural representations of the environment are a natural consequence of action in the 
real world. 
5 
1.2.3 Language 
Chomsky challenged behaviourist explanations of language with representational accounts of 
grammar, citing language acquisition and the ability to generate novel grammatical utterances 
as evidence(Gardner, 1987; Leahey, 1992). Cognitive psychologists have looked at issues of 
broader interest in cognition. These include sentence memory and language comprehension. For 
example, it has been proposed that people use the explicit content of discourse only as a basis for 
comprehension, filling in for and making inferences about missing details as necessary (Cohen, 
1989; Garnham, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1981; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). In a famous study 
Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972) gave subjects a number of sentences constructed from the 
same basic sentence frame: 
"Three turtles rested (on/beside) a floating log and a fish swam beneath (it/them)" 
Bransford and his colleagues showed that subjects presented with sentences such as "Three 
turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath them" would later confuse them with 
sentences of the form "Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath it". 
Bransford, Barclay and Franks argued that subjects were not simply representing the semantic 
deep structure of the sentences they had learned, but were abstracting (or constructing) 
representations of the situations being described. They noted that, because of the nature of the 
stimuli used in their experiments, people may generate spatial representations of the situations 
described, and these may take the form of mental images. Constructive processes in sentence 
comprehension result in semantic representations, though not necessarily in the form of mental 
images. They proposed that representations of the language alone are not sufficient to explain 
language comprehension and that semantic representations of situations play a functional role in 
language understanding (Bransford et al., 1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971; Garnham, 1981; 
Garnham, Oakhill, & Johnson-Laird, 1982). More recent psychologists and psycholinguists 
would refer to these semantic representations as mental models, discourse models or situation 
models. Despite the confusing mix of terminology they would agree on the main conclusion of 
Bransford and his colleagues that comprehension involves the construction of a coherent 
representation of the meaning or situation described by discourse (Albrecht & O'Brien, 1993; 
Bower & Morrow, 1990; Garnham, 1987; Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindberg, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Schmalhofer & Glavanov, 1986; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Understanding how people use 
language to convey spatial information is therefore an important element of any theory of 
spatial representation. The analysis of how spatial information is expressed through language 
has a long tradition in psychology and linguistics (Clark, 1973; Levelt, 1984; Miller & Johnson- 
Laird, 1976). However, in this thesis, spatial language will be considered only as a starting 
point for or an input to a spatial representation, rather than as an area of study in its own right. 
6 
1.2.4 Reasoning 
Traditional theories of reasoning derived from philosophy and mathematics propose that 
people make deductive inferences by the application of formal, logical rules (Braine, 1978; 
Henle, 1962; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958; Rips, 1983). One of the strongest challenges to this view 
has been found in the area of relational reasoning. In fact the account of relational reasoning 
described here can be traced back at least as far as William James or even Aristotle (Garnham & 
Oakhill, 1994; Hunter, 1957; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Relational inferences are made from 
premises which can be expressed on a linear dimension such as "A is better than B" or "X is above 
Y". These premises lend themselves to being represented spatially. One plausible alternative to 
logic-based accounts is that people construct an integrated representation of the premises and use 
this rather than a set of formal rules to derive a conclusion. Most versions of this account have 
assumed that this integrated representation is spatial or visual, but the essential feature of the 
explanation is that all the information in the premises is integrated into a single coherent 
representation during reasoning. Ian Hunter (1957) proposed that people transform the premises 
of relational problems in order to construct an integrated representation in primary or working 
memory. Imagine being presented with a three-term series problem in the form: 
Ingrid is sadder than Dorothy. 
Emma is happier than Dorothy. 
Who is the happiest? 
According to Hunter people could solve this problem using two kinds of operation. Conversion of 
the first premise (reversing the relation) would produce "Dorothy is happier than Ingrid". 
Reordering of the two premises results in a representation where the two middle terms are 
adjacent. Evidence that people use these two operations to construct an integrated representation 
of the premises according to the exact rules proposed by Hunter is mixed. However, evidence that 
these or similar operations are used in relational reasoning is very strong (Evans, Newstead, & 
Byrne, 1993). Problems which require premise integration are harder than those, like two-term 
series problems, which do not (Clark, 1969), while five-term series and three-term series, both of 
which involve premise integration, are equally difficult (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). 
Problems with premises which are continuous, and hence which do not need to be transformed, 
are easier than those which are discontinuous (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Potts, 1972). 
These issues are discussed in more detail in a review by Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993) who 
conclude that relational reasoning does involve an integrated representation of the premises. 
The idea that operations are carried out in working memory to transform verbal descriptions into 
integrated representations lies at the heart of reasoning theories based on mental models. 
Premise conversion, in particular, is implicit in the mental model construction processes described 
by Johnson-Laird (1983) and Payne (1993). An explicit account of why and how verbal 
descriptions are converted during spatial mental model construction is provided at the end of 
Chapter 2. 
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1.3 Representation and memory 
In the rest of this chapter the concept of mental representation will be discussed in relation to 
memory research in cognitive psychology. The concept of representation is central to information 
processing theories (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Palmer & Kimchi, 1986; Pylyshyn, 1984; 
Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). This is because the origins of cognitive psychology lie in the 
necessity to postulate knowledge that is held by an organism which is independent of the way 
that knowledge influences behaviour (Tolman, 1932; 1948). This knowledge is held to be 
essential to explain complex behaviour in areas such as language comprehension, problem 
solving, perception and action (as illustrated earlier in section 1.2). Many arguments and debates 
in psychology arise because of different interpretations or definitions of common constructs such 
as representation (Broadbent, 1985; Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Palmer, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1973; 
Rumelhart, 1989; Smolensky, 1988). It is important to establish the assumptions cognitive 
psychologists share when they write or talk about representation. For the same reasons genuine 
differences also need to be outlined. Theoretical accounts of memory, and in particular human 
memory, are examined for two reasons. Firstly, because the development of accounts of different 
kinds of mental representation are intimately linked to the history of memory research in 
psychology and neuroscience (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Hintzman, 1990; McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1981; Paivio, 1971). Secondly, this thesis examines evidence that a particular form 
of mental representation in working memory is also represented in long-term memory (Glenberg et 
al., 1987; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). This chapter provides a general introduction 
to issues surrounding the relationship between representation, working memory and long-term 
memory. Subsequent chapters discuss the nature of mental models and present original empirical 
evidence that supports the thesis that people construct and retain spatial mental models in long- 
term memory. 
1.3.1 Representation and process 
The simplest definition of a representation is that it is an entity that stands for, or denotes, 
another entity. This definition is something that most, if not all, cognitive psychologists would 
agree with (Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). A representation 
can be an external entity such as a portrait, flag or emblem, or it can be mental entity, for 
example an idea, an association or an image. Many cognitive psychologists believe that mental 
representations are somehow related to the 'phenomenological' experience of mental events and 
play a causal or mediating role in behaviour (Bruce & Green, 1985; Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1984; 
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1985). Cognitive psychologists are primarily concerned with mental 
representation. However, many psychologists are interested in external representations, either 
in themselves, or for what they can tell us about the mind. Of particular interest are the 
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representations that are difficult to classify as internal or external (e. g. the written, spoken or 
signed word). 
Some cognitive scientists, psychologists and philosophers place a stronger interpretation 
on what it means for something to be representational. They argue that mental representations 
are arbitrary symbols with particular formal properties (Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1975; Fodor, 
1980). According to Fodor (1980) formal properties "... are specified without reference to such 
semantic properties of representations as, for example, truth, reference, and meaning. " An 
example would be a structural property such as syntax. This strong 'symbolic' or 'computational' 
view, can be regarded, at least until the advent of connectionism, as the dominant approach in 
cognitive science, particularly in artificial intelligence, linguistics and cognitive psychology 
(Hunt, 1989; Rips, 1986). Dominant is not taken here to imply the consensus or even majority 
view. Even before the growth in popularity of the 'new' connectionism many cognitive scientists 
placed a different interpretation on computation and representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Paivio, 1971). In this thesis the 
weaker, more general view of what constitutes representation in information processing 
psychology is adopted (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Palmer, 1978; Palmer & Kimchi, 1986; Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1983). According to this view representations are considered to have constituent 
structure, but this structure is not necessarily based purely on formal 'syntactic' properties. This is 
the view that "different types of representation are logically distinguishable at some level of 
analysis, and, moreover, that they exist as different options for encoding information" (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983). It a level of analysis at which cognitive processes act upon representations and at 
which it is meaningful to construct theories which can be tested by traditional experimental 
psychological procedures. 
A major problem for theories of representation has been how to elucidate the 
correspondence between the representing world and the represented world. This problem lies at 
the heart of a number of controversies in psychology and cognitive science (Broadbent, 1985; 
Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Pylyshyn, 1973; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1985; Smolensky, 1988). 
Palmer (1978) illustrates this by arguing that a representation should not be considered as a 
single entity but as part of a representational system; linking two "functionally separate worlds" 
which are related in some way. A representation can be specified by stating the relevant aspects 
of the represented world that refer to the representing world. Palmer (1978) argues that to do 
this requires a statement of: 
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(1) what the represented world consists of, 
(2) what the representing world consists of, 
(3) the aspects of the represented world being modeled, 
(4) the aspects of the representing world doing the modeling, and 
(5) the correspondences between the two worlds. 
Rumelhart and Norman (1983) express the same idea in terms of sets. The represented world and 
the representing world are made up of a set of objects and relations among those objects. The 
representing world is mapped onto a subset of the represented world (the to-be-represented 
world). The two important correspondences are thus between the objects and the relations of this 
to-be-represented world and the objects and relations of the representing world. 
These descriptions both place emphasis on the representational systems, rather than on 
individual representations per se. Palmer (1978) argues that these processes define or limit the 
informational content of the representation. Process issues are thus also central to mental 
representation. In practice representation and process are very difficult to separate because 
mental events are not directly observable. The notion that process and representation are 
fundamentally linked in any representational system is a central feature of the model of memory 
for spatial mental model construction and consultation outlined in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 6). 
1.3.2 The imagery debate 
Psychology and cognitive science have been dominated by a number of controversies and debates 
relating to the nature of mental representation (Gardner, 1987; Leahey, 1991). Early 
psychologists debated questions such as whether it was possible to have `imageless' thought 
(Boring, 1950; Dellarosa, 1988; Leahey, 1991). Behaviourists rejected the notion that knowledge 
could be represented independently of the way it was used (Boring, 1950; Tolman, 1932; Tolman, 
1948; Watson, 1913). In recent years the ground has shifted to a slightly different kind of 
question: is it necessary to postulate more than one form of representation in working memory or in 
long-term memory? Possibly the most important debate in relation to this question has concerned 
the nature of mental imagery. The debate can be divided roughly into two phases. In the early 
phase the controversy concerned whether it was possible or reasonable to distinguish between 
imagery and verbal representations as distinct long-term memory codes. This phase was 
dominated by the work of Allan Paivio on memory and imagery using a traditional verbal 
learning methodology (Paivio, 1971; 1986; 1991). The second phase was dominated by striking 
empirical observations that the process of inspecting a visual image was very similar to 
perceiving a real picture or object (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
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The rise and fall of dual-coding theory 
When memory for different stimuli is compared pictures are consistently remembered better than 
words (Denis, 1991; Eysenck, 1984; Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Intraub, 1979). The most influential 
explanation of this picture superiority effect is dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1971; 1986; 1991). 
Dual-coding theory proposes two independent, but interacting, symbolic systems; an image 
system and a verbal system. The image system is specialized for dealing with perceptual 
information, while the verbal system is specialized for dealing with linguistic information. 
While distinct encoding and retrieval systems are associated with each system the picture 
superiority effect arises because two distinct codes are stored for pictures (an imaginal code and a 
verbal label) whereas under normal circumstances words are only stored using a verbal code. 
According to dual-coding theory when imagery instructions are given or when people 
spontaneously adopt an imagery strategy (e. g. when people learn lists of concrete, easily imaged 
words) the picture superiority effect is eliminated or reduced (Paivio, 1971; 1986; 1991). 
Dual-coding theory has come under attack from two main directions. The first line of 
attack is in relation to the nature of mental representation. Propositional theorists in the 
imagery debate have attacked the idea that imagery plays any causal role in cognition 
(Pylyshyn, 1973; 1984). The second line of attack comes from theorists who are willing to accept 
the view that imagery can be meaningfully studied and that it may play a causal role in 
cognition. It is this second line of attack that has been most damaging to dual-coding theory. 
These imagery theorists propose that there is a separate, functional imagery system in working 
memory, but that there is no functionally distinct long-term memory imagery code (Anderson & 
Bower, 1973; Denis, 1991; Hampson & Morris, 1979; Kosslyn, 1980; Marschark & Surian, 1989; 
Nelson, 1979; Yuille & Catchpole, 1977). Evidence has accumulated against dual-coding 
explanations of picture superiority and concreteness effects from a number of different sources. 
Research on the influence of different imagery instructions has shown that it is 
relational or linking imagery rather than imagery per se that improves recall for concrete words. 
Item specific imagery (concentrating on the visual features of the imagined entity) or separation 
imagery (imagining two or more spatially separated entities) do not improve memory for 
concrete words whereas relational imagery (imagining two or more entities in some form of visual 
or spatial relationship) does. These studies have supported a number of processing or encoding 
accounts of the effect of imagery on memory (Bower, 1970; Hunt & Einstein, 1980; Marschark, 
1985; Marschark & Surian, 1989; Morris & Stevens, 1974; Morris and Reid, 1975). A related 
finding is that the influence of imagery on memorability appears to be restricted to the visual 
mode. Ellis (1991) has demonstrated that neither olfaction, audition or touch show the same 
'imagery' effects as vision in intentional, incidental or paired-associate learning as well as on an 
imagery Stroop task. This goes against coding redundancy accounts favoured by Paivio (1991), but 
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is consistent with the relational processing account of Marschark and Surian (1989). Ellis himself 
explains his findings in terms of the parallelism of visual perception and visual imagery which 
supports relational processing in a way that other modalities do not (Ellis, 1991). These findings 
leave open the possibility that other modalities may support different kinds of processing 
during encoding. 
Other evidence is also problematic for dual-coding theory. The theory assumes that 
picture are always 'implicitly' named. Intraub (1979) has shown that naming latency does not 
influence the retention of pictures. Nelson (1979) has shown when pictures are not implicitly 
named the picture superiority effect is not reduced or eliminated. Neurophysiological and 
neuropsychological studies have suggested that there is a functional distinction between spatial 
and visual aspects of imagery, complicating the conception of a single visual imagery system 
(Farah, 1988; Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988). At least one prominent 
neuropsychologists has concluded that such case studies do not reflect functionally distinct 
systems of storage in semantic memory, in fact only a handful of these deficits are thought to 
implicate semantic memory rather than input or output processes (Shallice, 1988). Weldon and 
Roediger (1987) have noted that the retention of words surpasses that of pictures in data-driven 
implicit memory tests and have proposed an explanation of picture superiority and other 
imagery results based on the notion of transfer-appropriate processing (Bransford, Franks, 
Morris, & Stein, 1979; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). 
While a great deal of experimental evidence has accumulated against dual-coding 
theory it has still retained some popularity. Paivio has also defended dual-coding theory 
against many of the findings presented here, however many of his responses have emphasised 
encoding and retrieval processes such as the "conceptual peg hypothesis" at the expense of coding 
redundancy (Paivio, 1991). In conclusion, there is relatively little evidence to support the strong 
assumption that functionally distinct imaginal and verbal codes are represented and stored in 
long-term memory. Alternative explanations have focused on characteristics of the retrieval 
situation or, perhaps more often, on encoding processes (see section 1.6). 
How are images represented in working memory? 
Imagery theorists such as Kosslyn and Shepard rejected the notion that there are separate 
imaginal and verbal codes in long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, 1981; Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Podgorny, 1978). Kosslyn in particular stressed the distinction between 
structural codes stored propositionally in long-term memory and special-purpose working 
memory representations temporarily constructed and manipulated in a spatial medium. His 
mental scanning experiments have provided evidence that inspecting an image is similar to 
inspecting a visual scene, with size, granularity and distance of the imaged object all having 
appropriate effects (Kosslyn, 1981; Kosslyn et al., 1978). For example it is easier to 'see' 
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information in a large image than a small image, and the time taken to scan across a visual 
image increases with the distance between the scanned parts of the image. Shepard and 
colleagues have shown that mental rotation of two and three dimensional objects is compellingly 
like actually perceiving such a rotation (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Feng, 1972; 
Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Shepard, Kosslyn and others argued that imagery was not dependent 
on the manipulation of arbitrary propositions but on analogical representations which are 
"quasi-pictorial" in nature. The mental processes involved are similar to those underlying the 
perception of a picture or a visual scene (Johnson-Laird, 1983; McGuinness, 1989). Critics of 
imagery like Zenon Pylyshyn have argued that imagery is epiphenomenal. In other words that 
the image or the experience of the image plays no causal role in cognitive activity. Despite the 
wealth of experimental evidence on imagery the distinction between analogical and 
propositional representations is still controversial. The central question, therefore, is what does 
it entail for a representation to be analogical? 
Digital or analogical representation? 
One possible candidate is that analogical corresponds to continuous representation and 
propositional to digital representation. Shepard and Cooper's experiments have stressed the 
importance of demonstrating that mental rotations are continuous in that they progress through 
intermediate transformational states. Cooper (1976) measured rates of mental rotation for 
subjects. She was able to demonstrate a linear relationship between angular departure from the 
expected orientation of the object and time to decide whether it was a mirror image of the test 
item or not. However, it is a misunderstanding to suggest that the importance of analogical 
representations is that they are continuous. Mental rotation must be continuous in order to mimic 
or approximate to an actual rotation (Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). A continuous 
'analogical' representation of a digital process would be a poor approximation of the original 
process, though it may be that analogical representations may, for other reasons, be more 
appropriate for modeling continuously varying information (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). 
Intrinsic or extrinsic representation? 
Palmer (1978) proposes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic representation. Analogical 
theorists (Kosslyn, 1980; Paivio, 1986) argue that not only do images represent spatial 
dimensions, but they are represented in a spatial medium such that the image resembles what it 
represents. According to Palmer (1978; Shepard, 1975; Shepard & Chipman, 1970) this claim is 
weaker than physical isomorphism (e. g. the 'picture metaphor' of imagery), but stronger than 
functional isomorphism where the representation maps changes in the real world directly onto 
objects in the represented world (e. g. a physical and mental rotation that both pass through 
intervening stages). Intrinsic (analogical) representations use relations that have the same 
inherent structure as the relations being modeled. Extrinsic representations possess only 
arbitrary, syntactic structure, in that they do not attempt to approximate to the structure of the 
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represented situation. Therefore, for an extrinsic representation the relevant relations that exist 
in the real world have to be explicitly built into the system by reference to the external world 
(Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). 
Attempts to resolve the imagery debate 
Pylyshyn (1973; 1984) argues that imagery requires tacit knowledge of what it would be like to 
perceive the stimuli, rather than relying on similarities between the processes of perception and 
imagery. This tacit knowledge (which is not accessible to conscious experience) of visual 
processes and the visual world is used to generate information about what would be seen if a 
particular object or scene were present. The appeal to tacit knowledge is problematic because it is 
difficult and probably impossible to falsify. Pylyshyn has asserted that images are 'cognitively 
penetrable' because they can be influenced by propositional desires, beliefs or goals (Boden, 
1988). For example if people are asked to shift their gaze as quickly as possible from one part of 
an image to another they do not show the scanning effects obtained by Kosslyn and others 
(Boden, 1988; Pylyshyn, 1984). However, Johnson-Laird has pointed out that the argument can be 
reversed. Beliefs must also be epiphenomenal because they are 'imagistically penetrable' and so 
can be interpreted "in a rationally explainable way by images" (Johnson-Laird, 1983). A deeper 
conflict between the two camps is at the level of functional architecture. The propositional camp 
(Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1975; Fodor, 1987a; Pylyshyn, 1984; Rips, 1986) believes that mind must 
have an underlying formal representational system that gives rise to all high-level thought 
processes. The imagery camp, though less united, tends to believe in an architecture where even 
high-level, central processes may have differing, specialized representational systems 
(Anderson, 1983; Denis, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kosslyn, 1980; Marschark & Surian, 1989). 
1.3.3 Levels of representation 
Anderson (1978) attempted to show that the imagery debate cannot be resolved because theories 
of representation, providing certain assumptions are held, cannot be distinguished from one 
another empirically (Johnson-Laird, 1980). Thus it may be the case that the differences between 
theories of representation are not fundamental (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1983). Johnson-Laird has taken a different line by suggesting two possible resolutions. 
The first conclusion is to accept that there may well be some underlying (propositional) 
representational format. This kind of argument is however not an interesting one for the present 
thesis because it is not susceptible to empirical investigation by psychologists (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Palmer, 1978). An alternative conclusion is that different representational structures may 
be used at different functional levels of the information processing system (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
In keeping with this conclusion Johnson-Laird has proposed three 'high-level' representations 
which are of interest to psychologists; propositions, mental models and images. Propositions are 
"mental representations of a verbally expressible proposition", a mental model is a 
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representation of the structure of a situation and an image corresponds to a "view" of a mental 
model (the implications of this tripartite distinction are discussed more fully in Chapter 2). It 
may be the case that these high-level representations are all manifestations of a single 
primitive representational code. Such a code, however, would still have to explain all the 
phenomena for which psychologists currently appeal to high-level representations. Whatever 
the underlying representation may be, it is legitimate to propose high-level representations such 
as images, mental models and verbal propositions to explain processes like comprehension, 
planning and reasoning (Anderson, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Newell, 1990). 
This debate has concentrated, to a greater or lesser extent, on explicitly representational 
issues such as structure. In turn, these have implicated structural and organizational properties 
of the architectures in which representations are embedded (Anderson, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1989; 
Rumelhart, 1989). Representational issues are implicit in discussions of cognitive architecture. 
Perhaps the clearest way of demonstrating this is to focus on the question of process rather than 
structure or notation. Anderson (1978) has argued that it is in principle impossible to distinguish 
between different notations for mental representation. Similarly, Palmer (1978) has suggested 
that fundamental issues of representational structure, and specifically the nature of the 
isomorphism between the represented world and the representing world may not be open to 
investigation by cognitive psychologists (he leaves open the question of neuropsychological 
investigation of this issue). Palmer has also stressed that representational formats must be 
defined with respect to the actual processing operations that they support. 
The use of multiple representational formats in ACT* marked an apparent reversal of 
Anderson's previous position that only a single representational format is necessary (Anderson, 
1983). In fact, Anderson was supplementing his previous position by recognizing that form and 
notation were less important than issues of process and efficiency. Specifically, "different 
representations are needed ... 
for different aspects of the same application" (Anderson, 1983). 
This stance is remarkably similar to the distinction made by Johnson-Laird (1983) between high- 
level constructs and low-level constructs. Johnson-Laird illustrates his argument with reference 
to programming structures in a computer. Low-level representations thus correspond to the 
primitive machine code of the computer. This could just as easily be the propositional 
representations proposed by Pylyshyn (1984) or the subsymbolic representations of connectionist 
theorists (Rumelhart, 1989; Smolensky, 1988). High-level constructs such as images or mental 
models thus correspond to arrays and similar structures in programming languages. For the 
purposes of the programmer it does not matter that the array is not actually two-dimensional (or 
that it is implemented in a more 'primitive' low-level code), it only matters that it behaves as 
if it were a two-dimensional structure. In conclusion, it is reasonable to distinguish between 
multiple forms of representation provided these different forms of representation can be 
distinguished empirically at some level. For Anderson (1983) they are desirable because some 
tasks can be carried out more efficiently by a representational system if it has access to special- 
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purpose representations such as images or temporal strings. Multiple forms of representation are 
required to cope with the range and complexity of functions carried out by a cognitive 
architecture (Cohen, 1989; Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Newell, 1990). 
1.4 The perceptual and structural characteristics of imagery 
A central feature of imagery, and for many people the defining feature, is the compelling 
similarity between the experience of imagery and perceptual experience. As what is imagined 
becomes more complex the imagery encompasses a greater range (though not necessarily 
intensity) of sensory, and in many cases, emotional experience. Simple situations often invoke 
merely visual or auditory imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1978; Paivio, 1986). Tasks like mental paper 
folding or mental rotation sometimes involve tactile as well as visual imagery (Shepard & Feng, 
1972; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). A number of experiments have shown that mentally practising 
motor skills can lead to improvement in them (Denis, 1991; Paivio, 1986), especially when they 
are skills with a major cognitive component such as visuo-motor coordination (e. g. catching, 
hitting or throwing). The common thread in all these examples of imagery is that the experience 
is, in some way, related to the experience of actually perceiving or reacting to the presence of an 
object, scene or event. 
An important distinction to be made at this point concerns the source of the imagined 
experience. Modern theories of imagery tend not to differentiate between kinds of images and 
imagery experience. Some theorists have noted the difference between imagery in episodic and 
semantic memory (Brewer & Pani, 1983; Conway, 1990). Episodic memory "stores information 
about temporally dated episodes or events and temporal-spatial relations among these events" 
(Tulving, 1972). While Tulving (1972) has studied episodic memory in the context of paired- 
associate learning experiments, his definition is perhaps more appropriate for research into 
memory for personally meaningful episodes (Brewer & Pani, 1983; Conway, 1990). Semantic 
memory is "organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their 
meaning and referents, [and] about relations among them" (Tulving, 1972). Most psychologists 
extend Tulving's use of semantic memory to cover any abstract knowledge about the world which 
does not preserve spatio-temporal context (Brewer & Pani, 1983; Hintzman, 1978). Images of 
specific episodes are more likely to be involuntary memories in the sense described by Ebbinghaus 
(Brewer & Pani, 1983), and more likely to evoke strong affect. Images from semantic memory are 
more likely to be actively generated. These differences between episodic and semantic memory 
images may be related to the distinction (associated with Piaget and Inhelder) between 
reproductive and anticipatory imagery. The former are static I and derived from memory, while 
By static Piaget probably means they are not actively manipulated and transformed, rather than that 
they can not reproduce the experience of a dynamic event or series of events. In either case it is the former 
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the latter are actively generated and able to be transformed to meet specific goals (Denis, 1991; 
Kosslyn, 1980). 
A major finding in imagery research, that more complex images take longer to generate 
only applies to images generated from semantic memory (Conway, 1983). Complex images 
relating to personally meaningful or autobiographical memories are quicker to generate than 
even simple images from semantic memory. Conway suggests that these autobiographical images 
are preserved in some kind of "literal" format. In contrast, semantic images are generated, part 
by part, from a more abstract representational format such as a "propositional list of attributes" 
(Conway, 1983). These findings are consistent with evidence of imagery use in everyday life. In 
two diary studies by Kosslyn, Seger, Pani and Hillger (1990) the vast majority of imagery 
experiences were not directed toward any specific purpose. They concluded that "imagery 
appears typically to be a spontaneous response to related information". These results are not 
consistent with the view that imagery experience is only derived from a structural 
representation (constructed, perhaps, for reasoning or problem solving). The findings suggest that 
imagery experience is a way of accessing perceptual information about a situation. 
Representations constructed for reasoning and problem solving do preserve structural and spatial 
information. Occasionally people report imagery during reasoning, but there is virtually no 
evidence that visual imagery experience influences reasoning ability. For example, relational 
problems which are easy to image do not appear to be easier to solve than those which are hard 
to image (Evans et al., 1993). In one study three-term series problems with concrete face-name 
associations were significantly harder to solve than those only with name terms (Richardson, 
1987). 
This interpretation suggests a fundamental distinction between images which have 
constituent structure and those which do not. This is an important, and neglected, distinction 
which maps onto the distinction between a mental model and an image. A mental model is an 
analogical or intrinsic representation which preserves the structural relations between the real- 
word entities it is representing (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Palmer, 1978). A mental model does not 
necessarily involve the experience of visual or other imagery. Where imagery does occur, an 
image corresponds to a view of a mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Marks, 1989). Similarly, 
imagery can occur in the absence of a mental model and hence without the representation of 
structural relations, 2 as in the case of vivid autobiographical memories. Conway (1983) has 
interpretation rather than the latter which is emphasised here. The important point is that similar, but not 
identical, distinctions between different kinds of images have been proposed before in psychology. 
It should be noted that there is a difference between structure that can be derived and structure that is 
preserved in the representation. Structure can be derived from a purely visual representation such as newspaper 
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speculated that complex images retrieved from episodic memory may not show the 'classic' 
imagery effects found for images generated from semantic memory (Kosslyn et al., 1978; Shepard 
& Metzler, 1971). This distinction may also be related to the separation of visual and spatial 
components of visual imagery in neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies (Farah, 
1988; Farah et al., 1988; Farah, Peronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 1988). Only the spatial component of 
visual imagery necessitates that structural relations are preserved. In the remainder of this 
thesis the terms 'image' and 'imagery' are used to describe perceptual and not structural 
representations. 
1.5 Memory for objects, scenes and events 
In order to understand the nature of mental representation it is essential to consider what 
demands are placed on the representational system or systems. This requires an understanding not 
only of traditional laboratory studies of memory, but also of the demand placed on memory in 
more natural, everyday settings (Baddeley, 1988; Cohen, 1989). Brewer and Pani (1983) have 
proposed a descriptive or structural account of human memory which tries to take account of the 
breadth of memorial experience. They conclude that multiple forms of memory representation 
are required: 
" ... consider a typical semantic memory task where a subject is asked "What color is a 
canary? " and responds correctly. In terms of our analysis the subject's response could have 
been based on (1) a particularized image, (2) a schema, (3) a generic image, (4) semantic 
memory, or (5) rote linguistic skill. Clearly, if one is going to construct adequate models of 
the memory process, one must be sensitive to this issue and attempt to establish what form 
of representation the subject is using in a given performance ... " 
[Brewer and Pani (1983), p. 31] 
The purpose of the following sections is not to provide an exhaustive list of different forms or 
kind of remembering, but to give a flavour of the range of memorial experience. 
Early memory research concentrated on the retention of simple entities. In the area of perception, 
a great deal of research has focused on the recognition of single objects such as dots, lines, or 
alphanumeric symbols (Bruce & Green, 1985). Even models of categorisation and similarity have 
tended to deal with collections of discrete, individual objects (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; 
picture or a computer bitmap. However, nowhere are lines, features or objects represented in the picture. The 
same is true of a purely visual image or a "literal" representation of an autobiographical episode. 
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Tversky, 1977). The simplest perceptual models involve the matching of a stimulus pattern 
(usually standardized by rotation and scaling) to a stored representation of a pattern. These 
template matching models are generally considered too inflexible and too reliant on effective 
standardization procedures to be useful psychological models, except possibly for very-low level 
perceptual processes (Bruce & Green, 1985; Palmer, 1978). More sophisticated models make use of 
features rather than templates. In the Pandemonium model (Selfridge, 1959) a hierarchy of 
'demons' detect progressively more complex features. A third way of representing objects is to use 
structural descriptions which encode the relations between components that make up the object 
(Bruce & Green, 1985; Palmer, 1978; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974). The trend from lesser to greater 
reliance on structure in perceptual processing is clear, but all three methods rely on relatively 
static representations. 
Research on perception and comprehension has suggested that the major problem with 
representations of objects and scenes is that they are too static. Critics of traditional 
psychological approaches to perception, such as Gibson (1979) have stressed that the stimulus is 
a pattern of light intensity over a period of time, not a series of static images. Leading 
researchers on visual perception have taken static scenes as a departure point for more active 
representations (Lee, 1980; Marr, 1980; 1982). The notion of schema has also been extended to 
equally dynamic areas such as coordination and transfer of motor skill (Jordan & Rosenbaum, 
1989; Kelso, 1982; Rosenbaum, 1984). Other researchers, have increasingly come to realize that 
memory is more dynamic than originally conceived (Schank, 1982). For example, research on 
story recall and comprehension often dealt with relatively static plot units and episodes (Black, 
1984; Thorndyke, 1984). Schank's scripts represent typical events like going to a restaurant. Like 
nearly all schema representations scripts incorporate specific information by the use of default 
values or routines for calculating and accessing details (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Similarly, research on discourse comprehension has formulated the concept of a 
situation model or mental model which represents the changing meaning of a text or utterance as 
it is being understood (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). 
These dynamic working memory representations are constructed using real-world knowledge 
derived from both schematic and episodic knowledge in long-term memory. 
The likelihood of a large, probably indefinite, number of 'pre-stored' scripts organized in 
long-term memory has been questioned both in terms of efficiency and by experimental evidence 
(Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986; Schank, 1982; Thorndyke, 1984). Because 
of this Schank has proposed smaller, more abstract script-like entities known as memory 
organization packets (MOPs) which are used to provide expectations from information about 
earlier events (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). Instead of DOCTOR and DENTIST scripts there are 
PROFESSIONAL OFFICE VISIT MOPs. In some (presumably highly familiar) situations scripts 
will still be used, but in these cases more general information relating to the script will occur in 
the form of a number of MOPs. Thus scripts are now much more limited in scope and centrality to 
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cognition (Schank, 1982). What were previously known as scripts by Schank now correspond to 
superscripts ; large structures not stored as a 'chunk' but constructed from high and low level 
MOPs and related information in memory (Schank, 1982). One advantage of this process of 
superscript construction is that it is considerably more dynamic and capable of dealing with more 
complex events in a more flexible way, but with a relatively small number of MOPs. Schank's 
theory includes MOPs at different levels of generality as well as thematic organization points 
(TOPs) which capture more abstract properties still (e. g. GOAL PURSUIT) for reminding or high- 
level analogy (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). 
The main observation from a functional analysis of memory and representation is that 
both working memory and long-term memory have to cope with an enormous range of information. 
In order to cope with this kind of messy and sometimes unpredictable environment flexible, 
dynamic systems of representation are necessary: 
"We need a dynamic memory system to cope with changing circumstances and a changing 
physical environment. We need to be able to update the knowledge we have stored and to 
transform the models of the world we construct in our heads. We have to revise the concepts 
we have acquired, or throw them out and acquire new ones. Fixed memory structures are 
liable to become obsolete or to be inappropriate for the current situation. ... Fixed memory 
structures are uneconomical to store because the same high-level elements need to be 
reduplicated in many representations. Dynamic memories are readily revised, updated, and 
modified, whereas fixed memories would rapidly become redundant in a changing world. " 
[Cohen (1989), p. 218-219] 
The sheer amount of information available in the environment requires that memory preserve or 
derive structure not only within a given individual memorial event, but in terms of the way 
memorial events are organized in long-term memory. It is tempting to conclude that dynamic 
representations are only constructed and manipulated in the temporary, fluid medium of primary 
or working memory. However, long-term memory must reflect not only the static end-products of, 
but also, at the very least, the intermediate stages of working memory processes. Long-term 
memory also has to reflect the changes in working memory representations over time and from 
situation to situation. There is ample evidence in areas such as navigation or language 
understanding that long-term memory is able to integrate information acquired over an extended 
period of time or from different situations (Gernsbacher, 1991; Levine et al., 1982; Thorndyke & 
Hayes-Roth, 1982; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Both working memory and long-term memory have 
to reflect the demands of a complex, dynamic, environment. 
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1.6 The influence of working memory processes on long-term memory 
One of the most influential ideas in contemporary memory research is that encoding processes 
acting in working memory determine the durability of memory traces in long-term memory. Any 
investigation of representation in long-term memory would therefore be incomplete without some 
discussion of how encoding processes influence recognition or recall. A straight-forward discussion 
of encoding, however, is problematic. This is because tests of memory for encoding processes are 
not independent of conditions at retrieval. The next two sections discuss how performance on a 
memory test is a product of encoding processes, retrieval cues or the interaction of the two. 
1.6.1 Memory and encoding processes 
In 1972 Fergus Craik and Robert Lockhart proposed that the durability of memory traces was 
primarily the result of progressively 'deeper' and more 'meaningful' processing during encoding. 
This levels or depth of processing account was able to account for experiments that showed that 
perceptual processing (e. g. deciding whether a word started with the letter 'T') produced worse 
retention than semantic processing (e. g. deciding whether a word described an animate or 
inanimate object). This processing account of memorability proved to be problematic; the chief 
criticism being that it is not always possible to define 'deep' or 'semantic' processing a priori. 
Some experiments required post hoc judgements to explain results, others demonstrated that 
perceptual tasks could result in superior recall to apparently semantic tasks (Bransford et al., 
1979; Craik, 1979; Eysenck, 1979; Horton & Mills, 1984; Jacoby & Craik, 1979; Morris et al., 1977). 
Rather than being abandoned altogether the levels-of-processing framework has been expanded 
and revised to incorporate a number of different influences of processing at encoding and retrieval 
(Craik, 1979; Jacoby & Craik, 1979). Depth of processing refers to qualitative changes in a 
memory trace brought about by processing and still remains difficult to define and hence test 
empirically, though it retains its intuitive or metaphorical appeal (Craik, 1979; Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Horton & Mills, 1984). 
Several different kinds of processing accounts have emerged from work within, or in 
response to, the levels-of-processing framework (Craik, 1979; Horton & Mills, 1984; Smyth, 
Morris, Levy, & Ellis, 1988). Some accounts which stress the amount of processing which an input 
receives. For example, if people are asked to classify a list of words on two dimensions (e. g. 
whether something is consumable and whether something is a solid) words with both properties 
are remembered best, while words with neither are remembered worst (Johnson-Laird, Gibbs, & 
de Mowbray, 1978). Other accounts stress the type of processing involved. Good examples of 
these are relational and item-specific processing proposed by Marschark and others (Hunt & 
Einstein, 1980; Marschark, 1985; Marschark & Surian, 1989). Both these accounts are subsumed 
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under elaboration accounts which propose it is the combination of complexity and amount of 
processing which underlie levels-of-processing effects (Anderson & Reder, 1979; Eysenck, 1979; 
Reder, 1979; Reder, 1980). According to this view depth of processing effects occur "by changing 
the number and type of elaborations stored" (Anderson & Reder, 1979). A related, but slightly 
different account, is based on the effort expended during encoding (Horton & Mills, 1984). Effort 
is usually defined as the amount of processing capacity brought to bear on a task. Using divided 
attention procedures it is possible to show that effort is a better predictor of retention than time 
spent on the task (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979). 
Distinctiveness accounts propose that certain kinds of processing can lead to memory 
traces which are more easily differentiated from other memory traces and hence more easily 
remembered (Eysenck, 1979; Horton & Mills, 1984). Congruity accounts (see Craik, 1979) stress 
the importance of the overlap between encoding and retrieval operations. One of the most 
striking demonstrations of this was made by Morris, Bransford and Franks (1977). They compared 
a memory for words learned on a 'deep' semantic task (judging the whether the noun formed part 
of a meaningful sentence) or a 'shallow' perceptual task (making a rhyming judgement). Memory 
for semantically processed words was superior for a standard recognition task, but significantly 
poorer for a rhyming recognition task. These results were explained in terms of transfer- 
appropriate processing; people remember the activity or processing they engage in not just the 
input itself (Morris et al., 1977). Both distinctiveness and congruity place enormous emphasis on 
the relationship between encoding and retrieval conditions. In the case of distinctiveness an 
input cannot be classed as distinctive in isolation but only within a given context (Horton & 
Mills, 1984). In addition, distinctiveness will also be influenced by the type and amount of 
processing during encoding because some kinds of processing can give rise to more distinctive 
memory traces than others (Craik, 1979; Kulhavy, Stock, Woodard, & Haygood, 1993). It is 
almost certain that different kinds and amounts of processing during encoding and retrieval give 
rise to apparent 'depth' of processing effects. 
1.6.2 The influence of retrieval cues on recall 
In discussing; how encoding processes influence long-term memory it should be apparent that in 
every case what is encoded must also be retrieved or in some cases reconstructed. For this reason 
many of the processes that influence encoding long-term memory are also implicated at retrieval. 
This position is stated in its strongest form in the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). According to the encoding specificity principle, if information cues recall then 
that information must have been encoded onto the memory trace during the original learning 
episode. Stated in this form the principle is circular; any cue that promotes recall or recognition 
must de facto have been encoded (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). Rather than focus on the 
"informational overlap" (Tulving, 1979) between encoding and retrieval, because many of these 
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factors have been raised in the discussion of encoding processes, the remainder of this section 
describes how different cues promote or fail to promote retrieval. Looking at the effectiveness of 
different kinds of cues demonstrates how the retrieval context can have a significant effect on 
recall. It will also suggest that a simple acceptance of the encoding specificity principle is 
unwarranted. 
At this point it is helpful to distinguish between two traditions of human memory 
research. In one tradition people learn lists of verbal stimuli (e. g. words or nonsense syllables). 
At retrieval people are presented with cues such as the name of the list or paired associate 
learned with the list. In this verbal learning tradition the influence of retrieval context on recall 
is usually minimal; what is important is the overlap between the retrieval context and the 
encoding context (Craik, 1979; Jones, 1982; Tulving, 1979). In the second tradition people are 
presented with more complex stimuli such as stories in what are now termed more ecologically 
valid situations (Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Pani, 1983; Cohen, 1989). In these experiments 
retrieval context has a marked effect on recall; it is argued that people reconstruct the original 
learning material by using the retrieval context to generate general knowledge in the form of 
schema from long-term memory (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Bartlett, 1932; Cohen, 1989). 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that these two traditions are reflected in entirely 
separate, distinct or opposed fields of research. One example of the merging of the two 
approaches is in the generate-recognition theory of recall. This theory can be traced back at 
least as far as William James (Brown & McNeill, 1966; James, 1890; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). 
According to generate-recognition theory when presented with a memory cue people attempted to 
directly match that cue with an element in long-term memory. In the simplest case (recognition) 
the cue and retrieval target are identical and match. In the likely event that the cue and target 
are not identical, people use the cue (e. g. "BARK") to generate or search for additional cues (e. g. 
"TREE" or "DOG") until the correct target is recognized (e. g. "DOG" is matched with "DOG"). 
Versions of this theory account well for the ways people actively search and make use of their 
memory, but have problems, for example, in explaining recognition failure and context effects in 
recognition memory (Jones, 1978; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). Recognition failure is said to occur 
when people are able to recall something but not recognize it (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Watkins 
& Gardiner, 1979). 
One of the most successful recent theories of recall provides an account which attempts to 
reconcile models which propose recall is based on the degree of "informational overlap" between 
cue and target (Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and those where retrieval is always 
preceded by recognition (Jones, 1978; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). This dual mechanism theory 
(Jones, 1978; 1982; 1987) proposes that there are two routes to recall differentiated by two kinds 
of retrieval cue. The first kind of retrieval cue contains information encoded during the original 
learning episode and is termed an intrinsic cue. The second kind of retrieval cue contains no 
information from the original learning episode and is termed an extrinsic cue. Intrinsic cues thus 
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provide direct access to the memory trace. Extrinsic cues provide indirect access in the manner of 
generate-recognition theory discussed earlier. The dual mechanism theory has been successfully 
used to predict the relationship between levels of recognition and recall in many data sets from 
paired associate learning experiments (Jones, 1978; 1987; Le Voi, 1984). It has also been argued 
that it is the only theory which can be used to derive algebraically the Tulving-Wiseman 
equation for the relationship between the recognition and recall (Jones, 1987). In addition, the 
prediction that the availability of the indirect, extrinsic route increases recall has also been 
supported (Jones, 1982). Problems with the model have centred not so much on the availability of 
the two routes, but rather on the relationship between them, and in particular whether they are 
stochastically independent or exclusive (Jones, 1982; 1987). 
1.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to address the notion of representation, and in particular the 
representation of spatial information, in human memory. The approach that has been adopted is 
a functional one, based primarily on the role or roles which representation plays in information 
processing theories. Firstly, it has been argued that human memory may require more than one 
system of representation. These forms or systems of representation can be distinguished by 
traditional cognitive psychological methods and are defined by the kinds of special-purpose, 
high-level procedures able to operate on them rather than in terms of a primitive 
representational code. Secondly, it has been argued that memory must be flexible and dynamic in 
order to cope with the range and complexity of demands placed on people in everyday situations. 
Thirdly, it has been argued that long-term memory traces reflect the processes that construct and 
manipulate representations in working memory. The memory traces formed by these processes 
interact with cues available in the retrieval context when memory performance is tested. The 
common theme running through all these issues is the relationship between special-purpose 
representations in working memory and memory traces encoded in long-term memory. Of 
particular interest is the notion of a spatial mental model. It has already been noted that a 
spatial mental model is a representation of the spatial structure of a situation and can be 
distinguished from an image (a representation of the perceptual characteristics of a situation) or 
a linguistic proposition (a representation of a verbal description). In the next chapter theoretical 
and experimental evidence in relation to spatial and non-spatial mental models will be 
discussed in more detail. 
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Chapter 2- The representation of spatial 
mental models in memory 
This first part of this chapter is concerned with the representation of mental models in working 
memory. The purpose of this discussion is to present evidence for and against the thesis that 
mental models are also represented in long-term memory. While the theory of mental models 
advanced by Johnson-Laird (1980; 1983) is a general theory of mental representation the evidence 
will, where possible, focus on mental models of spatial situations (spatial mental models). 
Experimental and theoretical work on mental models of non-spatial situations is also discussed 
where it is important to the theory or where it complements available evidence on the 
representation of spatial mental models in working memory or long-term memory. The chapter 
ends with an outline of the processes that constitute mental modeling. This outline is motivated 
by the theoretical and empirical discussion presented earlier in the chapter and is intended to 
predict how mental modeling processes in working memory should influence long-term memory. 
The fundamental premise of mental models theories is that thinking and understanding 
depend on the ability of the mind to construct 'working models' of real world phenomena. 
According to Johnson-Laird (1983) the first modem formulation of this thesis is to be found in The 
Nature of Explanation (Craik, 1943). The importance of Craik's contribution is that he 
considered human beings as processors of information. He proposed that the mind constructs a 
model which "has a similar relation-structure to that of the processes it imitates. " Though the 
digital computer had not yet been invented, Craik's language is very similar to that of later 
psychologists working within a computational or cognitive framework. Recent formulations of 
the mental model thesis in psychology have focused on the kind of mental representation 
necessary or desirable either in reasoning or language understanding. Of particular importance is 
the work of Johnson-Laird (1980; 1981; 1983; 1989; 1993) because it draws together arguments and 
evidence from both these areas of research. 
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2.1 The theory of mental models 
The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) is concerned with uniting three areas of 
cognitive science research; the study of inference, language understanding and consciousness. 
Johnson-Laird argues that the notion of a mental model is fundamental to psychological research 
in both language comprehension and reasoning. Furthermore, the ability to construct mental 
models and to embed them within other mental models may be an essential component in self- 
awareness (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 1988a; 1988b). A full treatment of all these ideas is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. However, an overview of the nature of mental models and their role in 
reasoning and comprehension will be provided. 
2.1.1 What is a mental model? 
According to Johnson-Laird a mental model is not simply any representation that models real 
world situations, but a representation that models those situations in a particular way. Johnson- 
Laird (1989) offers the following working definition: 
" ... a mental model can be defined as a representation of a body of knowledge - either long- 
term or short-term that meets the following conditions: 
1. Its structure corresponds to the structure of the situation it represents. 
It can consist of elements corresponding only to perceptual entities, in which case 
it may be realized as an image, perceptual or imaginary. Alternatively it can contain 
elements corresponding to abstract notions; their significance depends crucially on the 
procedures for manipulating models. 
3. Unlike other proposed forms of representation, it does not contain variables. Thus a 
linguistic representation of, say, All artists are beekeepers might take the form 
For any x, if x is an artist, then x is a beekeeper. 
In place of a variable, such as `x' in this expression, a model employs tokens representing a 
set of individuals. " 
[Johnson-Laird (1989) p. 4881 
Mental models are contrasted with propositional representations and images. Johnson-Laird's 
use of propositions is confined to linguistic representations close to the structure of written or 
spoken discourse. There is at present a large and growing body of evidence to distinguish between 
the representations that are structurally similar to the situations they represent and 
representations that are similar to the language of the text or discourse from which they are 
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constructed (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Bransford & Franks, 1971; Glenberg et al., 1987; Johnson- 
Laird, 1981; Perrig & Kintsch, 1985; Tversky, 1991; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Many of the 
experiments take advantage of the inability of mental models to directly represent 
indeterminacy. For example, in order to represent the possible states of affairs described by the 
relation 'next to' mental models would have to be constructed for each plausible alternative (e. g. 
'to the right of', 'to the left of', 'above' and so on). By contrast, a propositional representation can 
encode this relation without explicitly representing two or more alternatives. Images correspond 
to views of mental models. Mental models may be accompanied by visual (or for that matter, 
other kinds of) imagery experience. Imagery, though, is not a necessary requirement - in fact, as 
the third point in the above quotation suggests, abstract or conceptual models may be difficult (or 
even impossible) to visualize. Unlike the distinction between propositions and mental models 
the relationship between mental models and imagery is left vague in the theory. One plausible 
interpretation of this relationship is that imagery corresponds to the generation or retrieval of 
perceptual information about a situation. Imagery would thus play an important role in 
'consulting' a spatial mental model where visual information such as colour, perspective or 
texture are required for to meet a goal or solve a problem. Johnson-Laird's theory of mental 
models made an important contribution to the 'imagery debate' and attempted to clarify the 
notion of mental representation in cognitive science (refer to Chapter 1 for a more detailed 
discussion of these points). 
2.1.2 Mental models and reasoning 
Mental models can be constructed for a number of different purposes. Johnson-Laird concentrates on 
three main areas of cognition where the notion of mental models is particularly attractive. The 
first area is that of reasoning. Traditional approaches to reasoning in psychology and 
philosophy have (implicitly or explicitly) focused on what Johnson-Laird has termed the 
'doctrine of mental logic' (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 1986; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Proponents of 
mental logic assert that human thinking is fundamentally a manifestation of an innate or 
acquired logic or logics; a set of rules and a set of procedures for applying them (Braine, 1978; 
Hehle, 1962; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958; Rips, 1983). Psychological theories of reasoning based on 
logic face difficulties attempting to account for logical errors, biases, content effects and so on. 
Typically they also involve non-logical mechanisms for extracting the premises of an argument 
and for generating an output from the conclusions provided by the logical, inferential processes. 
The mental models theory proposes instead that people reason using representations of the 
situations described by the premises. Johnson-Laird and his colleagues have shown that 
semantic procedures rather than logical, syntactic ones can be used to reason deductively 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; 1991; 1993). Johnson-Laird suggests that people attempt to construct a series 
of models of possible conclusions in working memory. Many deductive errors occur when people 
fail to search for counterexamples or because of working memory limitations (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985b). Similarly, belief bias and content effects can arise 
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through the construction and consultation of models influenced by real world knowledge 
(Oakhill & Garnham, 1993; Oakhill, Garnham, & Johnson-Laird, 1990; Oakhill & Johnson- 
Laird, 1985a; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989). A considerable body of evidence now 
supports the claim that model-based reasoning provides a more plausible account of reasoning 
competence, biases and errors than existing logic-based accounts (Baron, 1988; Boden, 1988; 
Cohen, 1983; de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Evans, 1991; Evans et al., 1993; Eysenck & 
Keane, 1990; Galotti, 1989; Gilhooly, 1988; Manktelow & Over, 1992; Newell, 1990; Newstead & 
Evans, 1993; Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones, 1993). A detailed account of how people construct 
mental models to reason with spatial descriptions is provided later in this chapter (see section 
2.1.7). 
2.1.3 Mental models and discourse comprehension 
While mental models have undoubtedly had their biggest impact in the area of reasoning they 
have also made a key contribution to the study of discourse comprehension. The mental model 
theory proposes that people construct not only a mental representation of the language of a text 
(linguistic propositions) but also a representation of the situation described by the text. This 
distinction built on the classic work of early construction-integration theorists (Bransford et al., 
1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971). Mental models are necessary to explain superior memory for 
gist, and causal or other inferences made about the situation described by the discourse (Bower & 
Morrow, 1990; Garnham & Oakhill, 1992; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Propositional 
representations are a necessary stage in the construction of a mental model and are needed to 
explain verbatim memory and memory for poorly comprehended discourse. Experimental work by 
Johnson-Laird and his colleagues has provided considerable support for this distinction (Ehrlich 
& Johnson-Laird, 1982; Garnham, 1981; 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1981; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Oakhill 
& Johnson-Laird, 1984). Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models also fits well with work by 
other researchers who also argue that comprehension often requires representations of situations 
rather than representations of the text (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Gernsbacher, 1991; Schank, 1975; 
van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). An understanding of discourse comprehension is important to this 
thesis for two reasons. Firstly, information about spatial situations is often derived from 
discourse. Secondly, it is likely that many cognitive processes involved in discourse 
comprehension are general cognitive processes (Gernsbacher, 1990; 1991). 
The theory of discourse comprehension proposed by van Dijk and Kintsch differs from 
that of Johnson-Laird in several important respects. It offers a detailed account of discourse 
comprehension rather than a general account of how people construct and transform 
representations of the world. A great deal of the theory and the subsequent research inspired by 
it addresses how people construct representations of the text rather than representations of the 
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situations described by the text (Kintsch, 1988; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Kintsch (1986) 
distinguishes between three separate (though not wholly independent) levels of analysis: 
"(a) the processes concerned with the parsing of the text; (b) the establishment of a coherent 
representation of the meaning of a text, both at the local and global levels; and (c) the 
integration of the text content into the comprehender's knowledge system. " 
[Kintsch (1986), p. 89] 
Each level of analysis corresponds to a particular representation of text; the surface form, the 
textbase and the situation model. 
The surface form of the text tends to be short-lived, but is essential for the formation of 
the textbase. The textbase corresponds closely to the linguistic propositions representation 
proposed by Johnson-Laird and Garnharn (Gamham, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983). One key 
distinction is that for Johnson-Laird the propositional representation is closer to the surface form 
of the text than the textbase proposed by van Dijk and Kintsch. According to their account the 
textbase may include higher level structures (e. g. macropropositions created by combining linked 
propositions) in addition to individual propositions resembling sentences or phrases from the 
original text. However, the two theories have more similarities than differences. For example, 
the van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) model is able to account for both views by appealing to the 
notion of processing cycles during discourse comprehension. Early in processing the textbase may 
retain many features of the surface form, later in processing the textbase may be sufficiently 
elaborated to include representations of the macrostructure as well as the microstructure of the 
text. A second point of departure from the mental models theory of Johnson-Laird and his 
associates lies in the concept of the situation model. Unlike Johnson-Laird, van Dijk and Kintsch 
have not attempted to address the representational status of the situation model directly. One 
possibility is that though the situation model does not explicitly represent the language of a 
text, its underlying representation is propositional (Kintsch, 1988; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). 
Elsewhere, Kintsch raises the possibility that a situation model may also take the form of an 
image or a temporal string (Anderson, 1983; Kintsch, 1986; 1988; 1994). 
2.1.4 The characteristics of mental models 
Intrinsic representation of structure 
As already noted, the structure of relations within a mental model corresponds to the structure of 
the relationships in the situation being modeled. This is the defining feature of a mental model 
and is inspired by the work of Kenneth Craik (1943). It is very similar to the notion of intrinsic 
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representation proposed by Palmer (1978). As will be shown, this property gives rise to several of 
the other important properties of mental models. 
Working memory limitations 
The construction and manipulation of a mental model is limited by the capacity of working 
memory. I This characteristic arises both from empirical research (Baddeley, 1986; Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980) and from a priori arguments that any representational system must have some 
limit on processing power (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
Explicit representation of structure 
All relations intrinsically represented in a mental model are by definition explicit. A mental 
model cannot directly represent indeterminacy. Indeterminacy can be represented indirectly (e. g. 
by explicitly representing two or more possible alternative situations). For this reason an 
explicitly represented situation requires as great or greater cognitive resources than an 
implicitly represented situation. Explicit representation is advantageous when the goals of the 
representational system require it to use knowledge that is currently implicit (e. g. a deduction 
from a set of premises). Where the knowledge held by a representational system contains 
indeterminate relationships explicit representation becomes inefficient (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Newell, 1990). A more efficient approach might be to abandon mental model construction and 
rely on an intrinsic representation such as a set of linguistic propositions. 
Incompleteness 
The explicit nature of relations represented in a mental model makes the representation of 
indeterminacy difficult, or because of capacity limitations, impossible. Similarly, many 
situations represented by a system are potentially too complex to be represented by a limited 
capacity system. One solution to this problem is to omit relations from a mental model; a mental 
model will usually contain only the minimum number of relations necessary to represent the 
relevant characteristics of a situation. It follows that it is not a simple matter to predict or 
otherwise specify the contents of a mental model held by an individual. The nature of the 
incompleteness of a given mental model will be influenced by the processes of selection or 
abstraction employed by an individual. 
Working memory is used here in its general sense rather than as a reference to a specific theory of 
working memory. 
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Abstract representation of structure 
Mental models are abstract in the sense that they are not tied to a specific modality. Unlike 
images, mental models are not restricted to a particular viewpoint or perspective (Johnson-Laud, 
1983; Tversky, 1991). According to Johnson-Laird mental models are capable of representing 
abstract relations such as negation and disjunction2 (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), although as 
has already been argued, a mental model is explicit and therefore not capable of representing 
highly abstract properties such as indeterminacy (also see section 2.3.5). A mental model is thus 
more abstract than an image but less abstract than a proposition (Marks, 1990). 
Dynamic representation of structure 
Mental models are constructed and updated in sequence. When an alternative mental model is 
constructed during reasoning the existing mental model is usually abandoned and a new model 
constructed (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985b). When a situation 
being represented changes (e. g. during discourse comprehension) the current mental model is 
updated to reflect those changes (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg et al., 1987). Mental models 
are transient, dynamic entities. The term mental model often denotes a 'snapshot' of the 
processes involved in constructing, maintaining and updating a mental model. The dynamic 
characteristic of mental models helps distinguish them from the relatively static way imagistic 
representations are portrayed in the literature, as well as being desirable in order to capture the 
dynamic properties of everyday memory (Cohen, 1989). 
Cognitive economy 
It has already been argued that explicit representations such as mental models are less efficient 
than propositions at representing certain kinds of information. However, Alan Newell has 
claimed that mental models are easier to process than propositional representations (Newell, 
1990). The apparent contradiction arises from the use of two different levels of analysis. The 
claim that mental models are less efficient than propositions at representing indeterminacy is a 
claim about the representation of a specific situation. Newell is making a claim about the 
processing power of a representational system (SOAR). Mental models in SOAR are powerful 
because they are incomplete; only relations explicitly represented in the representation need to 
be updated in the light of other changes in its working memory: 
It should be noted that some psychologists disagree that a mental model can represent negation or 
disjunction (Holyoak, 1993). However, this thesis does not require that negation or disjunction are 
represented in spatial mental models. 
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"Model representations are limited in scope but easy to process. Simplicity is obtained 
because models adhere to a structure-correspondence principle. ... No completeness or 
exhaustiveness is implied. " 
[Newel 1 (1990) p. 390] 
Newell argues that, unlike mental models, propositional representations suffer from what is 
known as the 'frame problem' (Fodor, 1983; Fodor, 1987b; Newell, 1990). The frame problem 
concerns how to decide which propositions to update in a large representational system when one 
or more represented states change. Mental models avoid the frame problem at the cost of 
incompleteness (or 'scope' in Newell's terminology). 
Mental models support consultation processes 
Mental models explicitly represent the structure of the situations they represent. They do this at 
the cost of completeness or scope. In return, inexpensive "match-like and counting processes suffice 
for working within the model" (Newell, 1990). These processes all depend on some form of 
'consultation' process. The utility of mental models depends to a high degree on these 
consultation processes. Deduction in a mental model requires that an appropriate mental model is 
constructed and that novel explicit information contained in the model is 'read off' (Johnson- 
Laird & Byrne, 1991). Similarly in non-deductive reasoning and problem solving an appropriate 
mental model may support 'insight' (Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Montgomery, 1988). Glenberg and 
colleagues have proposed an mental model consultation process called 'noticing' (Glenberg & 
Langston, 1992). When a mental model is updated the relationship between the updated element 
and those in proximity to it is noticed. The noticed relationship is recorded in long-term memory, 
facilitating the retention of important or useful information. 
Accessibility to consciousness 
Johnson-Laird (1983; 1988a) has argued that mental models may play an important role in 
consciousness. Elsewhere (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) it has been suggested that the "... tokens 
of mental models... may not be directly accessible to consciousness. " The accessibility of mental 
models to consciousness is therefore in some doubt. It is proposed here that the content of any 
mental model is in principle accessible to consciousness. It follows that conscious recollection and 
verbal report may provide evidence for the processes involved in the construction and 
manipulation of a mental model. It is assumed, however, that accessibility is limited by the 
transient, dynamic properties of the mental model or by working memory limitations. Proponents 
of the mental models theory argue that errors in reasoning reflect a subset of the possible models 
of the premises (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). This line of argument suggests that 
the content of a mental models is, in principle, accessible to consciousness (Evans, 1990; Evans, 
1993). 
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2.1.5 Alternative conceptions of mental models 
A separate strand of mental model research is concerned with the theories and models people 
generate when interacting with or attempting to understand complex devices or systems. The 
existence of alternative conceptions of mental models is a source of confusion, particularly as 
there are similarities between the different strands of research. The term "mental model" has 
been used in several different (though not necessarily contradictory) ways (Brewer, 1987; 
Johnson-Laird, 1989). One approach treats mental models as complex knowledge structures 
corresponding to complex domain (or other real-world) knowledge which people hold (Gentner & 
Stevens, 1983). This approach is popular in human-computer interaction and other research on 
understanding complex systems. Often these models are characterized as particularly rich 
schema-like knowledge structures, though many researchers prefer to distinguish these mental 
models from scripts or frames by stressing their dynamic, transient nature and the ability of 
subjects to explore problem areas by "running" these models (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & 
Thagard, 1986; Norman, 1983; Payne, 1988; Payne, 1991; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). 
These formulations of a mental model differ to a greater or lesser extent from that 
proposed by Johnson-Laird. Johnson-Laird's mental models are high-level, analog structures in 
working memory. Definitions of different kinds of 'mental models' thus lie at two ends of a single 
dimension. At one end lie relatively static long-term knowledge structures (Minsky, 1975; Schank 
& Abelson, 1977). At the other end are high-level, transient, dynamic, capacity-limited 
knowledge structures in working memory (Baddeley, 1992; Garnham, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Kosslyn, 1980; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Somewhere between these falls the use of mental 
models to describe the conceptual understanding of real-world situations or naive physics 
(Anderson, Tolmie, Howe, Mayes, & Mackenzie, 1992; Gentner & Collins, 1990; Gentner & 
Gentner, 1983; Hayes, 1979; Hayes, 1985). 
2.1.6 Mental models as representations of space 
Johnson-Laird (1983) distinguishes between physical and conceptual mental models. The 
distinction is useful but also a little misleading. The structure and characteristics of a mental 
model vary according to the structural relations of the situation it is modeling. This in turn will 
be influenced by the way an individual conceptualizes a given domain. Many people try to 
conceptualize abstract problems in physical terms, for example, through the aid of metaphors or 
analogies. Of course the particular analogy adopted may prove either fruitful or misleading 
depending on the nature of the task (Gentner & Gentner, 1983). 
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Conceptual mental models are classified as monadic, relational, meta-linguistic or set- 
theoretic (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Conceptual models are required for comprehending or reasoning 
with abstract relations. While some abstract relations, such as disjunction, are relatively 
infrequent, others, such as negation, are very common. Monadic models represent identity or non- 
identity relations among finite sets of individuals. Relational models represent finite sets of 
mappings between tokens of one set and another. Meta-linguistic models represent abstract 
relations between abstract linguistic expressions and elements within a mental model of any 
type. Set-theoretic models permit tokens directly representing sets rather than individuals. 
Physical mental models are classified as relational, spatial, temporal, kinematic, or 
dynamic (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 3 This typology is ordered approximately from low to high 
complexity. A relational model is a finite, static set of tokens and relations (or 'frame') 
representing physical entities in the world. A spatial model is a relational model containing 
only spatial relations (in two or three dimensions). A temporal model consists of a series of 
spatial 'frames' representing the temporal order of a sequence of events. A kinematic model is a 
temporal model that is psychologically continuous and capable of representing changes and 
movements in real time. A dynamic model is a kinematic model where some or all of the 
represented relations are causal. 
In this thesis the term spatial mental model is taken to mean any physical mental 
model which includes spatial relations between tokens. It is, both in principle and in practice, 
difficult to separate the spatial, causal and temporal properties of many spatial situations. For 
example a route is primarily considered a spatial representation, yet is inevitably both 
temporally and causally structured. The processes of constructing and updating a mental model 
are sequential. It is possible that more complex physical mental models take advantage of the 
sequential nature of these processes in order to represent causality and temporal order. The 
typology of physical mental models described here reflects differences of degree or complexity 
rather than differences in kind. The mental model account of temporal reasoning is closely based 
on the mental model account of spatial reasoning (Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & d'Ydewalle, 
1993). Other researchers have proposed and found evidence for a 'spatialized' conception of time 
in reasoning with mental models (de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Vandierendonck & de 
Vooght, 1992). 
Johnson-Laird (1983) also includes images as types of physical mental model. However, as an 
image is described as a view or projection from an underlying spatial or kinematic mental model it has not 
been included as a separate classification here. 
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2.1.7 Mental models and spatial reasoning 
A summary of the mental model account of spatial reasoning is provided here to demonstrate the 
process of reasoning with mental models and to provide empirical evidence of the representation 
of spatial mental models in working memory. The account is derived from work on two- 
dimensional spatial reasoning by Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989; 1991). The main challengers to 
mental model accounts of spatial reasoning are logic or rule-based accounts such as those of 
Hagert (1984). 
In spatial reasoning tasks people are given a number of premises describing spatial 
relationships between two items, for example 'A is to the right of B' or 'C is in front of D'. People 
engaged in the task are asked to determine what follows from these sets of premises. 
A is on the right of B 
C is on the left of B 
D is in front of C 
E is in front of B 
What is the relation between D and E? 
CBA 
DE 
Multiple Model Valid Conclusion Problem Corresponding Models: 
B is on the right of A i) CAB 
Cis on the left of B DE 
D is in front of C 
E is in front of B ii) ACB 
What is the relation between D and E? DE 
B is on the right of A i) C AB 
Cis on the left of B D E 
D is in front of C 
EisinfrontofA ii) A CB 
What is the relation between D and E? E D 
Figure 2.1: Spatial mental models constructed from the premises of three types of problem. 
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Byrne and Johnson-Laird argue that people solve these problems by constructing a mental model 
of the spatial relations between the items in the premises. First, each premise is read and the 
meaning of the relation understood. Second, tokens corresponding to items in the premise are 
entered into the mental model consistent with the meaning of the relationship given in the 
premise. This continues until all premises have been read and the spatial mental model is 
complete. At this point a putative conclusion is drawn. However, not all two-dimensional 
problems can be solved by the construction of a single spatial mental model. In order to be certain 
of reaching a valid conclusion (or to be certain that there is no valid conclusion) a reasoner should 
search for counterexamples by attempting to construct different spatial mental models derived 
from the same premises. Figure 2.1 gives examples of models derived from single model, multiple 
model and no valid conclusion problems. 
On the basis of this account Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1989) predicted that single model 
problems with a valid conclusion should be easier than multiple model problems with a valid 
conclusion. In addition, problems with valid conclusions should be easier than problems with no 
valid conclusion (because all the models of the problem have to be considered to appreciate that 
nothing follows). Although rule-based accounts also predict that problems with no valid 
conclusions are the most difficult (because all potential derivations need to be attempted before 
reaching a conclusion) rule theories predict no difference between single and multiple model 
problems. These predictions were borne out by the two experiments reported by Byrne and 
Johnson-Laird (1989). Their second experiment was particularly interesting because the valid 
conclusion problems they used were chosen to give opposite predictions between the mental model 
and the rule theory. The single model problems were chosen because they have long derivations 
(in terms of the number of rules that need to be applied) according to the rule theory. The 
multiple model problems were chosen because they had short derivations. The rule theory 
predicts that problem difficulty should increase with the number of rules that need to be 
applied. However, Byrne and Johnson-Laird found that the length of the derivation required to 
solve a valid conclusion problem did not predict difficulty. 
One of the most common defences of rule-based accounts of reasoning is that different 
predictions about the difficulty of problems are obtained by postulating different sets of 
deduction rules. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have detailed an elegant counterargument to 
this. They demonstrate that a rule theory can be constructed that makes the same predictions as 
the mental model theory in their second experiment (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989), but it would 
fail to explain performance on the problems in their first experiment (Johnson-Laird, 1993). 
Hence, they argue that no rule theory can account for the overall pattern of difficulty observed. 
There will always be two-dimensional spatial reasoning problems where the rule theory 
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departs from the predictions derived from the mental model account and in those cases the 
experimental evidence supports the mental models account. 
2.2 Mental models and theories of working memory 
Work by Alan Baddeley and colleagues (1992; 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gathercole & 
Baddeley, 1993) provides a useful framework within which to consider the relationship between 
mental models and working memory. Recent experimental studies have begun to investigate this 
relationship in more detail (de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, & 
Wynn, 1993; Morra, 1989; Morra, Pascual-Leone, Johnson, & Baillargeon, 1991; Toms, Morris, & 
Ward, 1993). 
2.2.1 A specific model of working memory 
William James (1890) distinguished between primary memory (corresponding to the immediate 
content of consciousness) and secondary memory (equivalent to short- and long-term memory 
stores). Cognitive psychologists have proposed a number of theories which postulate a working 
memory which contains only temporary representations relevant to current conscious cognitive 
activity. The specific model of working memory proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) made a 
tripartite distinction between a central executive (a multi-modal, limited capacity processor 
resembling attention), a phonological or articulatory loop (a temporary store of speech-based 
information) and a visuo-spatial sketch pad for generating and manipulating visual or spatial 
information. It is argued that each of these components has a finite, limited capacity. 
The central executive serves as a central working memory resource and acts as an 
executive or regulatory system over slave systems such as the phonological loop and visuo- 
spatial sketchpad: 
"Some of its primary functions are regulatory in nature: It coordinates activity within 
working memory and controls the transmission of information between other parts of the 
cognitive system. In addition, the executive allocates inputs to the phonological loop and 
sketchpad slave systems, and also retrieves information from long-term memory. " 
[Gathercole and Baddeley (1993), p. 5] 
The central executive is thought to be involved in tasks such as reasoning, problem solving, 
mental arithmetic, random letter generation, reading, language comprehension, planning and 
recollection (Baddeley, Logie, Nimmo-Smith, & Brereton, 1985; Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & 
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Wilson, 1988; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993; Just & Carpenter, 1992; 
Morra, Moizo, & Scopesi, 1988; Vandierendonck & de Vooght, 1993). The central executive may 
also provide additional processing resources to the slave systems on very memory intensive tasks 
(e. g. recalling long lists of digits). The central executive is often equated with general working 
memory factors proposed by other theorists (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 
1992). The just and Carpenter theory is particularly interesting because it proposes that working 
memory capacity limitations arise from a limit to the total activation of units in long-term 
memory. Elements in working memory are thus highly-activated long-term memory units rather 
than elements in a separate store (Just & Carpenter, 1992). The important consideration is that 
elements in working memory can be considered functionally different from those of long-term 
memory rather than that they are elements of a separate store. Provided different processes 
operate on elements in working memory from those which operate on elements in long-term 
memory it makes sense to differentiate between the two systems. 
Recently, Baddeley has argued that the phonological loop is comprised of two sub- 
components -a phonological store and an articulatory control process (Baddeley, 1986). The 
phonological store is a passive system which represents material in a phonological code subject 
to decay over time. The articulatory control process is used to maintain material in the store 
through rehearsal or to recode nonphonological material (e. g. written words or pictures) for entry 
into the phonological store. Evidence for divisions within the visuo-spatial sketchpad is less 
clear-cut. There is strong neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence for a distinction 
between visual and spatial components of the sketchpad (Farah, 1988; Farah et al., 1988; 
Hanley, Young, & Pearson, 1991). Empirical work on this distinction is less convincing, though 
there is evidence that many tasks are more influenced by spatial than visual disruption 
(Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993). It is not known whether visual and 
spatial components reflect separate sub-components of visuo-spatial working memory or differing 
levels of central executive involvement in visual and spatial tasks (Gathercole & Baddeley, 
1993; Logie, 1990; Logie & Marchetti, 1991). One proposal is that the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
consists of a passive visual store and an active rehearsal process involved in visual scanning and 
motor control (Logie & Marchetti, 1991). Interference from 'pure' spatial tasks may therefore 
reflect either a separate spatial store, or some form of rehearsal process, or central executive 
involvement. Evidence for different components and sub-components in working memory has 
relied heavily on so-called interference tasks. The rationale behind these experiments is simple. 
If a task involves a particular resource performance on that task should be disrupted by 
performing a concurrent task which competes for those resources. In many cases devising 'pure' 
interference tasks for a particular sub-component is not trivial; as has been noted it has proven 
particularly challenging for sub-components of the visuo-spatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986; 
Logie, 1986; Logie, 1989; Logie, 1990; Logie & Marchetti, 1991). 
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2.2.2 Mental models and specific working memory systems 
A number of researchers have investigated the involvement of specific working memory 
components in the processing of mental models. Working memory theorists have argued that the 
central executive plays an important role in reasoning and comprehension (Baddeley, 1986; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993). In fact, some researchers have argued 
that reasoning ability is little more than working memory capacity (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). 
Baddeley has also proposed that working memory provides a system for representing and 
reflecting on stored information (especially specific episodes). This, in turn, allows an organism 
to construct and manipulate mental models for comprehension, problem solving and prediction 
(Baddeley, 1992). One of the few specific proposals of the representation of mental models in 
working memory has been made by Glenberg and Langston. Glenberg and Langston have proposed 
that mental models are constructed in the spatial medium of the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
(Glenberg & Langston, 1992). 
The phonological loop 
It is often assumed that the phonological loop plays little or no role in the use of a mental model 
for reasoning or comprehension. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) showed that articulatory 
suppression had a small but significant effect on verbal reasoning performance, but Toms, Morris 
and Ward (1993) found that neither articulatory suppression nor visuo-spatial suppression 
influenced performance in a study of conditional reasoning. In a study by de Vooght and 
Vandierendonck (1993) articulatory suppression impaired performance on one-dimensional 
spatial reasoning problems, while Oakhill and Johnson-Laird (1984) demonstrated that 
articulatory suppression slowed reading times for spatial descriptions. Morra (1989) obtained a 
low but significant correlation between forward digit span and recall of spatial descriptions 
among adults using a mental models strategy. Thus most of the available experimental evidence 
supports the view that the phonological loop is involved in the construction and retention of a 
mental model. However, the weak influence of articulatory suppression and the low correlation 
between digit span and retention suggest that its role is peripheral. Neuropsychological 
evidence reported by Baddeley and Wilson (1988) supports this view. They describe a patient 
with a digit span of two and a sentence span of three words who showed comprehension problems 
with long sentences. Baddeley and Wilson argued that the phonological store plays an 
important role in buffering information while a mental model of the meaning of a sentence is 
being set up. 
The visuo-spatial sketchpad 
Despite the proposals of Glenberg and Langston (1992) it is not clear that the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad is always involved in the processing of mental models. The study of conditional 
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reasoning by Toms, Morris and Ward (1993) failed to find any disruption of reasoning by tapping 
and tracking tasks. On the other hand, studies of understanding and reasoning with spatial 
descriptions have shown impairment due to concurrent spatial tasks (de Vooght & 
Vandierendonck, 1993; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984). Unfortunately, as has already been 
discussed, there is also evidence to suggest that the central executive is involved in the encoding r 
component of many supposedly spatial interference tasks (Baddeley, 1986; Gathercole & 
Baddeley, 1993; Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Quinn, 1991). While it is therefore plausible that 
spatial reasoning and comprehension utilizes the spatial component or sub-components of 
working memory (e. g. a passive spatial store or an active rehearsal process) the available 
empirical support is mixed. 
The central executive 
By contrast, the evidence for central executive involvement in the processing of mental models is 
very strong. Concurrent memory load disrupts verbal reasoning performance more than 
articulatory suppression (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). General working memory 
capacity is a good predictor of reasoning ability (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) and central 
executive load has been shown to disrupt both conditional and spatial reasoning (de Vooght & 
Vandierendonck, 1993; Toms et al., 1993; Vandierendonck & de Vooght, 1993). Two experimental 
studies are particularly illuminating because they show strong evidence of general capacity 
limitations and of the use of mental models. The first, by Morra, Pascual-Leone, Johnson and 
Baillargeon (1991) examines the predicted working memory demands for mental model and 
verbal memory strategies for understanding spatial descriptions by young children (aged 9.5,12 
and 14). The working memory demands predicted by the mental models strategy fitted the 
observed pattern better than that of the verbatim strategy for all three age groups studied. The 
second, a study by de Vooght and Vandierendonck (1993) showed that performance on a one- 
dimensional spatial and temporal reasoning task fitted the predictions of the mental models 
theory better than that of a rule theory. They also demonstrated that interference tasks 
involving the central executive, phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad all disrupted 
performance. 
A review of the evidence suggest probable roles for all three components of the specific 
working memory system discussed here in the construction or utilization of a mental model. The 
precise role of each component is more difficult to ascertain. The phonological loop appears to 
play a role in the construction of a mental model from verbal or written descriptions. This role 
appears to be particularly important where sentences are long (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988) or 
otherwise difficult to comprehend, for example because of discontinuities (Oakhill & Johnson- 
Laird, 1984). It may also influence retention of a mental model (Morra, 1989), perhaps by freeing 
more time or central executive resources for encoding. The visuo-spatial sketchpad appears to be 
involved in spatial comprehension and reasoning, but it cannot be ruled out that this is an 
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artefact of central executive involvement in spatial encoding (de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 
1993; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993; Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984). 
Finally, the central executive is almost certainly involved in reasoning and comprehension 
(Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). It is hardly 
surprising that the studies reported here have found central executive involvement in a number 
of reasoning and comprehension tasks. 
In conclusion, it appears that the central executive rather than the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad is likely to be the main working memory component in the processing of mental 
models. The phonological loop may be indirectly involved in the process of mental model 
construction. There is as yet little experimental evidence to link the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
with the construction and utilization of a mental model, although there is evidence that a 
spatial sub-component of the sketchpad is involved in reasoning and comprehension with spatial 
descriptions. 
2.3 Experimental studies of mental models in working memory 
Early experimental evidence for mental models tended to rely heavily on studies of long-term 
memory (Bransford et al., 1972; Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Garnham, 1981; Garnham et al., 
1982; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). Even research on reasoning has based its findings more often 
on the product of a reasoning task than the process (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman, 1978). There are good reasons why the representation of mental models in working 
memory has been neglected. Firstly, studying the processes of comprehension and reasoning 'on- 
line' is difficult 4 Secondly, the characteristics of long-term memory for mental models can be 
informative about representation of mental models in working memory. Unfortunately, though 
studies of long-term memory can provide useful information about the representation of mental 
models in working memory they can also be misleading. 
Recently, there has been a shift towards greater interest in the way mental models are 
manipulated and updated in working memory. A number of psychologists and psycholinguists 
have begun to carry out experiments to investigate mental models in the processing of discourse 
on-line (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg et al., 1987). Several experiments have used priming of 
spatial location as a methodology for studying narrative comprehension (Bower & Morrow, 1990; 
McNamara, 1991; McNamara, 1992). Other studies of the on-line comprehension of discourse 
For the purposes of this thesis `on-line' processes are those that rely almost exclusively on working 
memory, though the possibility that 'informationally encapsulated' lower-level systems may be involved is 
not discounted (Fodor, 1983). 
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have implicated mental models in anaphoric reference (Gamham, 1987; Garnham & Oakhill, 
1992; Speelman & Kirsner, 1990) and inference generation (Ehrlich & Tardieu, 1992; Garnharn & 
Oakhill, 1992; Noordman & Vonk, 1992; Tardieu, Ehrlich, & Gyselinck, 1992). 
Research into spatial mental models in on-line narrative comprehension shares a number 
of assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that elements in working memory, such as tokens in a mental 
model, may possess different levels of activation (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Glenberg et al., 
1987; Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987). Secondly, it 
assumes that tokens in a mental model can 'point' or refer to other elements in working or long- 
term memory (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). Finally, it assumes some mechanism for 
'foregrounding' or 'focusing' attention on key elements in the narrative (Bower & Morrow, 1990; 
Glenberg et al., 1987). Bower and Morrow (1990) illustrates the notion of focus or foregrounding 
with the 'spotlight' metaphor. In narrative comprehension the shifting spotlight follows the 
protagonist's path though space and time (Bower & Morrow, 1990; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992). 5 
Objects, characters and events in the foreground (the 'here and now' of the narrative) are at 
higher levels of activation, can be more readily accessed and are more likely to prime (e. g. 
spatially) associated items. Glenberg found evidence that mental models contribute to the 
foregrounding process in text comprehension (Glenberg et al., 1987). Items that are in spatial 
proximity to the protagonist (who is assumed to be foregrounded) are more quickly accessed than 
items not spatially associated with the protagonist. 
Although many of the findings have been primarily concerned with the representation 
of goals, plans, motives or emotions in mental models of narratives (Bower, 1989; Garnham & 
Oakhill, 1992; Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992) some of the most interesting results 
have related to the spatial representation of narratives as the study by Glenberg et. al. (1987) 
illustrates. Morrow, Greenspan and Bower (1987) gave people maps of buildings to learn and then 
asked them to read stories set in those buildings. Each map location contained one or more objects 
unique to that particular room, and each story had a new character with a distinct goal. They 
found that subjects were quicker to respond to object probes from goal rooms (where they were 
heading) than source rooms (the prior location of the character). Responses were slower still for 
other rooms in the building and slowest of all to rooms outside the building. This was true even 
when the source room was most recently mentioned. Incidental mention of locations in passing did 
not change focus provided the location was irrelevant to the current actions of the protagonist. 
Morrow, Bower and Greenspan (1989; 1990) investigated whether intermediate locations or 
landmarks experience activation or whether only explicitly mentioned locations are activated. 
Presumably foregrounding follows different (but related) principles for other forms of text. For 
example, perhaps expository texts which offer thematic or conceptual protagonists make foregrounding and 
hence comprehension easier. 
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Intermediate locations are those that a character has to pass through to travel from the source 
room to the goal room, but which are not explicitly mentioned in the text. They found that 
responses to objects from the goal room were fastest, followed by those from the intermediate 
location, with those from source rooms slower still. These findings have since been replicated, 
with minor reservations. Readers only construct highly detailed spatial mental models when 
task demands (i. e. the kind of object probe used) require them to follow the protagonist through 
the learned spatial layout (Wilson, Rinck, McNamara, Bower, & Morrow, 1993). It is also worth 
noting that these highly detailed spatial mental models are constructed with the aid of spatial 
information retrieved from long-term memory. 
Where people adopt a point of view where the observer is embedded within the scene, or 
where people conceptualize more than one two-dimensional scene different kinds of spatial 
mental models are probably constructed (Franklin, Tversky, & Coon, 1992; Taylor & Tversky, 
1992a; Taylor & Tversky, 1992b; Tversky, 1991). An important consideration that has emerged 
from these and other studies is that people can and do conceptualize space in different ways; 
responding to the spatial demands of the situation and the task (Franklin et al., 1992; O'Brien & 
Albrecht, 1992; Tversky, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993). Understanding how these demands influence 
the representation of spatial mental models in working memory may illuminate the 
interpretation of evidence for their representation in long-term memory. In many cases the 
spatial mental models people have investigated may also involve switching information 
between working memory and long-term memory. For both these reasons the question of the 
relationship between working memory mental models and what is represented in long-term 
memory is crucial. 
2.4 Mental models and long-term memory 
It has already been suggested that the representation of mental models in working memory relies 
heavily on studies of long-term memory. In the following sections this research is reviewed and 
conclusions are drawn about the status of mental models and in particular spatial mental models 
in long-term memory. 
2.4.1 Memory and reasoning with mental models 
In studies of reasoning with mental models the nature of this representation is often only 
implicated in so far as it motivates the predicted pattern of reasoning performance (Byrne, 
Handley, & Johnson-Laird, 1992; Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1990; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Tabossi, 1989; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 
1985b; Oakhill et al., 1989). However, the evidence that people reason using mental models in 
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many situations is quite strong (Baron, 1988; Evans et al., 1993; Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Gilhooly, 
1988; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and relies on people remembering and reporting their 
conclusions. Experiments by Byrne and Johnson-Laird also suggest that people can remember the 
intermediate conclusions predicted by the mental models account (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1990; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). They gave people a surprise recognition test for the conclusions 
they had drawn in a reasoning task, but eliminated the correct 'no valid conclusion' response from 
the set of recognition items. Of the people who had originally reached the correct conclusion 20 
percent realized it wasn't on the list, 6 percent were unable to decide and the remaining 74 
percent all chose the conclusion that matched the predicted initial mental model of the 
premises. This is very difficult to account for by competing rule-based theories of reasoning 
(because there are no logical proofs for invalid problems). It shows that people may be able to 
remember not only information about the final model constructed but also information from 
intermediate steps or models in the reasoning process. 
2.4.2 Mental models and memory for text 
The classic studies of gist memory by Bransford and colleagues are frequently cited as support for 
the view that people represent and remember the situation described by discourse and that this 
representation takes the form of a mental model (Bransford et al., 1972; Bransford & Franks, 
1971; Glenberg et al., 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1989). Using a similar paradigm, Garnham has shown 
that people tend to recall mental models of events rather than linguistic expressions describing 
those events (Garnham, 1981). 
Further evidence comes from a study of the effects of different reading goals on memory 
for text. Schmalhofer and Glavanov demonstrated that readers asked to summarize a manual 
remembered more propositional information while readers asked to learn the whole text 
remembered more situational information (Schmalhofer & Glavanov, 1986). They also noted 
that situational information was accessed faster by all readers and (as in work by Bransford) 
influenced sentence recognition more strongly than propositional information. Reading for text 
summarization took longer and was less likely to facilitate the construction of an elaborate 
mental model. Reading for learning may have been quicker because it relied more on the reader's 
domain knowledge. This explanation would match the findings of research on expertise which 
suggests that experts construct richer, more elaborate mental models which facilitate inference 
generation during narrative comprehension (Noordman & Vonk, 1992; Tardieu et al., 1992). 
A study of recognition memory by Fletcher and Chrysler also provides convincing 
evidence of the distinction between mental models and representations of the language of a text 
(Fletcher & Chrysler, 1990). They tested recognition memory for surface form, propositions and 
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situations derived from the text by varying similarity between the targets and distracters. 
Recognition performance was best when distracter sentences were dissimilar in terms of their 
surface form, propositional content and situational content. Recognition got worse as the 
similarity of the distracters to the original sentences increased. Because information about 
surface form, propositional content and the situation described by the text all influenced 
recognition they argued that this supported the distinction between mental models and 
representations of the language of a text. 
Using a different task, Glenberg and Langston have argued that pictures and diagrams 
facilitate the construction of mental models. Pictures can only do this, however, if they depict 
the structural relationships of the situation described by the text (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). 
They presented subjects with a series of texts describing a procedure made up of several stages. 
All of the stages, except the middle two, have to be carried out in a strict order. The middle two 
stages could be carried out in either order. The structure of the text and the structure of the 
procedure thus differed. The pictures only facilitated memory for the procedures if they 
correctly depicted the structure of the procedure. In a control condition where text order did not 
differ from the order of the procedure the pictures failed to improve recognition memory. This 
cannot be explained by the influence of repetition, motivation or simple versions of dual-coding 
theory because pictures do not always aid retention (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Paivio, 1986). 
Studies of reasoning and memory for text both suggest that mental models are 
remembered. However, there is little or no evidence from this research on the characteristics of 
this long-term memory representation. It is very difficult to identify the underlying 
representation where more than one type of representation may be involved in a given task. 
Conclusions derived from a mental model might be translated into a verbatim representation for 
verbal report (though this would not explain the findings presented in section 2.4.1). Similarly, 
gist recall might be supported by a propositional representation of the situation rather than a 
propositional representation derived from the language of the discourse (Kintsch, 1988). The 
remaining discussion looks in more detail at research on memory for mental models, and 
especially spatial mental models, in order to clarify some of these issues. 
2.4.3 Mental models and the fan effect 
The fan effect discovered by Anderson (1984; 1973) has long been used to support the view that 
memory is structured in the form of a propositional network. The fan effect is "an increase in 
retrieval time or error rate ... accompanying an increase in the number of newly learned 
associations for a concept" (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). Radvansky and Zacks have proposed a 
different explanation of the fan effect based on the notion of mental models (Radvansky, 
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Spieler, & Zacks, 1993; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). They argue that where new associations for a 
concept can be integrated into a single, coherent mental model (such as when all the associated 
concepts are consistent with a single spatial location) no fan effect will arise. They demonstrated 
that if sentences like those in Figure 2.2 were learned a fan effect will occur for sentences 1,2 and 
3 but not 4,5 and 6 (compared with retrieval time or errors for sentence 7): 
Single location sentences: 
1. The cola machine is in the hotel. 
2. The cola machine is in the public library 
4. The display case is in the city hall. 
5. The potted palm is in the city hall. 
3. The cola machine is in the high school. 6. The broken window is in the city hall. 
Control sentence: 
7. The welcome mat is in the barber shop. 
Figure 2.2: Examples of the materials used by Radvansky and Zacks (1991). 
It is argued that people organize long-term memory around structures of real world situations and 
that the fan effect is caused by interference from irrelevant mental models. Radvansky and 
Zacks also found no evidence of a fan effect within a single mental model but speculate that 
there may be an effect for larger fan sizes (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). 
Organization of the mental models constructed in these experiments does not appear to be 
influenced by the transportability of the objects or by the use of the indefinite rather than 
definite article (Radvansky et al., 1993). Including animate entities (such as a person) in the 
sentences influenced some, but by no means all, people to adopt person-based rather than 
location-based mental models consistent with evidence from other studies of spatial mental 
models (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg et al., 1987; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992; Radvansky et 
al., 1993; Tversky, 1991). These experiments by Radvansky and her associates go against 
traditional propositional accounts of organization in long-term memory. While propositional 
theories could account for these results, to do so they would need to acknowledge (at least 
implicitly) the legitimacy of mental models (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). This is because the 
most important organizational element of the theory would be a mental model (e. g. made up of a 
set of propositions) rather than a single proposition. 
2.4.4 Referential continuity and the construction of spatial mental models 
Referential continuity is known to be an important factor in text comprehension and several 
researchers have proposed that this is best accounted by its role in the construction of a mental 
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model (Garnham et al., 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1980; Johnson-Laird, 1981). Ehrlich and Johnson- 
Laird (1982) provide an excellent demonstration of the importance of referential continuity, but 
also show that the importance of referential continuity does not rely on a linguistic 
representation but on a semantic representation of discourse. In their first experiment they 
showed that discontinuous spatial descriptions (where referential continuity is not maintained 
between sentences) are harder to recall than continuous spatial descriptions. Their remaining two 
experiments used three types of spatial description discontinuous, semicontinuous and continuous 
(see Figure 2.3). 
Continuous description: 
The calf is behind the deer 
The deer is on the left of the goat 
Discontinuous description: 
The hammer is on the left of the pins 
The ruler is on the left of the paper 
The rabbit is in front of the goat The paper is in front of the hammer 
Semicontinuous description: 
The bread is in front of the chocolate 
The chocolate is on the left of the meat 
The cheese is on the left of the bread 
Figure 2.3: Examples of materials used by Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982). 
Semicontinuous descriptions are those in which referential continuity between sentences is not 
maintained but where new sentences always refer to items which should already be present in a 
spatial mental model. Thus the mental model account predicts that semicontinuous descriptions 
should be easier than discontinuous descriptions. A propositional or linguistic account of spatial 
representation predicts that semicontinuous descriptions should be as difficult to understand and 
remember as discontinuous ones. The results showed that readers did find discontinuous 
descriptions harder to remember than semicontinuous descriptions, and that there was no 
significant difference in retention between continuous and semicontinuous descriptions. 
Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982) argued that difficulty with the discontinuous 
descriptions arise from having to hold two independent relations (each containing two items) in 
working memory while the third sentence is read or because the discontinuous descriptions are 
represented in a linguistic or propositional code that is harder to recall. A subsequent study 
replicated these findings and concluded that discontinuous descriptions suffered greater 
disruption from articulatory suppression suggesting that some readers switch to encoding 
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relations in a linguistic or propositional form (Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984). Experiments by 
Morra have also replicated these findings with adults and older children and underlined the 
role of working memory in the construction of spatial mental models (Morra, 1989; Morra et al., 
1991). It seems that people construct mental models to understand spatial descriptions and that 
referential continuity between new relations and items already in the mental model (rather than 
referential continuity between sentences) aids in the mental model construction process. Note 
that sentences which are more easily integrated into a spatial mental model are more easily 
remembered. As will be discussed later in this chapter, Johnson-Laird appeals to notions of 
greater amount of processing, greater depth of processing and greater elaboration to account for 
the difference in memorability between mental models and propositional or linguistic 
representations (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982). 
2.4.5 The determinacy of spatial descriptions; propositions versus mental 
models 
A classic experiment by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) manipulated the determinacy of spatial 
descriptions in order to investigate how people represent and remember spatial information. 
Propositional representations are able to explicitly represent both indeterminate and 
determinate descriptions (Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). Mental models, on the 
other hand, have difficulty in representing indeterminacy explicitly (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.1.4) 
Mani and Johnson-Laird gave subjects determinate or indeterminate spatial descriptions to read 
(see Figure 2.4). The linguistic content of the two types of description is very similar. In fact, 
they differ only by the substitution of a single relation term. However, changing a single spatial 
relation is capable of rendering a description radically indeterminate. Thus, even though the 
indeterminate description consists of four determinate spatial relations the description as a 
whole can support the construction of at least two distinct spatial mental models. This is the 
sense in which they are radically indeterminate (it is not merely a question, for instance, of 
uncertainty about the distance between items). 
Determinate description: 
The hospital is behind the garage 
The prison is in front of the garage 
The garage is to the right of the hotel 
The theatre is to the left of the hospital 
Indeterminate description: 
The hospital is in front of the garage 
The prison is in front of the garage 
The garage is to the right of the hotel 
The theatre is to the left of the hospital 
Figure 2.4: Example materials from Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982). 
48 
The initial task of the participants was to decide whether diagrams they were given matched 
the original description or not. Later they were given a surprise recognition test requiring them to 
rank four items (the original description, an inferable one describing the same configuration of 
objects and two foils). A similar recognition test to that used by Mani and Johnson-Laird is 
described in more detail in the introduction to Chapter 4. Mani and Johnson-Laird found that 
verbatim memory (exhibited when the original was ranked higher than the inferable) was 
higher for indeterminate descriptions. Gist memory (exhibited when the inferable and the 
original were both ranked higher than the foils) was higher for the determinate descriptions. 
This finding was interpreted as evidence for the construction and retention of mental models. 
Determinate descriptions permit the construction of a single mental model which supports gist 
recall. For indeterminate descriptions construction of a single consistent mental model is not 
possible, therefore people abandon their attempt to construct a mental model and concentrate on 
remembering the description itself. Johnson-Laird (1983) has argued that this crossover 
interaction cannot be explained without postulating at least two sorts of mental representation. 
Payne (1993) has questioned the interpretation of Mani and Johnson-Laird's findings. In 
order to consider Payne's alternative it is necessary to reconsider the purpose of the original 
experiment. Mental models are analogical representations formed in working memory for 
reasoning and comprehension. However, the Mani and Johnson-Laird experiment attempts to 
provide evidence for mental models by investigating how spatial descriptions are represented in 
long-term memory. The need for a distinction between the long-term memory representation of 
mental models and the representation of mental models in working memory has already been 
discussed. Payne argues, contrary to Mani and Johnson-Laird, that mental models are not 
represented in long-term memory (or at least not analogically). Instead he proposed that what 
people retain in long-term memory are the operations used to construct the mental model, rather 
than the model itself. There operations are recorded as a set of propositions in long-term memory 
which Payne calls an episodic construction trace. 
Payne attempted to replicate Mani and Johnson-Laird with more strictly controlled 
materials. The foils used by Mani and Johnson-Laird in the recognition test described spatial 
layouts of a different shape to those in the original descriptions. Payne constructed foils 
describing the same shape as the original and inferable descriptions, eliminating the possibility 
that people were only remembering the shape rather than a spatial mental model. Payne also 
ensured that all the descriptions in the surprise recognition test shared only a single common 
sentence. Finally, a stricter scoring procedure for recognition memory was used. A response was 
only scored as verbatim memory if the original description was ranked first. However, he was 
unable to find evidence that subjects were remembering mental models. Instead, his results 
suggested that memory was dependent on the overlap between the process of mental model 
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construction for the original description compared with the descriptions presented in the surprise 
recognition test. This overlap (henceforth termed trace overlap) is operationalized as the 
number of shared propositions in the episodic construction trace of the two descriptions. 
Payne (1993) reimplemented the computer model described by Johnson-Laird (1983) in 
order to make the predictions of his theory more explicit. In both cases the computer program 
constructs arrays in working memory. Unlike the version written by Johnson-Laird, however, the 
version by Payne discards the array it has constructed in working memory. It stores only a record 
of the operations involved in constructing the spatial mental model. The episodic construction 
trace records operations in the form of a list. The first element in the list is usually a token 
already present in the array, the second token is usually a token being added to the array, and 
the third token usually describes how the new token was located relative to the first token. So 
the list [table chair front] records the operation of placing the token 'table' in front of the token 
'chair' (which is already present in the array). There are two exceptions to this general 
procedure for recording the operations used to construct the array: 
1. The insertion of the initial pair of tokens in the array is denoted by the 
symbol 'start' as a modifier to the operation. This indicates that two new 
tokens have been added to the array. 
2. If an operation can not proceed because it would render the description 
indeterminate the symbol 'clash' is recorded as a modifier to the operation 
that produced the clash. In addition a sub-list containing the tokens 
involved in the 'clash' is recorded as the final element of the list. 
The episodic construction trace is stored propositionally in long-term memory. In the computer 
model this takes the form of an unordered list. The list is unordered in the sense that each 
separate proposition is equally accessible in long-term memory. It is important to note that the 
episodic construction trace preserves information about the order of spatial mental model 
construction. However, some (but not all) information about the order of construction is implicit in 
the operations which have been recorded, rather than being explicitly preserved in the order or 
accessibility of the propositions in long-term memory. Partial forgetting is simulated by a fixed 
percentage chance that a random list will be deleted. Figure 2.5 shows the episodic construction 
trace for the two descriptions in Figure 2.4. Note that despite the change of only one word there 
are only two shared propositions (the trace overlap) between the descriptions. 
Payne found that trace overlap predicted recognition performance better than verbatim 
or mental model accounts. He argues that the findings of Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) were due 
to an experimental artefact. It is possible to construct inferable determinate descriptions with a 
trace overlap of 3 (i. e. inferable descriptions which share three propositions in their respective 
episodic construction traces). For indeterminate descriptions the maximum trace overlap for a 
corresponding inferable description is 1. Thus the Mani and Johnson-Laird crossover interaction 
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could be a product of this 'psychological distance' between the inferable and original description 
rather than genuine memory for mental models. 
Determinate episodic construction trace: 
[Start hospital garage behind] 
[ prison garage front] 
[hotel garage left] 
[theatre hospital left] 
Indeterminate episodic construction trace: 
[Start hospital garage front] 
[ prison garage front [clash prison hospital]] 
[hotel garage left] 
[theatre hospital left] 
Figure 2.5Episodic construction traces for the descriptions in Figure 2.4. 
In a stronger test of the episodic construction trace model Payne (1993) showed that reordering 
the sentences in the original descriptions depressed recognition scores. Reordering disrupts the 
episodic construction trace but should have no effect on either the individual sentences or the 
array that is described. For this reason it is difficult to argue that recognition depends on either 
verbatim memory for the description or memory for the mental model itself. One possible 
problem for the episodic construction trace account is that it seems counter-intuitive that people 
do not remember mental models they construct, but only the operations used to construct the 
models. A number of the studies of spatial memory and reasoning already discussed suggest that 
people can and do remember the mental models they construct. The next two sections look at 
studies of memory for spatial descriptions and narratives which apparently contradict the 
finding that people only remember the process of spatial mental model construction and not the 
spatial mental model itself. 
2.4.6 Perspective, order and memory for spatial mental models 
In a series of experiments Holly Taylor and Barbara Tversky asked subjects to learn stories 
incorporating spatial descriptions of places (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). Later, 
subjects were given a true/false sentence verification task. They were also asked to draw the 
environment described in each story. Half the stories took a 'route' perspective and half a 
'survey' perspective. A route perspective is characterized by a ground-level, moving viewpoint; 
directions are usually relative to the protagonist of the narrative. A survey perspective is 
characterized by a stationary viewpoint from above; directions are usually canonical in form, as 
if describing a map (Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). Other researchers have shown that the 
perspective taken by a spatial narrative influences the mental model that readers construct 
(Perrig & Kintsch, 1985). However, text perspective may have been confounded with how well 
the texts were organized (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a). Tversky and Taylor equated the coherence 
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of the narratives they used by asking pilot subjects to rate them and they were also able to show 
that both 'route' and 'survey' texts were equally well remembered. 
They found that verbatim statements (sentences taken from the original text) were 
verified more quickly than inference statements (statements that were true with respect to the 
situation described in the story but which were not explicitly mentioned in the text). This 
provided evidence that readers of the stories had some form of mental representation of the 
language of the text. The inference statements in the verification task adopted either a route or a 
survey perspective. Tversky and Taylor found that the perspective of the inference statements 
did not influence verification accuracy or speed. They argued that this required a 'perspective- 
free' representation of the situation described by the text. Hence, this mental representation was 
like a spatial mental model rather than image (Johnson-Laird, 1983). The nature of this spatial 
mental model is reminiscent of the spatial representations of people navigating very familiar 
environments (e. g. refer to the study by Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth described section 1.2.2). 
When Tversky and Taylor asked people to draw the environments they had read about 
it was noted that the drawing order of the features in the description was significantly related 
to the order items were mentioned in the description (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). 
According to Tversky (1991) this drawing order effect arises because participants in their studies 
"reconstruct the mental model of the environment in the same order as they originally 
constructed it, i. e. in the order of the description they read". Furthermore she argued that: 
"... readers' mental models are not image- or map-like. If they were, there should be no 
differences in drawing order depending on description perspective; rather, drawing order 
should depend on the characteristics of the image or map alone ... " 
[Tversky (1991) P. 130] 
In other words an image would not preserve structural information about the order of construction. 
On the other hand a spatial mental model is a set of structural relationships between entities, 
therefore it can, in principle, encode structural information about the order or process of mental 
model construction (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1975; Tversky, 1991). It should be 
noted though that Tversky herself does not provide any indication why such information should 
necessarily be preserved. It appears then, that Tversky and Taylor have provided evidence both 
that the structure of spatial mental model can be remembered and that ordinal information about 
the process of mental model construction may be preserved in the representation of a spatial 
mental model in long-term memory. For a more critical discussion of these conclusions the reader 
is referred to the introduction to Chapter 3. 
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2.5 What constitutes memory for a spatial mental model? 
A number of issues have emerged from the previous discussion. Studies of long-term memory are 
often used to provide evidence for the thesis that people construct, update and manipulate 
mental models in long-term memory. Unfortunately this form of argument raises the possibility 
that long-term memory structures will be confused with structures in working memory. The 
approach adopted here, is to provide a theoretical account of the relationship between mental 
models in working memory and the resulting long-term memory representation. Such an account 
needs to be broadly consistent with existing mental model theories, and, most importantly of all, 
must provide predictions for empirical research. The next section outlines a 'working model' of 
the construction of spatial mental models for spatial descriptions. 
2.5.1 An outline of spatial mental modeling 
The process described below is based on a computer program for interpreting spatial descriptions 
written by Johnson-Laird (1983). Johnson-Laird has used the program to demonstrate that his 
theory does not capitalize on a 'visual' metaphor. The procedures embodied in the program are 
able to construct and generate conclusions from a mental model without being able to 'see' the 
arrays that make up the model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). It is this 
program which Payne has modified to implement his episodic construction trace account of 
memory for spatial descriptions (Payne, 1993). 
Stage 1. Comprehension 
Stage 2. Construction 
Stage 3. Consultation 
Figure-2.6- The three stages in the cycle of spatial mental modeling. 
Other details of the process are drawn from by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). For the sake of 
simplicity, mental models, including spatial mental models, are assumed to be constructed 
within a general working memory system such as the central executive (see section 2.2). The 
processes described here are limited to the construction of mental models from spatial 
descriptions, but would form the basis for the construction of spatial mental models from 
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perception, from long-term memory or, as in many everyday situations, from more than one source. 
The outline has been divided into three separate stages for clarity. The three stages are 
described in the order which they first occur. However, it should be noted that spatial mental 
modeling is a cyclical, ongoing activity (see Figure 2.6). Once the first sentence of a description 
has been read, appropriate tokens and relations entered into the model, the process begins again 
with the next sentence. In most, if not all cases, construction is followed by some form of 
consultation process to check the model is consistent with the original description. 
Stage 1. Comprehension 
Before construction of a spatial mental model can begin it is necessary to read and understand the 
meaning of the spatial relationships contained in the description. The meaning of each spatial 
relationship is derived from the lexical meaning of linguistic relations but is also influenced by 
general knowledge. Mental model construction occurs on-line and so demands on verbal or 
phonological working memory appear to be an important factor in the construction process, 
especially when people attempt to construct mental models from difficult sentences, for example 
those involving a discontinuity (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; 
Mona, 1989; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984). Sentences describing difficult relations take longer 
to read (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984) and it is suggested that 
they are rehearsed while an attempt is made to integrate the new spatial relationships into the 
mental model. With complex spatial descriptions the mental model construction process is not 
only slowed down but may even be abandoned in favour of a representation closer to the linguistic 
form of the description. Comprehension processes are also involved in checking or refreshing 
information in the model. 
Stage 2. Construction 
The spatial mental model described here consists only of tokens and spatial relationships 
between tokens. However, other relationships such as temporal or causal relationships are 
possible and would follow the same general procedure outlined here (de Vooght & 
Vandierendonck, 1993; Schaeken et al., 1993). Tokens and relations are assumed to possess an 
activation level. Activation of tokens and relations decay with time, but may increase if a given 
relation or token in the model is refreshed or inspected. Tokens and relations in the model also 
increase in activation when adjacent tokens are added, inspected or refreshed. Tokens may refer 
or point to other elements in working memory or long-term memory. These would be elements 
strongly associated with the tokens in the spatial mental model (Bower & Morrow, 1990; 
Glenberg et al., 1987). Elements that are pointed or referred to increase activation in proportion 
to the strength of the association and the activation level of the token in the mental model. 
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Construction of a spatial mental model begins after a novel spatial relationship is read 
and comprehended: 
1. Two tokens corresponding to the initial spatial relationship given in the 
description are placed in the mental model in two separate steps. The order in 
which these tokens are entered into the model is determined by the symmetry or 
asymmetry of the spatial relationship being considered: 6 
a. Where the initial spatial relationship in the description is 
asymmetric the second item is entered as the first token in the model. 
b. Where the initial spatial relationship in the description is symmetric 
the items are entered into the model in the order they occur in the 
description. 
2. The next step in the spatial mental model construction process depends on the 
items referred to in subsequent spatial relations: 
a. If a subsequent spatial relation refers to a single novel item a new token 
is entered into the model relative to the positions of existing tokens. 
b If a subsequent spatial relation refers to two tokens already present in 
the model they are inspected and it is determined whether or not the 
new relation is consistent with the existing spatial mental model. 
c. If a subsequent spatial relation refers to two items not represented in 
the current spatial mental model then (subject to working memory 
limitations) a new spatial mental model is begun as described in Step 
la or lb. 
d. If a subsequent spatial relation refers to two existing tokens which are not 
in the same spatial mental model then the two representations are 
integrated into a single spatial mental model. 
3. If at any point in the construction process an apparent conflict arises between a 
new spatial relation and an existing spatial relation one or more of the following 
procedures is executed: 
i) The content of the spatial mental model is checked with respect to the 
content of the spatial description (e. g. to determine whether a sentence 
was misread or misinterpreted). 
6 Asymmetric spatial relations are those like 'X is to the right of Y' or 'P is behind Q that do not 
retain the same meaning if reversed. A symmetric relation retains the same meaning when reversed (e. g. `A is 
opposite B' means the same as `B is opposite A'). Most common spatial relations are asymmetric. 
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ii) An attempt is made to reinterpret the new spatial relation, the 
existing spatial relation or both in order to eliminate the conflict. 
Typically this will involve revising an interpretation of a spatial 
relation (e. g. abandoning an assumption that two objects cannot occupy 
the same spatial location). 
iii) The spatial mental model is inspected using a recursive procedure 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) to determine whether the tokens in the model 
can be updated or whether the model can be reconstructed to resolve 
the conflict.? 
iv) The spatial mental model construction process is abandoned. 
Note that, where possible, tokens are placed into the model with reference to a token already 
present in the model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Payne, 1993). The steps described above capture many 
of the procedures detailed by Johnson-Laird (1983) with one substantive addition. The placing of 
the two initial tokens in the spatial mental model has been broken down into two separate 
operations (see Figure 2.7 below). 
Sentence being read 
The city is in front of the mountain. 
Operation being performed Spatial mental model 
1. Enter mountain in model. Mountain 
2. Place city in front of Mountain 
mountain. 
City 
The mountain to the left of the lake. 3. Place lake to right of Mountain Lake 
mountain. 
City 
The forest is in front of the lake. 4. Place forest in front of lake. Mountain Lake 
City Forest 
Figure 2.7: The process of mental model construction for a simple spatial description 
7 The program described by Johnson-Laird (1983) always checks for other possible models whether an 
inconsistency is present or not. However, as the process outlined here is a general one, not specifically 
intended for inference generation, this procedure is assumed to be carried out only if an inconsistency has been 
detected. 
r 
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While this interpretation of the construction process is not explicit in the accounts of either 
Johnson-Laird or Payne it is consistent with the principle implicit in both accounts that if 
possible new tokens are always added to a spatial mental model in relation to existing tokens 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Payne, 1993). The importance of the symmetry of the spatial relation can 
be demonstrated by an illustration of the operations necessary to construct a spatial mental 
model with asymmetric spatial relations (see Figure 2.7). 
Stage 3. Consultation 
Spatial mental models are constructed to understand spatial situations and to use that 
understanding to communicate information, to make predictions, to plan actions and to solve 
problems. Spatial mental models do this by supporting a variety of 'consultation processes'. 
Consultation processes are also involved in the construction of the mental model and are essential 
in order to be able to integrate new information into the representation. The simplest form of 
processing that the spatial mental model supports is the 'checking' of information in the model; 
this, and other consultation process, may serve to 'refresh' relations in the spatial mental model 
which, in turn, prevent loss of elements in the model through decay. Consultation processes often 
take the form of simple procedures such as counting and matching (Newell, 1990). It may be that 
consulting a spatial mental model is synonymous with generating a view of that model in the 
form of a visual image, though this has not been strongly advocated (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1991). When a part of a spatial mental model is consulted (for instance 
when an element is updated) it is possible that new relationships will be 'noticed'. Glenberg and 
Langston suggest that noticing new relationships in this way forms the basis of inference 
generation and is an important determinant of memorability in a mental model (Glenberg & 
Langston, 1992). Consultation processes are thus important for several reasons. Firstly, they are 
essential in monitoring or checking the construction of the spatial mental model. Secondly, they 
serve to maintain activation of tokens and relations and hence to 'refresh' the contents of the 
spatial mental model. Thirdly, they allow information, such as inferred spatial relations, to be 
accessed from the spatial mental model. 
2.5.2 How many ways can a spatial mental model be remembered? 
Earlier it was suggested that an account of the processes involved in the construction of a spatial 
mental model would help clarify our understanding of what constitutes memory for a spatial 
mental model. According the outline given above spatial mental modeling involves three 
relatively distinct stages of cognitive processing. The first stage of processing has been called 
comprehension and involves grasping the meaning of the description being read or heard 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The second stage is the construction of the spatial mental model 
itself (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Payne, 1993). The third stage involves one or more consultation 
processes to check, match or otherwise read off information from the model (Glenberg & 
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Langston, 1992; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Newell, 1990). All three stages of processing act in 
working memory, but are capable of influencing what is stored in long-term memory. It follows 
that memory performances attributed to the construction of a spatial mental model could depend 
on one or more of these stages of processing. What form of long-term memory trace would each 
stage of processing be associated with? 
Memory for comprehension processes 
In the simple case being considered - that of comprehending spatial descriptions - memory for 
comprehension processes consists of memory for the language of the description. It is possible to 
distinguish between at least two different levels of representation of the language of the 
description; surface form and propositions (Fletcher & Chrysler, 1990; Johnson-Laird, 1983; van 
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Surface form representations preserve the exact wording of the discourse. 
Propositional representations preserve the meaning and overall structure of the text but not its 
exact wording. For simple descriptions it is likely that the difference between propositions and 
surface form is relatively small. Memory for the language of the text is likely to be most strongly 
influenced by the number of times it is read, heard or rehearsed. While comprehension processes 
are essential to spatial mental model construction in themselves they can provide no evidence of 
memory for a spatial mental model. This is because retention of the language of the text is 
possible even if a spatial mental model is not constructed. In fact, before memory performance can 
be attributed to memory for a spatial mental model the possibility that performance is based on 
a linguistic representation has to be discounted (Fletcher & Chrysler, 1990; Mani & Johnson- 
Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993; Tversky, 1991). 
Memory for construction processes 
It is possible to remember the operations carried out to construct a particular spatial mental 
model. The episodic construction trace proposed by Payne (1993) takes exactly this form. Payne 
proposes that this takes the form of an unordered sequence of propositions, however it is also 
possible that other information about the construction process is retained. For instance there is 
evidence that the order of spatial mental model construction is preserved (Taylor & Tversky, 
1992a). This ordinal information could be preserved in the content of an ordered episodic 
construction trace or it could be a side effect of the construction and consultation processes. For 
instance tokens integrated into a mental model early on are more likely to receive activation or 
to be 'noticed' and refreshed later in the construction process. Evidence from experimental studies 
suggests that these tokens would also receive activation when adjacent tokens are updated 
(Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg et al., 1987). 
The probability of recall of tokens from a spatial mental model should decrease as the 
predicted spatial mental model construction order proceeds from first to last. This is a kind of 
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'negative recency effect'. A similar negative recency effect in long-term memory for word lists 
has been observed by Craik (1970). Craik interpreted these results as indicating that earlier 
items were more likely to receive deep, semantic processing (see section 1.6.1). Later items, 
which are more likely to be produced from primary memory during immediate recall, are less 
likely to be processed semantically and hence less well retained in long-term memory (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). This explanation is similar to the idea that tokens integrated into a mental 
model early in the construction process will receive greater elaborative processing. The 
interpretation here differs from that of Craik in that it is not serial position at presentation (i. e. 
the order in which items are mentioned in a list or text) which is important, but the order in 
which the items are integrated into a spatial mental model. Some experimental evidence 
already exists to support this position. Morton Ann Gernsbacher (1990; 1991) has presented 
evidence that where discourse supports the construction of a single, coherent mental structure 
(such as a mental model) items which are mentioned first take longer to process and are accessed 
more readily. Denhiere and Denis (1988) have shown a similar relationship between order of 
mention and the probability of recall of landmarks in a spatial description. However, a genuine 
test of this prediction requires that order of mention in the text (text order) and the order of 
spatial mental model construction are not identical. Only then can the possibility that people 
recall the language of text be ruled out. The status of order effects in recall as a test of memory for 
a spatial mental model is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Memory for consultation processes 
Consultation processes in working memory may result in two different kinds of long-term memory 
trace. Firstly, when a particular spatial relation is accessed by a consultation process the long- 
term memory trace of that relation is strengthened. This applies both to spatial relations 
explicit in the original spatial description (consulted during construction) and to new spatial 
relations that are 'noticed' when the model is consulted at a later stage (Glenberg & Langston, 
1992). The idea that memory for relations and tokens in the mental model is dependent on 
structural processing of this kind is reminiscent of the advantage of relational over item specific 
imagery in recall (Hunt & Einstein, 1980; Marschark, 1985; Morris & Stevens, 1974). Memory for 
this kind of consultation process is demonstrated by the retention of the structure or 'gist' of a 
spatial mental model, but at least one recent account of memory for spatial descriptions has 
questioned the conclusion that people retain the gist of determinate spatial descriptions in long- 
term memory (Payne, 1993). The issue of whether people remember the structure (or 'gist') of a 
spatial mental model is explored in Chapter 4. 
The second kind of long-term memory trace that a consultation process might give rise to 
is memory for a visual image (or particular view) generated from a spatial mental model. This 
memory trace would be akin to that underlying recognition memory for pictures or scenes. While 
it is possible that people could remember an image generated from a particular spatial mental 
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model there is, as yet, little evidence to support this view (Payne, 1993; Tversky, 1991). The 
argument presented here, however, is that memory for spatial structure does not, in itself, 
constitute memory for a visual image. 
2.5.3 Conclusions 
Long-term memory for a spatial mental model can take a number of different forms, depending on 
the particular processes involved in its creation. In order to understand how or whether spatial 
mental models are remembered it is necessary to consider the processes involved in 
comprehending a spatial description, the operations involved in its construction and the ways 
the spatial mental model is consulted. The remaining chapters in this thesis present and discuss 
evidence from a number of experiments on long-term memory for spatial descriptions with 
reference to this framework. 
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Chapter 3- Ordinal recall as evidence of 
memory for a spatial mental model 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that a spatial mental model constructed from discourse can be 
remembered in three relatively distinct ways; memory for the processes of discourse 
comprehension, memory for the processes of construction and memory for processes used to consult 
the spatial mental model. In this chapter evidence that people remember an integral aspect of 
the construction process - the order of spatial mental model construction - is investigated. The 
experiments presented here concentrate on the findings of Tversky and Taylor (1992a; see also 
Tversky, 1991) also discussed in Chapter 2. 
3.1 Challenges to Tversky's account of ordinal effects in drawing 
recall 
The experiments presented in this chapter examine the nature of the drawing order effect 
observed by Taylor and Tversky (1992a). Tversky has argued that drawing landmarks in the 
order they were mentioned in a narrative (the drawing order effect) is support for the view that 
people are remembering the order of spatial mental model construction (Tversky, 1991). There 
are several problems with this conclusion. The first objection is that the drawing order effect 
may be an artefact of the particular learning procedures and materials used by Taylor and 
Tversky (e. g. the stories were presented in segments using a personal computer). The second 
challenge to Tversky's position is that, while a spatial mental model might preserve the order 
of construction, no reason is put forward as to why this information is preserved. The third and 
most important challenge is that drawing order may not be determined by memory for a spatial 
mental model at all. In each of the stories the order of mental model construction corresponds to 
the order objects are mentioned in the propositions of the text. Thus, the drawing order effect 
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may not be determined by memory for a spatial mental model, but by memory for the propositions 
of the text. While construction of a spatial mental model may result in a representation of the 
language of a text, albeit not a very rich or elaborated one, memory for the language of a text 
cannot be taken as evidence for the construction of a spatial mental model. 
Of the three challenges to Tversky and Taylor raised here the first two are relatively 
minor. Tversky and Taylor have replicated their initial findings several times and the drawing 
order effect appears to be fairly robust (Tversky, 1991). However, studies by Kulhavy and 
colleagues have failed to obtain an effect of order during recall of spatial information (Kulhavy, 
Stock, Verdi, Rittschof, & Savenye, 1993; Kulhavy, Woodard, Haygood, & Webb, 1993). They 
interpret their findings as supporting a dual-coding explanation, where the spatial properties of 
the map are encoded as "intact images in memory" and the narrative is encoded verbally 
(Kulhavy et al., 1993). In contrast, Tversky has argued that the spatial representation people 
form on these tasks is not image-like (Tversky, 1991). 1 The Kulhavy studies used learning 
procedures where subjects were given a map to learn in addition to being presented with a text 
describing the environment depicted by the map. This means that the order of presentation of 
landmarks in the text and the order landmarks are scanned in the map differ. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the eventual order and probability of recall showed no clear relationship with 
the order landmarks were encoded during presentation of either the map or the text. In one study 
(Kulhavy et al., 1993) verbal protocols were produced by subjects while they learned the maps. 
Before reading a text about the environment depicted in the map the subjects were asked to 
reconstruct the map. No systematic relationship was observed between serial position of the 
landmark in the verbal protocol and the accuracy of its spatial location or probability of recall 
in the reconstruction of the map. However, the order of reconstruction is not reported, possibly 
because only a few subjects recalled all the features depicted in the map. The authors also note 
that no marked primacy or recency effects were present. It appears, therefore the drawing order 
effect obtained by Taylor and Tversky (1992a) is dependent on a single consistent order of 
presentation. If order of presentation varies between subjects then the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction will also vary from subject to subject. It is also possible that recall 
during map reconstruction is not influenced by the order in which features are encoded during the 
learning of a map. These findings can therefore not be considered as conclusive evidence against 
the position adopted by Tversky. In addition, the work of Payne (1993) provides some support for 
Tversky's position. It suggests that memory for the order of spatial mental model construction 
could be mediated by an episodic construction trace (see section 2.4.5). 
It should be noted that both Kulhavy and Tversky stress the importance of the structural properties 
of the representation. However, Kulhavy argues that the representation is an intact "unitary chunk" in long- 
term memory whereas Tversky believes that the representation is composed of parts and relations among 
parts (e. g. as a structural description). 
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However, the final objection is far more serious. Tversky provides no direct evidence that 
the order effect is not mediated by memory for the language of the text that has been read. 
Perhaps, readers were simply remembering the text and not a spatial mental model constructed 
from the text? 
This chapter examines the nature of the drawing order effect observed by Taylor and 
Tversky. Three experiments are presented which focus on the relationships between text order, 
spatial mental model construction order and the order of recall in a drawing task. For this reason 
subjects in the experiment are asked to read stories for which the text order and the spatial 
mental model construction order differ. This is accomplished by presenting some readers with 
stories that depart from their natural or original sequences - in these 'scrambled' stories sections 
of the text are presented in a random order (Kintsch, Mandel, & Kozminsky, 1977). This 
manipulation disrupts the original text order. However, in order to have a coherent spatial 
representation of the situation described by the text it is necessary to construct a spatial mental 
model like that of the original (unscrambled) order of the story. A second reason for the use of 
'scrambled' narratives in these experiments is that some researchers have argued that being able 
to understand a scrambled story requires the construction of a mental model (van Dijk & Kintsch, 
1983). 
3.2 Preface to the experimentation 
In the nine experiments reported in this thesis distribution-free are preferred to parametric 
statistics for the majority of analyses. There are two principle reasons for this decision. The first 
reason is that many of the analyses are for a predicted trend or order (e. g. the order in which 
landmarks are recalled in a drawing task). It is not necessarily the case that these predicted 
trends are linear therefore a more conservative assumption (that they are monotonic) can be 
tested by applying one of the three distribution-free trend tests adopted here (Meddis, 1984; 
Siegel & Castellan, 1988). In the specific case of the analysis of drawing orders it also 
questionable whether the data are interval, therefore statistics based on ranking procedures 
tests (and which only assume ordinal data) seem more appropriate. The second reason concerns 
the occurrence of ceiling and floor effects in some of the data sets reported in the thesis. Where 
ceiling or floor effects are present parametric data may longer be normally distributed (and 
variances for different conditions may not be homogenous). Again, in these cases, distribution- 
free statistics are preferred. 
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3.3 Experiment 1 
The first experiment attempted to replicate Taylor and Tversky's drawing order effect with both 
unscrambled and scrambled texts. Subjects were presented with either a route or a survey text in 
either an unscrambled or scrambled format. This resulted in a total of four texts. Both the route 
and the survey text described a small village. The route text described a linear, coreferentially 
coherent text and took the perspective of a character driving round the village in a specific 
sequence. It used a mixture of canonical and relative directions. The survey text was coherent but 
did not describe the village in a linear fashion; the perspective it took was that of a character 
describing the village as if describing a plan (see sections 1.2.2 and 2.4.6 for a discussion of route 
and survey representations). It used only canonical directions (for a copy of the unscrambled 
survey and route text refer to Figures 3.1a and 3.1b respectively). Previous research has shown 
that scrambled survey texts can be understood even when it is not possible for subjects to 
determine the original order the sentences were in (Langer, Keenan, & Nelson, 1991; Langer, 
Keenan, & Nelson, 1991). This appears to be because survey texts rely more on global, canonical 
spatial relations (e. g. North or South). Route texts rely more on local, relative spatial relations 
(e. g. right and left). Global, canonical spatial relations allow people to understand a scrambled 
text without establishing the original order of the narrative. 
Tversky's explanation of the drawing order effect would predict that drawing order 
should always be influenced by the original unscrambled order of the text that was read. This 
should happen whether or not the sentences are actually presented in that unscrambled order. 
However, for a drawing order effect to be apparent readers would have to remember a significant 
proportion of the landmarks from the text version they had read. Where not all the landmarks 
are recalled the spatial mental model account suggests that items integrated into the spatial 
mental model early in the construction process will be remembered better than those entered 
later on. Some support for this prediction is found in a study by Denhiere and Denis (1988). They 
gave readers texts describing an island and then asked them to fill in blank maps of the island. 
They found that the order of a landmark in the text, but not the time taken to read sentences, 
predicted the probability of recall. 
The following four predictions are made. Firstly, for the unscrambled text conditions the 
drawing orders of subjects should reflect the order of spatial mental model construction. Secondly, 
for the scrambled texts drawing orders should be closer to the spatial mental model construction 
order than to the order landmarks are actually mentioned in the scrambled text (text order). 
However, as has already been noted, subjects may be able to understand the scrambled survey 
text without attempting to identify the order of the original unscrambled survey text. If this 
happens drawing order for the scrambled survey text should reflect the order landmarks are 
actually mentioned in the scrambled survey text. If drawing recall is not at (or close to) ceiling, it 
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may not be possible to detect any drawing order effects. Accordingly, the third prediction is that 
the probability of recalling a landmark should also be influenced by the order of spatial mental 
model construction rather than by text order. The fourth and final prediction is that reading 
times should also be influenced by the scrambling manipulation, reflecting the increased 
difficulty of constructing a spatial mental model from a scrambled text. This is because the text 
would probably have to be read several times before people are able to construct a spatial mental 
model. 
3.3.1 Method 
Subjects 
The forty-seven subjects in the experiment were graduate students or staff from the Open 
University. Ages of subjects ranged from early twenties to early sixties. 
Design 
There were two between subject variables. The first independent variable was the spatial 
perspective adopted by each story (route or survey). The second independent variable was text 
organization; the original or natural order of the story (henceforth unscrambled) and a randomly 
ordered (or scrambled) version. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of the four text 
conditions. 
Materials 
Two versions of a story entitled "Eric goes to Lower Barking" were prepared. Both versions 
described an inexperienced detective attempting to locate a car in a village called Lower 
Barking. The key differences between the texts lay in the form of spatial description used. The 
first text took a survey perspective (see Figure 3.1a). It described the village as seen from above, 
using canonical direction terms such as 'North', 'South', 'East' or 'West'. The second text took a 
route perspective as if travelling round the village in a particular sequence (see Figure 3.1b). The 
route text used relative directional terms such as 'left, 'right' and 'clockwise' (however, in order 
to reduce confusion and increase coherence for the scrambled version, some canonical terns were 
also used). Additional non-spatial information was added to the survey text in order to make the 
two texts approximately equal in length (both were eighteen sentences and approximately 285 
words long). The two texts were also comparable on a selection of text comprehension measures. 
Scrambled versions of the texts were obtained by grouping consecutive sentences into pairs and 
randomly reordering the resulting sentence pairs. In this experiment sentence pairs were used 
because subjects found that reordering by sentence was too difficult when the materials were 
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piloted. The same random number sequence was used to scramble for the survey and route versions 
of the text in order to equate the degree of 'disarray' present in each scrambled text. 
Eric goes to Lower Barking (unscrambled survey text). 
Eric was the new man in the Milton Keynes Detective Agency and his first case was a 
routine car surveillance job. Eric followed the suspect's red Ford Escort south down the 
motorway until the suspect turned off. 
Eric ended up in the picturesque village of Lower Barking which lay about two miles 
east of the motorway. Eric couldn't help admiring the unspoilt rural landscape. 
The Main Road (1) had taken Eric straight into the centre of the sleepy hamlet. 
Suddenly Eric realised that he had lost sight of the car he was supposed to be 
following. 
The inexperienced detective would have to drive round the little village until he 
tracked down his quarry. The Common, (2) in the centre of the village, was circled by 
Dog Kennel Lane. 
Old Farm Lane (3) ran due north from the Common until it came to a Deserted 
Farmhouse (4). Church Lane (5) ran east from the Common, past a red telephone box, 
until it reached St. Malcolm's (6). 
Eric had arrived in the village on the Main Road from the West. Lower Barking began 
where the Main Road met Dog Kennel Lane in a T-junction. 
On the northern corner of the Main Road and Dog Kennel Lane stood the village Post 
Office (7). Directly south of the Post Office Eric noticed a pub car park and just beyond 
it the Rose and Crown Inn (8). 
After driving round the village for forty minutes Eric decided to end his search. The 
disappointed detective made his way to the Rose and Crown for a consolatory drink. 
As Eric got out of his car he brushed against a nearby vehicle. The car, a red Ford 
Escort, began to emit a high pitched wail ... 
Figure 3.1a: The unscrambled survey text presented in Experiment 1 (landmarks used in the 
analysis are shown in italics and numbered in the order in which they are first mentioned). 
66 
Eric goes to Lower Barking (unscrambled route text). 
Eric was the new man in the Milton Keynes Detective Agency. His first case was a 
routine surveillance job. 
Eric followed the suspect's red Ford Escort south down the motorway until he turned off 
towards Lower Barking which lay about two miles east of the motorway along a Main 
Road (1). The Main Road took Eric right into the picturesque little village. 
Suddenly Eric realised that he had lost sight of the suspect's car. Eric would have to 
explore the village to find his quarry. 
Driving into the village from the West, Eric slowed down where the Main Road ended 
in a T-junction with Dog Kennel Lane (2). To Eric's left, on the corner of the Main Road 
and Dog Kennel Lane, stood the village Post Office (3). 
To his right Eric noticed a car park and beyond it the Rose and Crown Inn (4). Eric 
turned left onto the northern branch of Dog Kennel Lane which curved round to the 
right and circled the village Common. 
Next Eric turned left, due North up Old Farm Lane (5), until reached a Deserted 
Farmhouse (6). Eric turned round and drove back to the Common, continuing clockwise 
round Dog Kennel Lane until he came to a junction where a left turn took him onto 
Church Lane (7). 
Driving East down Church Lane Eric went past a red telephone box, until he reached 
St. Malcolm's (8). Eric had driven round the village for forty minutes and he decided 
to give up the search. 
From St. Malcolm's Eric drove back to Dog Kennel Lane and continued clockwise round 
the Common until he returned to the junction with the Main Road. The disappointed 
detective drove into the car park of the Rose and Crown for a consolatory drink 
As Eric got out of his car he brushed against a nearby vehicle. The car, a red Ford 
Escort, began to emit a high pitched wail ... 
Figure 31b" The unscrambled route text presented in Experiment 1 (landmarks used in the 
analysis are shown in italics and numbered in the order in which they are first mentioned). 
Procedure 
Each subject was informed that they would be given a short story to read, followed by a task 
related to the events described in the story. They were instructed to read the story through as 
many times as they wished. They were asked to concentrate on the spatial layout and physical 
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description of the village mentioned in the story. When they had finished reading and had a 
clear understanding of the events in the story they were asked to indicate this to the 
experimenter. Reading times were recorded for each subject. Those receiving scrambled versions 
of the texts were informed that the story they were about to read contained sentences out of their 
original or natural sequence. After reading the story each subject was asked to draw the major 
features (such as roads and buildings) that make up the village of Lower Barking as well as they 
could. In addition each subject was asked to label features and landmarks as they drew them. At 
the same time as the subject drew the village the experimenter noted down the order in which 
each landmark was drawn. To make scoring easier a coding sheet, consisting of a table containing 
every possible combination of landmark and output position, was constructed. Recording the 
drawing order was thus a simple matter of ticking the appropriate box. 
3.3.2 Results 
Reading times 
Reading times were analyzed using a2 by 2 factorial ANOVA. There was a significant main 
effect of text perspective; survey versus route (F1.43 = 10.80; p<0.01) and text organization; 
unscrambled versus scrambled (F 1.43 = 16.23; p<0.001). Mean reading times, in seconds, for the 
four conditions are given in Figure 3.2 below: 
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Figure 3.2: Mean reading times by text perspective and text organization 
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Survey Route 
There was a trend towards an interaction between text organization and perspective, but this did 
not reach significance (F1.43 = 2.88; p=0.097). Reading and understanding a scrambled text takes 
longer than an unscrambled text. This is consistent with the prediction that people reading a 
scrambled text have greater difficulty in constructing a spatial mental model of the situation the 
text describes, perhaps because of factors such as a reduction in referential continuity which are 
known to make spatial mental model construction more difficult (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 
1982). 
Scoring procedures for the drawing task 
Preliminary analysis of the maps drawn by subjects revealed that very few subjects recalled all 
of the landmarks and features mentioned in the story. This appeared to be due to two factors. 
Firstly, not all subjects interpreted the instructions provided by the experimenter in the same 
way (refer to the procedure section for the instructions which were provided). Some subjects later 
reported they had (not unreasonably) excluded landmarks such as 'Milton Keynes' which were 
not "in the village". Other subjects reported that they had not included features such as the 'red 
telephone box' because they were not landmarks (i. e. roads and buildings). The second factor was 
that many subjects, particularly those in the scrambled text conditions, were unable to remember 
all the landmarks and features present in the story. For this reason the analysis was confined 
only to the major landmarks which were within or partly within the village (these landmarks 
are shown in italics in Figures 3.1a and 3.1b). In this way it was possible to reduce any differences 
due to how subjects interpreted the instructions for the drawing order task. One other minor 
problem in scoring recall on the drawing task should also be noted. Distinguishing between 'The 
Common' and the road 'Dog Kennel Lane' (which surrounds it) in any given drawing proved to be 
very difficult and in many cases impossible. For this reason the two landmarks were considered 
as a single item for the purposes of data analysis. It is extremely unlikely this had a significant 
impact on the results as, if both landmarks were recalled, they were (without exception) 
recalled together. 
Levels of recall on the drawing task 
Almost all the subjects in the unscrambled conditions recalled all eight of the major landmarks. 
This ceiling effect made it difficult to investigate differences in recall between groups. Between 
group differences were analyzed using the Mann-Whitney U test. Percentage mean recall of these 
landmarks is shown by group in Figure 3.3 below: 
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Figure 3.3: Mean recall by text perspective and text organization. 
There was a significant effect of scrambling, but no difference between the route and survey 
perspective (though it is possible that ceiling effects may have obscured an interaction). 
Scrambled text versions resulted in significantly lower recall than unscrambled texts regardless 
of perspective (U = 183; N= 47, p=0.018). 2 This is consistent with the view that unscrambled 
texts result in superior recall because it easier to construct a single, coherent spatial mental model 
from them. Again, however, this effect could also be caused by linguistic factors (such as loss of 
referential continuity in the scrambled text). 
Drawing orders 
Drawing orders were obtained for those maps which depicted all eight major landmarks (refer to 
the procedure section for a description of how drawing orders were recorded). For each of the four 
texts an order of landmarks was obtained which corresponded to the order in which items were 
mentioned in the text (henceforth referred to as text order). By comparing drawing order with 
text order it is possible to calculate a measure of the extent to which the two orders are related. 
The measure adopted was the Kendall rank-order correlation coefficient or tau statistic. Tau 
was chosen because it is calculated by counting the number of times individual scores have to be 
swapped (inverted) in order to transform the ranks of one data set into those of another data set. 
So tau is used here not as a correlation coefficient but a measure of how closely two orders are 
related. An additional advantage is that tau can be used to 'partial out' the influence of a third 
This analysis is still significant if all thirteen landmarks, rather than just the eight major landmarks 
are included in the analysis. 
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Survey Route 
relationship, provide that relationship is known to exist (Howell, 1992; Siegel & Castellan, 
1988). 
It was also possible to calculate a tau value for how each drawing order differed from 
the text order of each of the three other texts used in the experiment (i. e. the text orders of the 
three texts the subjects had not read). Thus it was possible, for each subject, to calculate a tau 
value for the relationship between their drawing order and any of the four text orders. Using 
these tau values it is possible to determine which text order was most closely related to the 
drawing orders produced by subjects who had only one of the four possible texts. This was carried 
out by comparing tau values for a given drawing and text order for each group of subject in turn. 
These comparisons were made using within subjects t-tests. 
Condition Tau values compared between drawing order and text order 1 or 2. 
1. The text read by the subject 2. Comparison text 
(not read by the subject) 
US Unscrambled survey text Unscrambled route text 
UR Unscrambled route text Unscrambled survey text 
SS Scrambled survey text Unscrambled survey text 
SR Scrambled route text Unscrambled route text 
Figure 3.4: Table of the choice of comparison text in the drawing order analysis for each 
condition. 
Only a selection of the possible comparisons were conducted. In each case the tau value 
between drawing order and the text order of the text the subjects had read was compared with 
that between drawing order and text order for a text the subject had not read. These comparison 
texts are listed in Figure 3.4. For subjects in the unscrambled text conditions the comparison text 
was the unscrambled text which the subject had not read. The comparison text (a text which 
described the village from a different perspective) provides a control or 'baseline' tau value. 
This control tau value would take into account any general preferences on the part of the subjects 
for a particular drawing order (e. g. right to left or top to bottom). For these two comparisons 
partial tau values were used (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). These partial tau values take account of 
the positive relationship between the text order of the two unscrambled texts (for example both 
text orders begin with the 'Main Road'). 
The drawing orders obtained from readers of the unscrambled texts were significantly 
closer to the order items were mentioned in the same perspective text (the text that they had 
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read) than that of a different perspective text. This was confirmed by carrying out related t-tests 
for the unscrambled survey (t= 3.33; d. f. = 8, one-tailed p=0.0051) and unscrambled route 
conditions (t= 3.28; d. f. = 8, one-tailed p=0.0056). This difference was significant even when 
partial tau values were not used. Mean partial tau values for same and different perspectives are 
shown in Figure 3.5 below: 
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Figure 3 . 5. 
Mean concordance values by perspective for the unscrambled texts 
This finding replicates the results obtained by Taylor and Tversky (1992a). It suggests that 
drawing orders on this task may be related to the order of spatial mental model construction. 
However, in this comparison text order and predicted spatial mental model construction order 
are confounded. 
For subjects in the two scrambled text conditions the comparison text was the unscrambled 
text which adopted the same perspective as the scrambled text they had read. Thus the 
comparison was between the text order of the scrambled text they Iºad read and the predicted 
order of spatial mental model construction. This is because constructing a spatial mental model 
construction for a scrambled text should require readers to reconstruct the situation described by 
the original unscrambled text. So people should construct a spatial mental model from a 
scrambled text in an order which is as close as possible to the order of the corresponding 
unscrambled text. 
For the readers of the scrambled texts there were only small differences between the tau 
values generated for the text order of the scrambled texts and those of the comparison text. These 
differences were not significant. This was confirmed using related t-tests for both the scrambled 
survey condition (mean SS tau = 0.53, mean US tau = 0.53, t= 0.002; d. f. = 8, two-tailed p=n. s. ) 
and the scrambled route condition (mean SR tau = 0.44, mean UR tau = 0.42, t= -0.13; d. f. = 6, two- 
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tailed p=0.93). The lack of significant differences is likely to be due to three factors. Firstly, 
many subjects in the two scrambled conditions could not be included in the analysis because they 
recalled less than eight of the major landmarks. Secondly, drawing orders for the scrambled 
survey condition were quite strongly related to the order of the unscrambled route (though this 
trend did not reach significance). This may have been influenced by a general tendency to draw 
from left to right (approximately the order in which items are mentioned in the unscrambled 
route text). Thirdly, the scrambling procedures resulted in relatively high residual correlations 
between the different text orders. These correlations were calculated using Kendall's tau. The 
residual correlations for the unscrambled survey text was 0.327 (with the unscrambled route 
text), 0.357 (with the scrambled survey text) and 0.429 (with the scrambled route text). The 
residual correlations for the unscrambled route text was 0.837 (with the scrambled survey text) 
and 0.546 (with the scrambled route text). There was also a high residual correlation between 
the scrambled route and survey text orders (tau = 0.5). 
Probability of landmark recall (scrambled texts conditions only) 
Because many of the subjects in the scrambled text conditions failed to recall all eight major 
landmarks further analyses were carried out on the probability of recall. Recall of items from 
the unscrambled stories was at ceiling and so was not analyzed. For drawings made by subjects in 
the scrambled text conditions the presence or absence of each of the eight major landmarks in the 
story was recorded. Then the likelihood of recall was compared within subjects against one of 
two predicted orders; either the order of the unscrambled text (the predicted spatial mental 
model construction order) or the order of the scrambled text (the actual order of the presented 
text). The data were analyzed using a non-parametric trend test for dichotomous data 
(Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1967; Meddis, 1984). Each set of data was tested (using the set of 
coefficients: -7, -5, -3, -1,1,3,5,7) for a trend against the same perspective scrambled and 
unscrambled text order in turn. 
For the route text no significant relationship was found between probability of recall and 
the actual text order read by the subjects (the order of the scrambled route text). Instead, 
probability of recall appeared to be related to the order of the unscrambled route text (the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction). This was confirmed by testing for a 
specific trend using the trend test for dichotomous data described above (Z estimate = 3.92, N= 
14, one-tailed p<0.0001). Figure 3.6 shows the mean percentage recall by item for readers of the 
scrambled route text plotted against the order of mention of items in the unscrambled route text: 
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Figure 3.6: Mean percentage recall for readers of the scrambled route text against order of 
mention in the unscrambled route text 
This result is clear support for the prediction that the probability that a landmark is recalled 
from a scrambled route text is related to the order of spatial mental model construction. 
For the scrambled survey text the results were reversed. There was no significant 
relationship between the probability of recall and the order of the unscrambled text (the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction). 
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Figure 3.7: Mean percentage recall for readers of the scrambled survey text against order of 
mention in the scrambled survey text 
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Instead probability of recall was related to the order of the text subjects had read (the order of 
the scrambled survey text). Significance was confirmed by testing for a specific trend (Z estimate 
= 3.89, N= 13, one-tailed p<0.0001). Figure 3.7 shows the mean percentage recall by item for 
readers of the scrambled survey text plotted against the order of mention of items in the text 
they had read. This result suggests that readers of scrambled survey tests do not construct a 
spatial mental model in the order of the unscrambled survey text. Two possible interpretations of 
this result are offered. The first explanation is that people are not recalling a spatial mental 
model, but a propositional representation of the language of the text. The second explanation is 
that people are able to construct a spatial mental model from a scrambled survey text without 
identifying the order of the unscrambled text. This explanation is supported by experiments 
which show that scrambled survey texts can be understood and remembered even when the 
original order of the text can not be detected (Langer, Keenan, & Cumbo, 1992; Langer et al., 
1991). This probably arises because the global, canonical direction terms used in survey texts are 
easier to understand when a text is scrambled than local, relative direction terms. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
In the introduction to this experiment it was predicted that drawing order and the probability of 
recall on a drawing task should reflect the order of spatial mental model construction. For the 
two unscrambled texts this is the order landmarks are mentioned in the text subjects have read. 
For the scrambled text conditions, however, this is the order landmarks are mentioned in the 
corresponding unscrambled text (a text which the subjects have not read). This is because people 
will try to construct a spatial mental model based on the situation described by the text. This 
should involve trying to construct a spatial mental model as similar as possible to that supported 
by the unscrambled version of the text (the unscrambled or 'natural' order of the story). 
The first important finding presented here is that the drawing order effect observed by 
Taylor and Tversky (1992a) for unscrambled texts has been replicated using different materials 
and different learning procedures. However, for the scrambled texts no significant relationship 
has been obtained between drawing order and either the order landmarks are mentioned in the 
text or the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. The reading times for the four 
text versions replicate the common finding that scrambled stories require longer to read than 
unscrambled stories (Langer et al., 1992; Langer et al., 1991). 
Unfortunately, many readers appeared not to have constructed a coherent spatial mental 
model (or at least not a complete one). This may be reflected in the failure to find any significant 
differences between tau values for the text orders of the scrambled texts and relevant 
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unscrambled text order (see Figure 3.3). This failure may be due to the fact that half the subjects 
in the scrambled route condition were not included in the drawing order analysis, because they 
could not recall the major landmarks in the village. Another factor may have been a preference 
among some subjects to adopt a left to right drawing order which, by coincidence, was similar to 
that of the unscrambled route text. Similar preferences have been observed by other researchers 
when people are asked to draw maps of places they know or have learned about (Taylor & 
Tversky, 1992a). 
However, some support for the hypothesis that readers of scrambled texts attempt to 
construct a spatial mental model close to that of the corresponding unscrambled text is provided 
by evidence concerning the probability of recalling a landmark. Readers of the scrambled route 
text showed a significant relationship between probability of landmark recall and the predicted 
order of spatial mental model construction. People who read the scrambled route text were more 
likely to remember landmarks which were mentioned early in the corresponding unscrambled 
text than those mentioned late. This suggests that readers of the scrambled route text attempted 
to construct a spatial mental model of the situation described by the unscrambled route text and 
that they were at least partly successful. However, a completely different result was obtained 
with the scrambled survey text. Readers of the scrambled survey text showed no relationship 
between the probability of recalling a landmark and the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction. In fact, the probability of recalling a landmark from the scrambled survey 
text was significantly related to the order landmarks were mentioned in the scrambled survey 
text itself. This is consistent with either of two different explanations. The first explanation is 
that readers of the scrambled survey text were unable to construct a spatial mental model. In this 
case drawing recall would be based on a propositional representation of the language of the text. 
The second explanation is that the global, canonical direction terms used in the scrambled survey 
text allow subjects to construct a spatial mental model without having to identify the original 
(unscrambled) order of the survey text. In this case the actual and predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction will be completely different. Evidence to support this explanation 
comes from studies by Langer which have shown that scrambled survey texts can be very well 
understood and remembered even though people are very poor at reordering them (Langer, 
Keenan, & Bergman, 1993; Langer et al., 1992; Langer et al., 1991). 
In conclusion, the evidence from this experiment provides some support for the view that 
the order and probability of landmark recall on a drawing task is predicted by the order of 
spatial mental model construction (Denhiere & Denis, 1988; Gernsbacher, 1991; Tversky, 1991). 
However, the drawing recall data from readers of the scrambled survey text could also be 
consistent with a linguistic representation of the text. These conclusions are further weakened by 
several methodological problems. Firstly, unless recall is at ceiling it is not possible to analyze 
the drawing orders obtained from every subject. Secondly, there is some evidence that drawing 
orders are influenced by other factors (notably a preference for a left to right drawing order). 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, it is possible that the instructions given to subjects may have 
biased them to report certain landmarks more than others. In Experiments 2 and 3 steps are taken 
to control for all three of these problems. 
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3.4 Experiment 2 
This experiment attempts to investigate further the drawing orders produced by readers of 
scrambled texts. From Experiment 1 there is some evidence that the probability of recall in 
scrambled stories is related to the order of spatial mental model construction. It is likely that 
the failure to find a relationship between drawing order and either the order of spatial mental 
model construction or the order of the scrambled texts in Experiment 1 was, in part, to due to the 
low levels of recall for the scrambled stories. There were also problems with the methodology 
and materials adopted in Experiment 1. For this reason Experiment 2 used more coherent stories, 
which maintained referential coherence from one sentence to the next, which described events in 
a plausible sequence and which contained some redundant spatial information (typically in the 
form of canonical directions). These changes were designed to produce a higher level of recall for 
the two texts used in the experiment. Care was taken so that neither text described a simple left 
to right progression. On this occasion two route texts were used. Survey texts were not used for two 
reasons. The first reason is that it is more difficult to construct a plausible, coherent survey text 
than a plausible, coherent route text. The second reason is that it may not be possible to 
distinguish between a propositional representation of a text and a spatial mental model 
constructed from a survey text (refer to the discussion section of Experiment 1). In addition, the 
study used scrambled texts which were more sensitive to drawing order effects by manipulating 
the distance between the spatial mental model construction order and the text order of the 
scrambled text (these changes are discussed in more detail below). Finally, in the instructions for 
the drawing task subjects were clearly asked to draw all the landmarks and features they could 
remember from the original text. These changes in instructions and materials were designed to 
address the methodological problems which arose in Experiment 1. The two stories used in this 
experiment are shown in Figures 3.8a and 3.8b. The title and first sentence set the scene for each 
story and are not included in the scrambling procedure. Italics indicate the ten landmarks for 
which drawing orders are recorded. Numbers in brackets indicate the serial position of each 
landmark in the unscrambled text. 
Before being asked to draw the environments they had learned each reader was also 
tested on their recognition memory for the sentences of the texts they had read. This involved 
presenting a series of sentences by computer and asking subjects to decide as quickly and 
accurately as possible whether each sentence was true or false of the story they had read. Four 
types of sentence were used: verbatim sentences (identical to sentences in the original text), 
paraphrase sentences (rewordings of the verbatim sentences), inference sentences (new sentences 
which were true with respect to the situation described by the original text) and distracter items 
(which contradicted sentences contained in the original text). 
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Roger Tenement Goes Shopping (unscrambled shop text). 
Every Tuesday Roger Tenement visits the Music Store in Central Milton Keynes. 
The Main Entrance (1) to the Music Store is due North of the Bus Stop (2) where Roger 
arrives in town. 
As Roger enters the shop through the sliding doors he notices a new Video display (3) 
to his left. 
Behind the Video display Roger can see the familiar red sign of the Bargain Section 
(4) of the shop and he goes over to inspect the special offers. 
After searching through the bargain section, Roger walks down the Western wall to 
look at the Rock Music Section (5) at the back of the shop. 
While browsing through the Rock Music section Roger realizes that the jazz Section 
(6) has been moved to the back of the shop and is on his right. 
Roger walks over to the jazz section and spots an interesting CD which he takes to the 
Information Counter (7) at the front of the shop in the South East corner. 
At the information counter Roger asks if he can listen to the CD and he is directed to a 
Listening Booth (8) in the centre of the shop. 
After listening to his CD Roger leaves the booth and pays for the CD at the Cash Desk 
(9) on the Eastern wall of the shop. 
With the newly purchased CD in his hand Roger leaves through the Side Entrance 
(10) next to the cash desk. 
Figure 3.8a: The unscrambled version of the shop text. 
The sentences in the recognition test were presented to each subject in a random order generated by 
the computer. After the recognition tests the readers were given an opportunity to reread each 
story once. The purpose of this second presentation of the original texts was to prevent any 
contamination from the recognition memory test. Each subject would able to reread the original 
text and check whether their responses in the recognition test were accurate or not. 
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A Morning in the Life of Erica Emerald (unscrambled apartment text) 
Erica Emerald lives alone in a two room studio flat on the outskirts of Milton Keynes. 
Every morning at five o'clock precisely Erica wakes up in the King-size Bed (1) in the 
centre of her Plush Bedroom (2). 
After getting up Erica makes her way over to the Ensuite Bathroom (3) which lies 
against the middle of the North facing wall of the bedroom. 
When Erica has finished her morning shower she takes some clothes from the Large 
Wardrobe (4) positioned in the centre of the wall, opposite the ensuite bathroom. 
After getting dressed and dosing the wardrobe Erica goes through the Pine Door (5) 
located in the wall immediately to the East of the wardrobe. 
Having left the bedroom Erica turns right and walks down the short, Well-lit 
Hallway (6). 
At the end of the hallway Erica comes to an Ornate Glass Door (7) which she opens 
and walks through. 
The glass door leads directly into Erica's Well furnished Living Room (8). 
After entering the living room Erica turns to her right and walks down to the far end of 
the room until she reaches the Kitchen Area (9). 
When Erica has finished her breakfast in the small kitchen she goes over to the South 
side of the room and leaves her flat by the Back Door (10) located in the middle of the 
wall. 
Figure 3.8b: The unscrambled version of the apartment text. 
Each subject was given one unscrambled and one scrambled route story to read. The texts 
were scrambled by sentence rather than by sections (this was to reduce any relationship which 
might exist between the predicted spatial mental model construction order and the scrambled 
text orders). Only route texts were used because readers appear to be better at unscrambling them. 
One of four different scrambled story orders were used for each subject (this made it unlikely that 
the results were influenced by a particular scrambled order). Care was taken to make sure that 
the stories described routes that were not a simple left to right progression - an order which 
many people seem to adopt when asked to draw maps of places (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a). 
Finally, each of the original (unscrambled) stories was constructed so that the order of mention in 
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the text and the predicted order of spatial mental model construction differed. This was done by 
manipulating the sentence that introduced the first two landmarks (e. g. "The main entrance to 
the Music Store is due North of the bus stop where Roger arrives in town"). Because the initial 
landmark in the sentence (the 'main entrance') is described in relation to the second landmark 
('the bus stop') the spatial mental model account predicts that the reference point ('the bus stop') 
is entered into the model first. 
The spatial mental model account predicts that drawing order should be significantly 
related to spatial mental model construction order for both scrambled and unscrambled route 
narratives. In addition, drawing order for the scrambled texts should be significantly closer to 
the order of spatial mental model construction than that of the actual scrambled text. It is also 
predicted that accuracy and response time to the different statements in the sentence verification 
task should follow the pattern found in experiments by Tversky and others (Perrig & Kintsch, 
1985; Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). Verbatim statement should be faster and more 
accurately responded to than paraphrase sentences which, in turn, should be faster and more 
accurate than inference statements. This pattern would be in accord with the view that readers 
form a propositional representation of the text which preserves some information about the 
verbatim content of the original text. 
3.4.1 Method 
Subjects 
Sixteen graduate students and members of staff from the Open University participated in the 
study. The age of the subjects ranged from early twenties to early fifties. 
Design 
There were two within subject variables; text organization (unscrambled and scrambled) and the 
location described by the text (an apartment and a shop). Half the subjects received the shop 
text in its unscrambled form and the apartment text in its scrambled form. The remaining subjects 
received the shop text in a scrambled form and the apartment text in an unscrambled form. The 
order of the scrambled narrative (one of four random sequences of sentences) varied between 
subjects. Text organization and the location described by the text were counterbalanced. Subjects 
were assigned randomly to one of the counterbalanced conditions and to one of the four scrambled 
text orders. 
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Materials 
The two stories used in the experiment "Roger Tenement Goes Shopping" and "A Morning in the 
Life of Erica Emerald" are presented in Figures 3.8a and 3.8b. Both unscrambled texts were ten 
sentences long 228 and 218 words respectively). The initial sentence after the title was used to 
introduce the description, but was not scrambled in any of the text versions. The initial sentence 
did not introduce any of the items involved in the subsequent analysis. The second sentence 
introduced two items; the first item being described in relation to the second ("The main entrance 
to the Music Store is due North of the bus stop where Roger arrives in town. "). Each of the 
additional eight sentences introduced one new item and described its location relative to a 
previously mentioned item. Each text thus described a route incorporating ten items and the 
spatial relationships between them. The scrambled texts were prepared by presenting the title 
and first sentence of the story followed by the remaining nine sentences in one of four random 
orders. The four random orders were obtained using a random number generator and a checking 
procedure. The checking procedure was used to eliminate two orders correlating highly with the 
original order. 
The sentence verification task used four types of sentences; verbatim sentences (taken 
from the original texts), paraphrase sentences (sentences with the same meaning as sentences in 
the text, but using slightly different wording), inference sentences (statements describing correct 
spatial relationships not explicitly described in the original texts) and distracter items 
(sentences based on the above items with one or more words altered to render them false). 
Procedure 
The procedure and instructions were similar to that of Experiment 1. The experiment was divided 
into four stages. The sequence and content of the stages, along with an example of the order of 
presentation for one condition, is shown in Figure 3.9 below. In the first stage of the experiment 
each subject read one story in its unscrambled form and the other story in its scrambled form. In 
the second stage each subject was given an intervening sentence verification task for each story 
they had read. The sentences were presented, in a random order, using a personal computer. 
Subjects were asked to decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether each sentences was 
'true' or 'false' with respect to the stories they had read by pressing one of two keys on the 
computer keyboard. In the third stage each subject was given both texts to reread. The 
instructions were to read each text through once from start to finish. Reading times for each text 
were recorded in both stage 1 and stage 3. In the final stage each subject was asked to draw all 
the landmarks and features from the places described in each of the stories they had read. They 
were requested to label features as they drew them. The resulting drawing orders were then 
recorded (as for Experiment 1). Across stages the order of the two stories (the shop text followed 
by the apartment text, or the apartment text followed by shop text) remains constant (refer to 
Figure 3.9). 
82 
Stage Procedure carried out in this stage: 
1 a) Read first text (e. g. unscrambled apartment text). 
b) Read second text (e. g. scrambled shop text). 
2 a) Sentence verification task for first text (e. g. unscrambled apartment text). 
b) Sentence verification task for second text (e. g. scrambled shop text). 
3 a) Reread first text (e. g. unscrambled apartment text). 
b) Reread second text (e. g. scrambled shop text). 
4 a) Drawing recall task for first text (e. g. unscrambled apartment text). 
b) Drawing recall task for second text (e. g. scrambled shop text). 
Figure 3.9: The four stages of the procedure carried out in Experiment 2. 
So between reading any given story and carrying out the sentence verification task or the drawing 
recall task there was always an intervening activity (involving the other story). Half the 
subjects read or carried out a task involving an unscrambled story in the sub-stage labelled 'a'. 
The remaining subjects read or carry out a task involving an scrambled story in sub-stage 'a'. 
Similarly, half the subjects read the shop text in sub-stage 'a', while the other half read the 
apartment text in sub-stage 'a'. This means that the order of presentation is counterbalanced for 
the type of text (unscrambled or scrambled) and the particular text used (route story 1 or route 
story 2). 
3.4.2 Results 
Reading times 
There were no significant differences in the overall reading times for the different texts or 
between the unscrambled and scrambled text versions (though the scrambled texts did take 
slightly longer to read). 
Performance on the sentence verification task 
The overall pattern of performance on the sentence verification task between the two different 
stories was similar. This was confirmed using a series of Mann-Whitney U tests. There were no 
significant differences in total accuracy between unscrambled versions (U = 20.5, Z =1.22, N= 16, 
two-tailed p=0.22) or the scrambled versions of the shop and apartment texts (U = 24, N= 16, Z 
= 0.85, two-tailed p=0.40). Nor were there any significant differences in response times between 
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the unscrambled or scrambled versions of the two stories. This was confirmed by comparing times 
for correct responses to verbatim, paraphrase and inference sentences. For the unscrambled text 
versions these comparisons were not significant for verbatim (U = 20, Z=1 . 
26, N= 16, two-tailed 
p=0.21), paraphrase (U = 25, Z=0.74, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.46) or inference sentences (U = 16, 
Z=1.68, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.093). Nor were there any significant differences for the 
scrambled text versions on verbatim (U = 32, Z=0, N= 16, two-tailed p=n. s. ), paraphrase (U = 
27, Z=0.59, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.56) or inference sentences (U = 23, Z=0.97, N= 16, two- 
tailed p=0.33). For the remaining analyses data obtained from the two stories were pooled 
together. 
As predicted, verbatim sentences were verified more quickly and accurately than 
paraphrase sentences. Inference sentences were verified more slowly and even less accurately. 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show mean accuracy and response times for each type of sentence for the 
unscrambled and scrambled text conditions. The response times reported are only those for correct 
responses (though including incorrect responses does not alter the observed pattern of results). 
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Figure 3.10: Mean percentage accuracy on the sentence verification task for readers of 
unscrambled and scrambled stories 
For the accuracy data the predicted pattern of results (verbatim > paraphrase > inference) was 
analysed using the Page test for ordered alternatives. This analysis confirmed the significance of 
the observed trend for both the unscrambled (L = 204.5, N= 16, Lcrit = 202, p<0.05) and 
scrambled conditions (L = 207, N= 16, Lcrit = 202, p<0.05). 
For the response times, the predicted pattern of result, (inference > paraphrase > 
verbatim) was analysed in the same way. This analysis confirmed the significance of the 
observed trend for both the unscrambled (L = 205, N= 16, Lcrit = 202, p<0.05) and scrambled 
conditions (L = 209, N= 16, Lcrit = 202, p<0.05). The median difference in response times between 
84 
Verbatim Paraphrase Inference 
inference and paraphrase sentences is relatively small (the mean differences are somewhat 
inflated by outliers). 
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Figure 3.11: Mean response times on the sentence verification task for readers of unscrambled and 
scrambled stories (correct responses only) 
However, it should be noted that the inference statements are, on average, shorter in length (and 
hence reading time) than the paraphrase statements. The paraphrase sentences were created 
from the verbatim sentences and so were matched for length. There is an indication in the two 
graphs that the scrambled text conditions produced better and faster recall for verbatim 
information and better recall for paraphrases. This trend is does not reach statistical 
significance. 
Levels of recall on the drawing task 
Overall levels of recall were close to ceiling in both unscrambled and scrambled versions of both 
texts (over ninety percent of the maps drawn included all ten landmarks). In fact, only for three 
drawings (one for an unscrambled text and two for a scrambled text) were any items omitted. 
These three drawings were therefore not included in the subsequent analysis (though the 
drawing order of the remaining landmarks also tended to confirm to the drawing orders predicted 
in the introduction). 
Drawing order 
There were no significant differences in recall or drawing order between the two different 
locations described in the texts. Therefore for the remaining analyses data from the two 
different original stories were pooled together (in fact, the significant differences reported 
below are also found if the two stories are analyzed separately). Drawing order was recorded for 
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each of the items in the analysis for readers of both the scrambled and unscrambled narratives. 
The data was analyzed between items using the Jonckheere trend test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). 
The position in which each landmark was drawn was compared with the position of that 
landmark in the predicted order of spatial mental model construction (using the set of 
coefficients: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10). Drawing orders for both the scrambled and unscrambled 
texts appeared to be strongly associated with the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. Figure 3.12 shows the mean drawing order for each item plotted against the order in 
which items are mentioned in the original text (see Figures 3.3a and 3.8b). Note that at the point 
where the order of mention in the unscrambled text and the order of spatial mental model 
construction diverge, the mean drawing order conforms to the spatial mental model account. The 
spatial mental model construction account predicts that the first item drawn should be the 
second item mentioned in the unscrambled text. The analysis confirmed the significance of these 
trends for readers of the unscrambled texts Q= 8971, N= 15, J* (Z estimate) = 12.77, p<0.00001) 
as well as for readers of the scrambled texts (J = 7251.5, N= 14, J* (Z estimate) = 10 29, p< 
0.00001). 
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Figure 3.12: Mean drawing order against order of occurrence in the unscrambled text for readers of 
the scrambled and unscrambled texts. 
Kendall's tau was calculated for each drawing order with the predicted spatial mental 
model construction order as well as for the actual order of occurrence of each itciii in the text that 
subjects had read. Figure 3.13 shows the mean tau values with spatial mental model construction 
order (SMM tau) and text order (text tau) for the readers of both scrambled and unscrambled 
stories. For readers of the scrambled texts tau values with spatial mental model construction 
order were significantly higher than those for text order (Wilcoxon's T=2, N= 14, Z=3.17, p= 
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0.015). However, for the unscrambled text there was no significant difference in tau values with 
text order and the tau values with spatial mental model construction order. 
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Figure 3.13: Mean concordance with text and spatial mental model construction order for readers 
of both unscrambled and scrambled texts 
The final analysis of drawing order looked only at the first item drawn by subjects. The 
spatial mental model account predicts that the item mentioned second in each text should be 
drawn first (depending on the text this should be either the 'bedroom' or the 'bus stop'). Figure 
3.14 shows the relative frequency with which the predicted item is drawn first: 
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Figure 3.14: Relative frequency with which the item predicted by the spatial mental model 
account is drawn first for the unscrambled and scrambled text versions. 
This pattern of results was analyzed using the binomial test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). For the 
unscrambled stories fourteen subjects drew the 'second' item first (N = 15, p<0.0001 using the 
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binomial test). For the scrambled stories all fourteen readers drew the 'second' item first (N = 14, 
p<0.0001). 
3.4.3 Discussion 
It is possible for people to understand and remember scrambled versions of texts describing routes 
through an environment. Performance on the sentence verification task suggests that readers do 
form a representation of the language of the text they read because verbatim and paraphrase 
sentences are both recognized more easily than inference sentences containing novel, but true, 
information about locations described in the text. The advantage for verbatim sentences over 
paraphrase sentences suggests that this representation preserves at least some information about 
the surface form of the text. These findings replicate those of Taylor and Tversky who have 
argued that inference and paraphrase questions are answered with respect to a representation of 
the language of the remembered text (Perrig & Kintsch, 1985; Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 
1991). 
Drawing recall orders for scrambled and unscrambled spatial descriptions are 
significantly related to the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. In particular, 
the first item drawn appears to be very strongly influenced by the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction rather than the order items are mentioned in the description. Because 
four different scrambled text orders were used it is unlikely that these results for the scrambled 
texts could be due to a particular text order. It is possible that the item drawn first is an artefact 
of a factor such as importance. This explanation is unlikely because the items mentioned second 
in the two stories (the 'bedroom' and the 'bus stop) vary considerably in the importance to the 
narrative. It could be argued the 'bedroom' is more important than other features in text 2 (e. g. it 
is a superordinate feature that contains several other items from the story and is output first 
because of its salience). However, in text 1, the 'bus stop' is not a Superordinate feature, in fact, it 
is only weakly associated with the main content of the story (the rest of the story describes a 
music shop). An alternative explanation might be that it is the temporal sequence of events from 
the story that determines the item drawn first. This works well as an explanation for why the 
bus stop is drawn first, but not so well for the bedroom. Thus no alternative explanation can 
account for the pattern displayed by both stories. This pattern is even more striking because it 
appears to override the 'advantage of first mention' found in other areas of language 
comprehension (Gernsbacher, 1990; 1991). 
Two possible criticisms of this experiment also need to be addressed. The first criticism is 
that the sentence verification task carried out by subjects may have contaminated recall on the 
drawing task. This is a weak criticism for a number of reasons. The order of the trials in the 
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sentence verification task was randomly determined by the computer for each subject. It is 
therefore virtually impossible that the order in which sentences were presented could have 
introduced any systematic bias. In fact, any contamination should increase between subject error 
and reduce the power of any subsequent statistical test. In addition, subjects were given the 
opportunity to reread each story after the sentence verification task. This would enable them to 
take account of any incorrect responses made during the sentence verification task. The second 
criticism is that the findings presented here rest too heavily on only a small deviation between 
the predicted order of spatial mental model construction and the order items are mentioned in 
the text. This criticism is true only in the case of the unscrambled texts. In the case of the 
scrambled texts there is virtually no relationship between text order and the actual drawing 
orders produced by subjects. In both cases the results favour the spatial mental model account. 
On balance the evidence seems to favour the spatial mental model construction order 
account. Perhaps spatial relationships, temporal sequence and importance all influence the first 
item drawn. Information about the order of events is often thought to be included in a mental 
model and in particular within a spatial mental model (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg & 
Langston, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1983). On the other hand it is very difficult to see how a 
representation of the language of the text could account for these influences. A mental model is a 
representation of the situation described by a text and hence should be influenced by the spatial 
and temporal properties of the situation as well as by general world knowledge brought to bear 
by the reader (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). 
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3.5 Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 have replicated the drawing order effect obtained by Taylor and Tversky 
(1992a). Experiment 2 demonstrated that the same effect is observed when readers of scrambled 
narratives are asked to draw maps of the places they have read about. It has been argued that 
these findings are best explained by memory for a spatial mental model of the situation 
described by the text rather than by memory for the language of the text. One possibility, 
however, has not fully been discounted. In both the previous experiments readers were presented 
with the entire text and were able to refer back to previous sections of the text as they read. It is 
possible, if unlikely, that readers were able to identify the correct order of the scrambled 
narratives with only minimal reading of the scrambled text itself. Identifying at least some of 
the original sequence of the scrambled text is an essential part of spatial mental model 
construction (this point is discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter in section 3.4.2). 
However, people might be able to 'reorder' the scrambled text without ever reading the text in 
its scrambled order, provided they are able to capitalize on superficial cues (e. g. identifying the 
first sentence and then scanning through the text for subsequent sentences which mention the same 
item or items). This possibility is eliminated in Experiment 3 by introducing a new method of 
presenting readers with the unscrambled and scrambled texts. Each text is presented one sentence 
at a time and readers are prevented from referring back to previous sections of the text. This 
manipulation prevents readers from using 'superficial' cues to reorder the scrambled narratives. 
Two other major differences were introduced into the experimental design. As in 
Experiment 2, two short route narratives were used. The first story, a short fairy tale used only 
asymmetric spatial relations (in this case North, South, East and West). The second story used a 
mixture of asymmetric (e. g. left and right) and symmetric spatial relations (e. g. opposite or 
across from). As noted in Chapter 2 the spatial mental model account makes different predictions 
about the first item entered into a spatial mental model according to whether the first spatial 
relationship described is symmetrical or asymmetrical. It is predicted that where the first 
spatial relationship is asymmetrical (as in Experiment 2) the second item mentioned in the 
description is entered as the initial token in the spatial mental model and acts a reference point 
for the first item. Where the first spatial relationship in a description is symmetric neither of 
the two items acts as a reference point and readers are likely to accept the first item mentioned 
as the initial token in their spatial mental model. Figure 3.15 shows the first sentences of both 
the stories used in Experiment 3 (see Figures 3.16a and 3.16b for the complete stories). The second 
change to the experimental design was that each reader was not only asked to draw the place 
described in each of the two stories, but also to write out as much as they could remember of the 
six sentences comprising the story. Half the readers drew the story before writing it out and half 
the readers wrote the story before being asked to draw it. 
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Story A (first sentence uses an asymmetric spatial relation) 
Princess Jane lived in an Ancient Castle on the Southern shore of an Enchanted Lake. 
Std B (first sentence uses a symmetric spatial relation) 
Mr. Simpson lives in a Thatched Cottage immediately opposite the old, red Telephone Box. 
Filtre 3.15: The first sentences of the two stories presented to subjects in Experiment 3 
The spatial mental model account predicts that the drawing orders of all the readers 
will preserve the order of the original, unscrambled story. One exception to this is predicted. 
Readers of Story A should draw the second mentioned item first because of the asymmetry of the 
relation "on the Southern shore of" (see Figure 3.15). Readers of story B should draw all the 
landmarks in the order they are mentioned in the unscrambled narrative. For the story recall it 
is predicted that verbatim memory for the two stories will be poor because readers will attempt 
to construct a coherent spatial mental model and may not actively attempt to remember the 
language of the text. 
3.5.1 Method 
Subjects 
Nineteen graduate students and members of staff from the Open University participated in the 
study. The age of the subjects ranged from early twenties to early forties. 
Design 
There were two within subject variables; text organization (each subject read both an 
unscrambled and a scrambled narrative) and the type of spatial relation employed in the first 
sentence of each text (asymmetric in story A or symmetric in story B). The order of the scrambled 
narrative (one of two random sequences of sentences) varied between subjects. Text organization 
and the location described by the text were counterbalanced. Subjects were assigned randomly to 
one of the counterbalanced conditions and to one of the two scrambled text orders. The dependent 
variables were whether and in what order a landmark was recalled in either of the two free 
recall tasks; drawing the place described by the text or writing out the sentences of the text. 
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Story A (unscrambled). 
Princess Jane lived in an Ancient Castle (1) on the Southern shore of an Enchanted 
Lake (2). 
One day she left the castle and travelled West along the Great High Road (3) in 
search of adventure. 
After travelling for a day along the Great High Road she came to Fire Mountain (4). 
Near the summit of Fire Mountain Princess Jane was able to see the entrance to The 
Dragon's Cave (5) where Prince Alan was being held captive. 
Princess Jane rescued the young Prince from the Dragon's Cave and they escaped 
Northwards through a Secret Tunnel (6). 
When they emerged from the Secret Tunnel they were able to walk East to the safety 
of the Imperial Palace (7), where they lived happily ever after. 
Figure 3.16a: The unscrambled version of story A. 
Mr. Simpson lives in a Thatched Cottage (1) immediately opposite the old, red 
Telephone Box (2). 
Every Sunday Mr. Simpson leaves his home and walks next door to the Village Shop 
(3). 
After having bought the Sunday papers from the Village Shop he crosses over the 
road and comes to the Village Common (4). 
On the far side of the Village Common lies the Cricket Pavilion (5) where Mr. 
Simpson pauses and watches the local team prepare for a match. 
Mr. Simpson then walks behind the Cricket Pavilion and comes to Church Lane (6). 
At Church Lane he turns left and walks down the road until he comes to the White 
Horse Inn (7), where he stops for lunch. 
Figure 3.16b: The unscrambled version of story B. 
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Materials 
The two stories used in the experiment (Story A and Story B) are presented in Figures 3.16a and 
3.16b. Both unscrambled texts were six sentences long. Each sentence contained a spatial 
relationship between two items. Each sentence after the first introduced one new landmark. In 
story A the first sentence used an asymmetric spatial relation, whereas in story B the first 
sentence used a symmetric spatial relation (refer to Figure 3.15). The scrambled texts were 
prepared by presenting the six sentences in one of two random orders. The two random orders were 
obtained using a random number generator and a checking procedure. The checking procedure was 
used to eliminate any orders correlating significantly with the original order. 
Procedure 
The procedure and instructions were similar to that of Experiment 2. The experiment was divided 
into three stages. The procedure for each stage is laid out in Figure 3.17 below. In the first stage 
of the experiment each subject read one unscrambled and one scrambled story. In the second stage 
half the subjects were asked to draw the places described in both the original stories (the 
drawing recall task) while the remaining half were asked to write out the six sentences that 
comprised the original stories (the story recall task). In the third stage subjects who had carried 
out a drawing recall task in stage 2 carried out the story recall task. The remaining subjects 
carried out the drawing recall task in stage 3. 
Stage Procedure carried out in this stage: 
1 a) Read unscrambled text A or scrambled text B. 
b) Read scrambled text B or unscrambled text A. 
2 either i) Drawing recall task or ii) Story recall task. 
3 either i) Story recall task or ii) Drawing recall task. 
Figure 3.17: The three stages of the procedure for Experiment 3. 
In stage 1 the instructions and both story A and story B were presented using Hypercard 
on a Macintosh personal computer. Each story (unscrambled or scrambled) was presented one 
sentence at a time. Each reader was allowed as much time as they wished to read each sentence, 
but each sentence was only presented once. If a reader had been presented with story A first he or 
she would attempt to recall story A first in both stage 2 and stage 3. If a reader had been 
presented with story B first he or she would attempt to recall story B first in both stage 2 and 
stage 3. Thus each subject read one unscrambled text and one scrambled text carried out both the 
story recall task and the drawing recall task for each text. It was not possible for subjects to rely 
93 
on recall from working memory to remember either story, because there was always an 
intervening task (reading or recalling the other story). 
3.5.2 Results 
Levels of recall on the drawing task 
Overall levels of recall on the drawing task for the both the unscrambled and scrambled stories 
were almost at ceiling (see Figure 3.18). Only those readers who successfully recalled at least six 
of the seven landmarks of a given story were included in the analysis. Out of the total of 38 
drawings only 5 could not be included in the analysis because they contained fewer than six 
correct landmarks. In the small number of cases where only six landmarks were recalled it was 
assumed that the missing item would be recalled last. 
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Figure 3.18: Mean percentage levels of recall for unscrambled and scrambled texts by stork!. 
Recall of landmarks (scrambled texts only) 
As has been noted drawing recall of landmarks was at ceiling for the unscrambled versions of 
both stories. Levels of recall for the scrambled versions of the two stories was analyzed using a 
non-parametric trend test for dichotomous data (Marascuilo & McSweenev, 1q67; Meddis, 1984). 
Each set of data was tested (using the set of coefficients: +3, +2, +1,0, -1, -2, -3) for a trend 
against the predicted order of spatial mental model construction and separately' against the 
original order landmarks were mentioned in the appropriate scrambled text. Figure 3.19 shows 
the pattern of recall for the scrambled versions of both story A and story B (the landmarks are 
numbered 1 to 7 in the predicted order of spatial mental model construction): 
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Figure 3.19: Mean percentage recall of landmarks for story A and story B against predicted order 
of spatial mental model construction (scrambled texts onl, y). 
The trend tests for both story A (N = 10, Z estimate = 2.64, one-tailed p=0.0041) and story B (N = 
9, Z estimate = 1.83, one-tailed p=0.034) were significant. These results provide some support for 
the prediction that recall is influenced by the order of spatial mental model construction. In 
neither of the two stories does recall for the second item entered into the spatial mental model 
exceed that for the first (though in both cases recall for the first two items is close to ceiling 
making a direct comparison difficult). That both trend tests reach significance is probably to due 
the large difference in recall (50% and 22% respectively) between the first and last items (the 
two items weighted most heavily by the analysis). For this reason the two tests should be 
interpreted with caution. 
The results of the trend tests performed against the scrambled order in which the 
landmarks were presented were less clear cut. For story A there was no significant relationship 
between the 'scrambled' order and landmark recall (N = 10, Z estimate =0 . 
26, one-tailed p= 
0.40). For story B there was a significant negative relationship between the 'scrambled' order 
and the level of recall for the seven landmarks (N = 9, Z estimate = -1.91, one-tailed p=0.028). 
This may be an artefact of a small negative relationship between spatial mental model 
construction order and the order of some of the scrambled text. There is no evidence that items 
mentioned early in either of the scrambled texts are remembered better than items mentioned 
later on. 
Drawing order 
As in previous experiments Kendall's tau was used as a measure of the relationship between 
subjects drawing orders and the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Figure 3.20 
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shows the mean tau values for subject drawing orders and the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction for the scrambled and unscrambled texts. 
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Figure 3.20: Mean tau values with predicted order of spatial mental model construction for 
unscrambled and scrambled texts by story. 
Tau values for story A and story B are shown separately as the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction differs between the two (2,1,3,4,5,6,7 for story A and 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 for 
story B). None of the differences in tau values shown in Figure 3.20 reached significance. For the 
scrambled texts drawing orders were also compared with the order that landmarks were 
mentioned when the text was presented in the first stage of the experiment. Figure 3.21 shows 
Kendall's tau between the drawing orders of the subjects and the actual order that the 
landmarks were presented in (scrambled tau). Tau values with the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction (SMM tau) are given for comparison. 
1 
0.8 
Figure 3.21: Mean tau values for scrambled texts by story with the scrambled order of 
presentation and the order of spatial mental model construction. 
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Analysis of these data confirms that the drawing orders of readers of the scrambled texts are 
more strongly related to the order of spatial mental model construction than the order that the 
landmarks are actually presented in the scrambled text. This was the case for both the 
scrambled story A (Wilcoxon's T=0, N=5, Z=2.12, two-tailed p=0.034) and scrambled story B 
(Wilcoxon's T=0, N=8, Z=2.55, two-tailed p=0.011). 
In addition to comparing concordance with spatial mental model construction order using 
Kendall's tau the drawing orders for unscrambled and scrambled versions of story A and story B 
were also analyzed by item. For each of the four possible combinations of story and text 
organization a Jonckheere trend test was performed on the serial position in which each of the 
seven landmarks was drawn. Figure 3.22 shows the mean serial position in which each of the 
seven landmarks (numbered 1 to 7 in order of presentation in the unscrambled story version) of 
story A was drawn for both the unscrambled and scrambled text version. 
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Figure 3.22: Mean drawing order for each of the seven items from Story A. 
The significance of this pattern of drawing orders was confirmed by comparing it between items 
with the predicted order of spatial mental model construction for story A (2,1,3,4,5,6,7) using a 
Jonckheere trend test for both unscrambled (J = 1636.5, N=9, J* (Z estimate) = 9.43, p<0.00001) 
and scrambled versions of the text (J = 520, N=5, J* (Z estimate) = 7.40, p<0.00001). The mean 
drawing order for each of the seven landmarks in story A conforms exactly to the predicted order 
of spatial mental model constructions. Even when the story has been scrambled subjects tend to 
draw the landmarks in the order predicted by the spatial mental model account (the spatial 
mental model construction order for the unscrambled text). 
The same analysis was performed on the drawing orders obtained from readers of story B. 
Figure 3.23 shows the mean drawing orders for each of the seven landmarks for story B: 
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Figure 3.23: Mean drawing order for each of seven items from Story B. 
The significance of this pattern of drawing orders was confirmed by comparing it with the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction for story B (1,2,3,4,5,6,7) using a 
Jonckheere trend test for both unscrambled (J = 1994, N= 10, J* (Z estimate) = 9.68, p<0.00001) 
and scrambled versions of the text (J = 1212.5, N=8, J* (Z estimate) = 7.73, p<0.00001). As for 
story A, the average drawing orders for both the unscrambled and scrambled versions of story B 
are consistent with the drawing orders predicted by the spatial mental model account. 
Drawing order and the symmetry of the initial spatial relation 
In all but one case either the first or second landmark was drawn first (the only exception, where 
the fourth item was drawn first was not included in the following analysis). Figure 3.24a shows 
the frequency each landmark was drawn first for the unscrambled versions of both story A and B. 
Figure 3.24b shows the frequency each landmark is drawn first for the scrambled versions of story 
A and B. 
Unscrambled texts 
Landmark 1 Landmark 2 
Story A18 
Story B90 
Figure 3,24a 
Scrambled texts 
Landmark 1 Landmark 2 
Story A05 
Story B70 
Figure 3.24b 
These frequency data appear to support the predicted pattern of results. This is the prediction 
that an asymmetric initial spatial relation (as used in story A) will result in the landmark 
mentioned second being drawn first while a symmetric initial spatial relation (as in story B) 
will result in the first landmark mentioned being drawn first. The significance of this pattern 
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was confirmed with Fisher's Exact tests for both the unscrambled (two-tailed p=0.0041) and the 
scrambled text versions (two-tailed p=0.027). 
Levels of recall on the story recall task 
The responses produced by subjects consisted of sentences or phrases containing two or more 
landmarks (usually, but not always linked by a spatial or temporal relation). Two scoring 
procedures were used to determine recall on the story recall task. The first scoring procedure used 
the criterion of exact verbatim recall; a sentence from the original text was scored as correctly 
recalled if it was reproduced exactly word for word. The second scoring procedure was as close as 
possible to the scoring of landmark recall in the drawing task. If a subject named or described a 
landmark during their attempt to rewrite the sentences of the original story that item was 
classified as correctly recalled. A name was considered correct if a part or all of it matched part 
or all of a single landmark from the story (e. g. "lake" for "Enchanted Lake"). A description was 
considered correct if it uniquely referred to the type or function of the landmark (e. g. "pub" for 
"White Horse Inn"). For example, a subject who wrote "One day princess Diana left her castle 
which was next to a magic lake" would be scored as incorrect for verbatim recall, but correct for 
recall of two landmarks (the 'Ancient Castle' and the 'Enchanted Lake') 
Verbatim recall of the sentences of the original stories was at floor. Only one person was 
able to reproduce a sentence exactly. However, the scoring procedure was very strict and most 
subjects were able to produce some sentences that partially matched the original sentences they 
had read. Overall recall of landmarks was high. Figure 3.25 shows percentage recall averaged 
over all seven landmarks for each of the four possible texts versions (note that the relatively 
low recall for the scrambled version of story appears to be due to outliers). 
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Figure 3.25: Mean percentage recall of landmarks in the story recall task for unscrambled and 
scrambled text versions of story A and B. 
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Memory for landmarks in the story recall task was analyzed in the same fashion as that for the 
drawing recall task (using a trend test for dichotomous data). A significant relationship was 
obtained between the predicted order of spatial mental model construction and the probability of 
recall for each landmark (Z estimate = 3.46, one-tailed p<0.0006) for the scrambled version of 
story A. There was also a trend towards a negative relationship between landmark recall and 
the order that landmarks were mentioned in scrambled version of text A (Z estimate = -1.44, two- 
tailed p=0.15). Recall for story B and the unscrambled version of story A was almost at ceiling. 
No further tests were carried for these text versions because only a handful of subjects could be 
included in the analysis. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
This study replicated and extended findings from the two previous experiments. Two predictions 
were made for the drawing recall task. Firstly, it was predicted that, in general, drawing orders 
for both scrambled and unscrambled text versions should be similar to the order landmarks were 
mentioned in the original unscrambled text. However, where the initial spatial relation 
employed in a story is asymmetric (as in story A, but not story B) the landmark mentioned second 
should be the first item entered into a spatial mental model. So the spatial mental model 
account predicts that this landmark should be drawn first. For the story recall task two further 
predictions were made. Firstly, it was proposed that verbatim recall of the story should be poor. 
Secondly, it was proposed that there may be evidence that subjects reconstruct the text of the 
story from their memory for a spatial mental model. 
Drawing orders for unscrambled versions of two different texts were highly related to 
the predicted order of spatial mental model construction for each of the two texts. The drawing 
orders of the scrambled versions of the two stories were more strongly related to the predicted 
order of spatial mental model construction for the unscrambled texts than to the actual order the 
scrambled text was presented in. This pattern of results is similar to that observed in Experiment 
1 and identical to that obtained in Experiment 2. Readers who recall most or all of the 
landmarks of the scrambled version of a story when the sentences of the story are presented only 
once produce the same drawing order effect shown by people permitted to reread sentences from 
the stories. It is therefore unlikely that the drawing order effect found in readers of scrambled 
texts are purely the result of detecting the original order and rereading the texts in an 
unscrambled order. 
In addition to predicting a relationship between overall drawing order and spatial 
mental model construction a more detailed prediction was made about the item that would be 
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drawn first. The spatial mental model construction process described in Chapter 2 makes a 
different prediction about the first two tokens entered into a spatial mental model according to 
the symmetry of the first spatial relationship in a description. Story A contained an asymmetric 
initial spatial relation. Story B contained a symmetric initial spatial relation. As predicted the 
first item drawn in story A was the second landmark mentioned in the description. For story B, 
however, the first item drawn was the first landmark mentioned in the description. This pattern 
of results was significant for both the unscrambled and scrambled versions of the two texts. The 
pattern is particularly significant because it appears to depend on the spatial characteristics of 
the relations used in the description. For this reason these results are difficult to explain 
without recourse to a representation constructed according to the spatial properties of the 
description. 
Memory for landmarks in the drawing task replicated the pattern of recall obtained 
with the scrambled route text in Experiment 1. For the scrambled versions of both story A and 
story B there was a weak, but significant relationship between the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction and the probability that an item was recalled. Neither story A nor 
story B showed any evidence that landmarks mentioned early on in the scrambled text were 
recalled better than those mentioned later. 
Interpretation of the results of the patterns of recall on the story recall task is more 
problematic. Verbatim recall, as measured by the exact reproduction of the original sentences, 
was close to zero. However it would be premature to suggest that readers had no memory for the 
language of the text. A number of subjects produced partial reproductions of the original 
sentences. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rule out the explanation that partial recall of a 
sentence was based on reconstructing the sentence using memory for a spatial mental model 
(Fletcher, 1992). Recall of landmarks in the story recall task showed similar levels of 
performance to the recall of landmarks in the drawing task (detailed comparison is difficult 
because of the differences in the two tasks and potential differences in the scoring procedures). 
The scrambled text version of story A shows levels of recall significantly related to the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction. The presence of a relationship in recall on 
the story recall task and the predicted order of spatial mental model construction provides some 
support for the view that the language of the text is reconstructed (in part at least) using memory 
for a spatial mental model. 
The findings of this experiment do however raise a more serious question. This is the 
question of how readers construct a spatial mental model from a scrambled text. One possibility 
is that they try and remember the sentences of the story as they are presented and only when 
they believe they have reached the initial sentence from the unscrambled text do they begin to 
integrate the information contained in the sentences into a spatial mental model. A second 
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possibility is that readers begin the construction of a spatial mental model on reading the first 
sentence and integrate information from the remaining sentences as they are read. The former 
strategy results in a single, coherent spatial mental model constructed exactly in the order 
predicted by the account outlined in Chapter 2. It also places a heavy burden on a reader's 
working memory and language comprehension resources. The latter strategy reduces the burden of 
language comprehension but may require that two unrelated spatial mental models are 
constructed and retained until the relationship between the two models is established. This is 
because it is unlikely that all the early sentences will share a common landmark. In this case 
the actual order of spatial mental model construction will not be identical to the predicted order 
of spatial mental model construction. It should be noted, though, that the correlation between 
the actual and predicted order will probably still be quite high. 
Perhaps the most likely strategy for readers to adopt is a hybrid one. Readers may defer 
construction of a spatial mental model until they have difficulty remembering the previous 
sentences or (more likely) until they establish a spatial relationship between landmarks from 
two different sentences. Such a hybrid strategy will still predict a spatial model construction 
order very close to that of the original, unscrambled text. This is because people will still have 
the overall goal of making sense of the situation described by the text. Most readers will find it 
easier to construct a spatial mental model once they that have identified the initial sentence of 
the unscrambled text (as in the first strategy). Even if they have already constructed a spatial 
mental model beginning with a different sentence (as is probable for the second strategy) 
information from the initial sentence is likely to reinforce the representation which has already 
been constructed. The main difficulty with all three strategies is that keeping track of all the 
information necessary to construct a spatial mental model is very demanding on working memory 
capacity. In this experiment this working memory burden can not be transferred to an 'external' 
memory resource because the sentences are removed from view once a subject has read them. This 
may explain why memory for landmarks from the last sentence of the scrambled texts is so poor 
(particularly in the case of story A). 
Other factors may also influence drawing order. Some readers in Experiment 1 
demonstrated a slight preference for a left to right drawing order, however, no indication of this 
was observed here (e. g. the sequence of landmarks for story A is predominantly right to left). The 
drawing orders produced by some readers may reflect the perceived temporal or causal order of 
the story rather than the order of spatial mental model construction. This could happen if the 
spatial mental model is elaborated by focusing on spatial relations according to their perceived 
temporal order. While this explanation appears plausible, it has difficulty accounting for all 
the findings reported here. For example, nearly every reader of story A drew the 'Enchanted 
Lake' first even though it was mentioned second. This is interesting because the 'Enchanted Lake' 
is not the starting point of the journey described in story A. This is difficult to account for in terms 
of perceived causal or temporal order. On the other hand it does make sense if it is considered to 
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be a reference point for another landmark and hence entered into a spatial mental model first. 
The patterns of recall for different landmarks suggest that (for some readers) certain landmarks 
are never fully integrated into a spatial mental model. If this is the case, it is difficult to 
explain solely in terms of the elaboration of spatial relations according to their perceived 
temporal order. This is because determining temporal order would require that most, if not all, 
the landmarks are present in the spatial mental model. It is more plausible that readers attempt 
to construct a representation using one of the strategies described above and that in most cases 
this results in a spatial mental model construction order close to that predicted in the 
unscrambled condition. However, the temporal and causal cohesion of the unscrambled route 
stories may explain why the relationship between spatial mental model construction order and 
drawing order is so strong when people recall an unscrambled text. 
3.6 General Discussion 
The results of the three experiments presented in this chapter have been used to support the 
view that the recall of spatial information from a description requires the retention of the order 
in which a spatial mental model is constructed. Three types of evidence have been considered. 
Firstly, evidence the drawing orders of subjects who have remembered most or all of the 
landmarks on being asked to draw the environment described by a short narrative. Secondly, 
evidence that the probability of a particular landmark being recalled depends on its location in 
the presented text or in the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Lastly, 
evidence that the language of the text is considered as an alternative to the spatial mental 
model account. 
The drawing orders of subjects in these studies replicate the effects first noticed by 
Taylor and Tversky (1992a). In every case drawing orders are strongly related to the predicted 
order of spatial mental model construction. Even where people read texts where sentences were 
presented in a scrambled order the same relationship between drawing order and the predicted 
order of spatial mental model construction was obtained. This relationship persisted even when 
each sentence was read only once, indicating that it could not simply be an artefact of rereading 
the text in an unscrambled order. In addition to replicating Taylor and Tversky's findings about 
overall drawing order, detailed predictions were made about which item people would draw 
first. Where an asymmetric spatial relation (e. g. 'to the left of') is used in the initial sentence of 
a description the second landmark in the sentence acts as a reference point for the first landmark. 
For this reason the spatial mental model construction process outlined in Chapter 2 predicts that 
the second landmark will be drawn first. Where the initial spatial relation in a description is 
symmetric (e. g. 'opposite') the meaning of the relation is not affected by the order of the two 
landmarks. In this case the spatial mental model construction order is likely to reflect the order 
the two landmarks are mentioned in the text. The analysis of drawing orders obtained in 
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Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed these predictions. These findings are consistent with the 
construction of a representation, such as a spatial mental model, that is constructed according to 
the meaning of the spatial characteristics of the relations used in the description. 
The drawing orders observed in these experiments suggest that subjects are remembering 
or reconstructing a spatial mental model. Relatively little attention, however, has been 
addressed to the question of why people should utilize order information preserved in memory 
for the construction of a spatial mental model. New elements or tokens are entered into a spatial 
mental model in relation to existing tokens. As a consequence the integration of new information 
will tend to improve retention of existing tokens and relationships. The account therefore 
predicts that, all other things being equal, the initial tokens and relationships should be 
recalled better than later ones. Given that this order information is preserved in long-term 
memory why would this order be utilized during a drawing task? The main reason would be 
cognitive economy; adopting an existing order is far simpler than deciding on a new one. In 
particular, less demand would be placed on working memory resources. Morra and colleagues 
have provided evidence that working memory demands for drawing tasks, and especially for 
planning a drawing, are high (Mona et al., 1988). The tendency for the first few items to be less 
likely to deviate from the predicted drawing order suggests that working memory constraints 
may indeed be an important factor in the adoption of a particular drawing order. Once the 
initial items have been drawn, the planning load for the remaining items will have been 
reduced. This reduced working memory load may enable people to take account of other, more 
pragmatic, factors in the drawing task such as proximity. Analysis of the drawing orders in 
Experiments 2 and 3 suggests that many deviations from the predicted order occur in the middle 
portion of the route. Perhaps the consistency in the order in which the last items are drawn 
reflects pragmatic factors (the last items may be exits and so on) or a tendency for these items to 
be recalled only when all the other items are drawn. There is certainly evidence that the last 
few items in the predicted spatial mental model construction order are particularly hard to 
recall. 
Where recall was not at ceiling it was possible to investigate the pattern of recall for 
different landmarks. A previous study by Denhiere and Denis (1988) found evidence that the 
probability of recall of a given landmark from a spatial description was related to the order in 
which the landmark was integrated into a spatial representation. In Experiments 1 and 3a 
significant relationship was obtained between the probability that an item was recalled from 
scrambled route texts and the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. A similar 
relationship was obtained between the probability of recall of items from the scrambled survey 
text in Experiment 1 and the order in which they were mentioned in that text. It was argued that 
this may be because readers are able to make partial sense of a scrambled survey text (and hence 
begin to construct a coherent spatial mental model) without successfully reordering it. While the 
observed effects are not as large as those for the drawing order analyses it is argued that they 
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reflect an advantage in retention for those landmarks that are most likely to be integrated into a 
spatial mental model early in its construction. These patterns of recall provide further support 
for the argument that the order that readers of scrambled texts construct representations of the 
situations described by the text is close (though not necessarily identical) to the predicted order 
of spatial mental model construction. 
Evidence from the analyses of memory for the language of the text is less conclusive. In 
Experiment 2 subjects had good recognition memory for verbatim and paraphrase sentences. In 
Experiment 3 exact verbatim recall was poor, but memory for landmarks when rewriting the texts 
was close to ceiling. Some memory for the language of the text appears to be present, but it is not 
clear whether memory for the language of the text is sufficient for readers to reconstruct the 
spatial characteristics of the environment it describes. In Experiment 3 memory for the 
landmarks from the scrambled version of story A in the story recall task was significantly 
related to spatial mental model construction order. This result would favour the view that 
subjects were reconstructing the story based on their memory for the construction of a spatial 
mental model. Nevertheless it is very unlikely that subjects do not have some memory for the 
language of the text, however slight. 
In this chapter a number of different arguments have been raised to support the view 
that recall on a drawing task is based on memory for a spatial mental model, or for the process of 
its construction. Many of these arguments refer to the way a particular experiment was carried 
out and have already been discussed in detail. Two remaining arguments which are of particular 
importance are reviewed briefly in the sections below. 
3.6.1 Drawing orders reflect a spatial mental model rather than an image 
This argument was first put forward by Tversky (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). 
Tversky has argued that if people are drawing from a mental image then drawing order should 
reflect characteristics of the image rather than the process of its construction. For example if 
someone were given a copy of a map and asked to draw it they might begin by drawing its major 
structural features (e. g. boundaries, rivers, major roads and so on). If scanning a mental image 
shares similarities with scanning a real picture or map we would expect to find similar patterns 
in the drawing orders of someone who has learned a map. The results obtained by Kulhavy and 
his collaborators may reflect memory for an image (Kulhavy et al., 1993). However, many 
imagery theorists are sceptical about the notion of a distinct imagery code in long-term memory 
(Denis, 1991; Hampson & Morris, 1979; Kosslyn, 1980; Marschark, 1985). Also, as has already 
been pointed out, the lack of a relationship between order of presentation and the order or 
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probability of recalling a landmark in Kulhavy's studies may reflect the learning procedures he 
used or the levels of recall present in his experiments (see section 3.1). 
3.6.2 Comprehending scrambled texts requires a mental model 
Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) provide an a priori argument why comprehension of a scrambled 
text is not possible without the construction of a representation of the situation described by the 
text (a situation or mental model). They argue that there are two ways to explain how people 
can understand scrambled stories: 
"First, it may be that in retelling people reconstruct the story from the situation model they 
had formed when they heard it in scrambled form: As they had available the appropriate 
knowledge schemata, they were able to construct a canonical model from the scrambled 
input, and in retelling they simply work from that model rather than from the text 
representation proper. Alternatively, it might be the case that the representation itself was 
unscrambled and put into the correct order, in spite of the disorderly input. However, the 
only way this unscrambling could be done was to construct a situation model in canonical 
form, and then use this model to rearrange the textbase. In either case, the reordering of 
scrambled narratives presupposes the construction of a situation model. " 
[van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), p. 341] 
Analysis of Van Dijk and Kintsch's argument suggests that in cases where people can bring to 
bear real-world knowledge (such as understanding a spatial description) they will concentrate 
on establishing a coherent 'situation model' rather than to go to the trouble of reorganizing their 
representation of the language of the text. This interpretation is at least partly borne out by the 
consistency of the relationship between spatial mental model construction order and drawing 
recall for scrambled texts. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The studies presented in this chapter have shown broad support for Tversky's position that 
drawing an environment described by a spatial description involves reconstructing a spatial 
mental model rather than recalling an image or a representation of the language of a text. A 
number of potential objections to this interpretation have been discussed and rejected. As always, 
though, there are a number of other issues that have not been dismissed. 
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Firstly, the material used in these studies (as well as those by Tversky) are relatively 
rich in semantic content; short texts relatively close to the kind of natural discourse such as 
verbal directions or descriptions of routes. While the studies may have gained in ecological 
validity they may have also lost in terms of generalizability. In particular, it is possible to 
argue that the findings are strongly influenced by the specific landmarks used in the stories or by 
the way the stories themselves were constructed. These criticisms are mitigated, to some extent, 
by the use of different stories and different types of story in each experiment. 
Secondly, it has not been possible within this methodology to make a sharp distinction 
between memory for a spatial mental model and memory for its construction. It is possible that 
people only remember the process of spatial mental model construction (Payne, 1993). Evidence 
from studies by Tversky and others suggests that the structure of the mental model is also 
recalled (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Tversky, 1991). Observation of the drawing orders from 
some subjects in the experiments presented here suggests that some of the deviations from the 
predicted drawing order may have been to insert a landmark in an intervening spatial location. 
If this is the case it would suggest that the structure of the spatial mental model is sometimes 
available. 
Finally, it is not clear how well subjects in these studies remember the language of the 
text. Direct comparison of levels of recall for text memory and memory for a spatial mental 
model are difficult. Another factor is the possibility that verbatim recall may be influenced by 
guesswork strategies employed by subjects (Fletcher, 1992). 
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 attempt to address all three of these issues. Less 
realistic and hence more strictly controlled materials are employed. Using methodology based on 
studies by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) and Payne (1993) it is possible to separate the influence 
of verbatim recall, memory for the structure of a spatial mental model and memory for the 
process of spatial mental model construction. 
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Chapter 4- Determinacy and memory for 
spatial descriptions 
In a classic study of the distinction between propositional and analogical representations Mani 
and Johnson-Laird (1982) demonstrated that memory for the spatial layout generated from a 
description ('gist' recognition) is better for determinate descriptions than indeterminate 
descriptions. Mani and Johnson-Laird also found that memory for the sentences of the description 
('verbatim' recognition) was better for indeterminate descriptions than for determinate 
descriptions (refer to section 2.4.5 for a summary of their experiment). The determinate spatial 
descriptions were consistent with only one arrangement of five objects. The indeterminate 
descriptions were consistent with two or more arrangements of the five objects. This 'crossover' 
interaction was interpreted as evidence that people construct spatial mental models to 
understand spatial descriptions. Determinate descriptions permit the construction of a single 
spatial mental model which supports memory for the structure or 'gist' of the situation. For 
indeterminate descriptions construction of a single consistent spatial mental model is not 
possible, therefore Mani and Johnson-Laird argued that people abandon their attempt to 
construct a spatial mental model and concentrate on remembering the description 'verbatim'. 
Recently, Payne (1993) has proposed that people remember the operations used to 
construct a spatial mental model (an episodic construction trace) rather than the spatial mental 
model itself (see section 2.4.5 for a detailed discussion this hypothesis). Payne argued that 
recognition is dependent on the degree to which the process of spatial mental model construction 
overlaps between the original description and the to-be-recognized description (see Figure 4.1). 
In a direct test of the episodic construction trace hypothesis Payne showed that reordering the 
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sentences in the original descriptions depressed 'verbatim' and 'gist' recognition scores. I 
Reordering disrupts the episodic construction trace but has no effect on either the individual 
sentences or the situation they describe. Thus recognition could not depend on either memory for 
the sentences of the description or memory for the spatial mental model itself. 
Original description: 
The table is behind the stool 
The table is to the left of the bed 
The table is to the right of the chair 
The chair is behind the lamp 
1. Enter stool into model 
2. Place table behind stool 
3. Place bed to right of table 
4. Place chair to left of table 
5. Place lamp in front of chair 
Reordered original description: 
The chair is behind the lamp 
The table is to the right of the chair 
The table is behind the stool 
The table is to the left of the bed 
Operations in the construction process: 
1. Enter lamp into model 
2. Place chair behind lamp 
3. Place table to right of chair 
4. Place stool in front of table 
5. Place bed to right of table 
Figure 4.1: The operations used to construct a spatial mental model from a reordered description. 
Two of the studies presented in this chapter (Experiments 4 and 6b) investigate the 
hypothesis that memory for spatial relationships includes both components. Initially people 
may focus on the construction of the spatial mental model and the process of construction is 
recorded in long-term memory. Once the spatial mental model has been constructed the 
representation is elaborated and the structure of the spatial mental model is recorded in long- 
term memory. These would correspond to the construction and consultation stages of spatial 
mental modeling (see section 2.5.1). In Experiment 4 the number of times subjects are presented 
with each description (once or three times) is manipulated. It is predicted that with only one 
presentation people will tend to remember only the episodic construction trace. With three 
It is important to note the distinction between `gist' and `verbatim' recognition scores and gist and 
verbatim memory. Payne (1993) has argued that it is possible to get high scores on `gist' or `verbatim' 
recognition test with no memory whatsoever for the language of the description or for the spatial 
relationships present in a spatial mental model. This is because under most circumstances the inferable 
description has a greater overlap with the original description than either of the two foils. 
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presentations people are also likely to remember the spatial mental model itself. Overall, the 
pattern of data should provide evidence for both the episodic construction trace and memory for 
the structure of a spatial mental model. 
Evidence of memory for an episodic construction trace is obtained if reordering 
descriptions in a recognition test reduces recognition memory. Reordering the original description 
changes the nature of the operations used to construct a spatial mental model. This is because the 
operations carried out to construct the spatial mental model depend on the tokens which are 
already present in the spatial mental model (this is demonstrated in Figure 4.1). However, there 
is no reason to expect reordering to influence memory for the sentences themselves, because each 
individual sentence is intact. In addition, the reordered descriptions still describe exactly the 
same arrangement of objects, so reordering should not influence memory for the structure of a 
spatial mental model. Memory for the structure of a spatial mental model would be indicated by 
the crossover interaction predicted by Mani and Johnson-Laird. This would be indicated by high 
'gist' recognition for the determinate descriptions and high 'verbatim' recognition scores for the 
indeterminate descriptions. Finally, memory for the sentences of the descriptions can be 
ascertained by looking at 'verbatim' recognition scores for the reordered descriptions. 
The remaining experiment presented in this chapter (Experiment 5) takes the 
opportunity to re-examine some of the issues raised by the experiments in Chapter 3. This is done 
by investigating memory for the spatial descriptions presented in Experiment 4 using a drawing 
task. Thus it is possible to look at drawing orders and the probability of recall for descriptions 
where there is no narrative structure to influence recall. Also by looking at eight different 
descriptions the influences on recall of individual items or landmarks (which may be more or less 
salient) is minimized. 
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4.1 Experiment 4 
In this experiment recognition memory and recall for determinate and indeterminate spatial 
descriptions is investigated. Evidence will be sought for and against three ways of remembering 
spatial mental models; an episodic construction trace, a verbatim (or propositional) trace of the 
language of the description or memory for the structure of a spatial mental model. The 
experiment is based on those of Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) and Payne (1993). In phase 1 of 
the experiment subjects learn determinate and indeterminate verbal descriptions for a simple 
diagram matching task. This task involves deciding whether a diagram presented by the 
experimenter is consistent with the original description or not (see Figure 4.2). The purpose of the 
diagram matching task is simply to ensure that subjects read and learn the spatial descriptions 
(they are not informed that there will be any further tests of their memory for the descriptions). 
In the second phase of the experiment subjects are given a surprise recognition test. Subjects are 
presented with four possible 'target' descriptions (the original description, an inferable 
description describing the same spatial configuration of objects and two foils). Their task is to 
rank the descriptions 1,2,3, or 4 according to how closely they resemble the original description 
(a description they were presented with in phase 1). In phase 3 subjects are asked to write down 
how they carried out the surprise recognition test and what they were thinking while they 
performed the task. 
An indeterminate description: 
The table is behind the stool 
The table is to the left of the bed 
The table is to the left of the chair 
The chair is behind the lamp 
A matching diagram: A non-matching diagram: 
Table Bed Chair Table Lamp Bed 
Stool Lamp Stool Chair 
Figure 4.2: An example of a matching and non-matching diagram for an indeterminate 
description. 
This experiment differs from that performed by Payne or Mani and Johnson-Laird in 
several details. Firstly, two groups of subjects were used. The first group of subjects read and 
matched each description in phase 1 only once (the one diagram condition). The second group of 
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subjects read each description three times, matched each description to three different diagrams 
and also received feedback (the three diagram condition). 
Original indeterminate description: 
The duck is behind the cat 
The cat is to the left of the frog 
The duck is behind the mouse 
The wolf is to the right of the duck 
Corresponding episodic construction trace: 
[start duck cat behind] 
[frog cat right] 
(mouse duck front [clash mouse duck cat]] 
[wolf duck right] 
Reordered description: 
The wolf is to the right of the duck 
The duck is behind the mouse 
The duck is behind the cat 
The cat is to the left of the frog 
[start wolf duck right] 
[mouse duck front] 
[cat duck behind [clash cat duck mouse]] 
[frog cat right] 
Inferable description: 
The wolf is behind the frog 
The cat is to the left of the frog 
The duck is to the left of the wolf 
The mouse is in front of the duck 
[start wolf frog behind] 
[cat frog left] 
[duck wolf left] 
(mouse duck front [clash mouse duck cad] 
Foil (created from original description): 
The mouse is behind the cat 
The cat is to the left of the frog 
The mouse is behind the wolf 
The duck is to the right of the mouse 
[start mouse cat behind] 
[frog cat right] 
[wolf mouse front [clash mouse wolf cat]] 
[duck mouse right] 
The duck is behind the frog 
The cat is to the left of the frog 
The mouse is to the left of the duck 
The wolf is in front of the mouse 
[start duck frog behind] 
[frog cat right] 
[mouse duck left] 
[wolf mouse front [clash wolf mouse cat]] 
Figure 4.3: Examples of the reordered. inferable and foil descriptions used in the surprise 
recognition test (sentences or propositions shared with the original description are in italics). 
r 
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The purpose of this manipulation was to induce greater elaboration or a greater amount of 
learning of the original descriptions. For the surprise recognition test (phase 2) half the original 
descriptions were reordered. In addition, all the descriptions apart from the stable originals (i. e. 
the original descriptions which were not reordered) were constructed to have an episodic 
construction trace overlap of one with the original description. -Figure 
4.3 shows how each 
alternative shared only one proposition of its episodic construction trace with the original 
description. Each description in the surprise recognition test (apart from the original 
description) also shared only one sentence with original description. In Figure 4.3 shared 
sentences and shared propositions from an episodic construction trace are shown in italics. This 
manipulation means that memory for an episodic construction trace can only support verbatim 
recognition of the stable original description (assigning the stable original description the rank 
'1'). Similarly, memory for the sentences will support verbatim recognition of both the stable and 
reordered original description (assigning the stable or reordered original description the rank 
'1'). Neither an episodic construction trace, nor memory for the sentences can support 'gist' 
recognition in the absence of verbatim recognition (assigning the inferable description the rank 
'1'). High levels of 'gist' recognition (for example for the determinate descriptions) could only be 
supported by memory for the structure of a spatial mental model. 
The predictions made by three different kinds of memory for spatial descriptions are 
summarized in Figure 4.4: 
What is remembered: Prediction: 
The language of the description i) No effect of reordering. 
(comprehension processes) ii) Verbatim recognition higher than gist. 
An episodic construction trace i) Reordering reduces recognition. 
(construction processes) ii) Verbatim recognition higher than gist. 
The structure of a spatial mental model i) High determinate gist recognition. 
(consultation processes) ii) High indeterminate verbatim recognition. 
Figure 4.4: The predictions from three different accounts of memory for spatial descriptions. 
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If people only remember the language of a description reordering should have no effect on 
verbatim recognition scores. Also, because only the original description contains more than one 
sentence from the original description it also predicts that gist recognition scores (based on a 
high rank for the inferable description) can not exceed verbatim recognition scores. The episodic 
construction trace account predicts that reordering the original description should depress 
verbatim recognition scores to chance levels in phase 2. The account also predicts that gist 
recognition scores will never exceed verbatim recognition scores, because the inferable 
description always has a trace overlap of one. Finally, the classic mental models account 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982) predicts that verbatim recognition scores 
should exceed gist recognition scores for the indeterminate descriptions and that gist recognition 
scores should exceed verbatim recognition scores for the determinate descriptions. In fact, support 
for the mental models account would be obtained provided gist recognition scores exceed verbatim 
recognition scores for the determinate descriptions. Though not as strong a prediction as that from 
the classic mental models account, such a result could only be explained by memory for the 
spatial relationships present in the descriptions. 
4.1.1 Method 
Subjects 
Thirty-six people volunteered to participate in the experiment (most were graduate students or 
staff from the Open University). Subjects were offered three pounds for taking part in the 
experiment. The ages of the subjects ranged from early twenties to early sixties. 
Design 
Three tasks were used in the experiment; a diagram matching task (phase 1), a surprise 
recognition task (phase 2) and a retrospective protocol task (phase 3). Subjects were randomly 
allocated to either the one diagram condition (where each description and was presented once 
before a single diagram in the matching task) or the three diagram condition (where each 
description was presented once before each of three diagrams). The three within subject factors 
were the determinacy of the spatial description (determinate or indeterminate) whether more 
matching diagrams than non-matching diagrams were seen by subjects in phase 1 (matching or 
non-matching) and whether the spatial description was reordered in phase 2 (stable or 
reordered). Two dependent variables were used for the analysis. These were verbatim 
recognition and gist recognition (see the results section for details of how these were scored). The 
eight spatial descriptions were randomly assigned to these eight conditions. 
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Materials 
Descriptions for phase 1 were based on the recipes of Payne (1993). Four determinate and four 
indeterminate descriptions were used (excluding the two practice items), each containing four 
sentences and describing five objects. Referential continuity was maintained by introducing one 
new object in each sentence after the first. Determinate and indeterminate descriptions differed 
only by a change of one word (e. g. 'left' instead of 'right'). Each description was headed by the 
category of objects described (e. g. Creatures). Categories were chosen to minimize confusion 
between descriptions, so that each of the eight categories was associated with a single condition 
of the factorial design. Each description described an F or C shaped array or a rotation or mirror 
image of such an array. For each description up to three diagrams were produced for the 
matching task. The diagrams depicted either a permissible configuration of the objects in the 
description (a matching diagram) or a configuration where only two of the four spatial relations 
in the description were satisfied (a non-matching diagram). 
For phase 2a set of four descriptions were created for each description category in phase 
1. For each set only one sentence was shared between the four descriptions. One description was 
the original, either in a stable form (with a trace overlap of 4) or in a reordered form (with a 
trace overlap of 1). A second description was inferable from the original, it described the same 
array of five objects but retained only one sentence from the original. The inferable description 
was constructed by reversing two relations ('x is to the right of y' in place of 'y is to the left of x') 
and adding a new relation true of (but not explicit in) the original. Two foils were created by 
interchanging three of the five original object names for the inferable and original descriptions 
(the two foils thus describe the same configuration of objects). These changes meant that only one 
sentence from the original description was left unchanged. Each foil retained a trace overlap of 
one with the original description as well as preserving its shape and general structure. For 
examples of the reordered, inferable and foil descriptions for one of the descriptions used in the 
experiment refer back to Figure 4.3 above. 
Procedure 
The experiment was in three phases. At the start of phase 1 (the diagram matching task) 
subjects were presented with instructions for the matching task and given two practice trials (one 
determinate and one indeterminate). The purpose of the phase 1 task was to ensure that subjects 
made an attempt to learn the descriptions before proceeding to phase 2 (however, note that 
subjects were not informed about phase 2 prior to carrying out the surprise recognition test). The 
practice descriptions were presented on cards, which subjects read until they indicated they were 
ready. At this point the description was removed and a diagram presented. Subjects were asked 
to circle 'good match' or 'bad match' on a prepared scoring sheet according to whether the 
diagram was consistent with the original description. For the two practice trials feedback (the 
word 'correct' or 'incorrect') was given by the experimenter. Following the practice trials subjects 
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were encouraged to ask questions about the task. After the practice items the eight test items 
(two determinate matching, two determinate non-matching, two indeterminate matching and 
two indeterminate non-matching) were presented in a random order. The procedure for the eight 
test items differed between the one and three diagram conditions. In the one diagram condition 
each test item was followed by a single diagram before proceeding to the next item. No feedback 
was given. In the three diagram condition each test item was followed by three diagrams. 
Before each new diagram the subject was re-presented with the original description and asked to 
reread it at least once. After each of these diagrams feedback was given as in the practice trials. 
For the matching descriptions two of three diagrams were good matches, for the non-matching 
condition only one was a good match. Before and after phase 1 there were no differences between 
the one and three diagram conditions. 
After phase 1 all subjects were given written instructions for phase 2 (the surprise 
recognition test). In phase 2 subjects were asked to rank four alternatives for each category of 
description presented in phase 1. The alternatives consisted of written descriptions similar to 
those presented in phase 1 (see Figure 4.3). Ranks were assigned according to how closely each 
alternative resembled the original description the subject had read. The four alternatives 
labelled A, B, C and D were presented in a random order on a single sheet of paper. A different 
size and style of font was used from that in phase 1. Subjects were told that in every case one of 
the four alternatives contained the four sentences of the original description, though not 
necessarily in the original order. Subjects were asked to rank this alternative 1 and the other 
three alternatives 2,3 and 4 according to how closely they resembled the original description. 
They were asked to rank all four alternatives even if they were certain of their first choice (an 
example of the recognition test materials for one of the eight descriptions is given in Figure 4.3). 
Phase 3 followed on immediately after the recognition task in phase 2. Subjects were 
given a blank sheet of paper and asked to briefly note down how they had performed the 
previous task and in particular what they were thinking as they performed it. For a sample of 
the 36 subjects a backward digit span test and the Daneman and Carpenter reading span test were 
carried out after completing the experiment (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). 
4.1.2 Results 
Performance on the diagram matching task (phase 1) 
Overall performance on the diagram matching task was high (86%). All thirty-six subjects 
scored over fifty percent for both the determinate and indeterminate descriptions, thus 
indicating that performance was reliably above chance. 
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Performance on the recognition task (phase 2) 
Scoring 
Two different scoring procedures were employed. The first procedure was that used by Payne 
(1993) and was used to calculate percentage recognition scores for each subject. 
Description: Rankin Ranking B Ranking Ranking D 
Original 1 2 1 4 
Inferable 2 1 4 1 
Foil A 3 4 2 2 
Foil B 4 3 3 3 
Type of recognition scored: 
Verbatim Yes No Yes No 
Gist Yes Yes No No 
Figure 4.5: 
-Four examples 
of the scoring procedure used by Payne (1993). 
Successful verbatim memory was scored when subjects ranked the original description (stable or 
reordered) first. Successful gist memory was scored when subjects ranked both the inferable and 
the original description (in either order) higher than the two foils. Examples of how four 
rankings would be classified is provided in Figure 4.5. The percentage recognition scores are used 
in the summary statistics, tables and graphs later in the results section. The percentage 
recognition scores are also used to make pairwise comparisons within subjects (using the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test) or between subjects (using the Mann-Whitney U test). 
A second scoring procedure was adopted in order to test for the crossover interaction 
predicted by Mani and Johnson-Laird. A separate scoring procedure was necessary to analyze this 
interaction using a chi square design. The chi square test requires that the variables being 
manipulated are independent, so for this scoring procedure subject responses which exhibit both 
verbatim and gist recognition procedure are not included in the analysis. In effect this means that 
only one type of response was not included (this type of response is indicated by 'Ranking A' in 
Figure 4.5). However as they represent tied recognition scores they do not contribute to the results 
of the pairwise comparisons reported in the results section. One additional difference between 
the two scoring procedures was prompted by the possibility that the scoring method used by 
Payne underestimates the actual level of gist recognition. Inspection of Figure 4.5 will show that 
in 'Ranking D' the inferable description is ranked '1' but gist recognition is not scored (because the 
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subject has not ranked the original description above the two foils). However, if some subjects 
assume that only one description describes the original arrangement of objects, they may rank the 
inferable '1' and rank the remaining three descriptions using some other criterion. For the chi 
square analysis gist recognition is scored if the inferable description is ranked first. Note that ifs 
Payne's scoring procedure is more accurate, the worst outcome from adopting this scoring 
procedure is that gist recognition scores will be slightly inflated by chance in all the conditions. 
Therefore there is no reason to believe that this new scoring procedure biases the results in any 
direction. 
Between group differences 
Differences between the one diagram and three diagram groups were analysed using Mann- 
Whitney U-tests. No significant differences were found between groups on verbatim and gist 
scores in phase 2 for any of the four matching descriptions or on the matching task in phase 1. For 
the subsequent analyses data were pooled across both groups of subjects. 
Overall recognition performance 
Chance performance is 25% for verbatim and 16.7% for gist recognition. Mean recognition scores 
are summarized by description type in Figure 4.6 below: 
Description tune Verbatim Gist 
Determinate Stable 56.9 % 55.6 % 
Reordered 50.0 % 62.5 % 
Indeterminate Stable 70.8 % 48.6 % 
Reordered 59.7 % 55.6 % 
Figure 4.6: Mean percentage verbatim and gist recognition by description typc 
Overall recognition performance (averaged over stable and reordered descriptions) 
showed a pattern consistent with memory for a spatial mental model; gist memory was higher 
for determinate descriptions and verbatim memory was higher for indeterminate descriptions. 
Figure 4.7 shows the interaction of description type (determinate or indeterminate) type of recall 
(gist or verbatim). The significance of this interaction was tested using a chi square design. 
Rankings which exhibited both gist and verbatim recognition were excluded from the analysis 
(refer to the section on scoring above). The analysis thus compared the frequency with which 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions supported gist or verbatim recognition (data points 
were pooled across subjects as well as across descriptions). 
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Figure 4.7: Mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition by type of descriiption 
The contingency table for the chi square test is shown in Figure 4.8 below: 
Type of recognition: 
Verbatim Gist 
Type of description: 
Determinate 23 34 
Indeterminate 38 18 
Figure 4.8: The frequency of verbatim or gist recognition for determinate and indeterminate 
descriptions. 
The chi square statistic for this contingency table is significant (Chi Square = 7.53, d. f. = 1, p< 
0.01). However, because individual observations are pooled across subjects they may not meet the 
criteria for independence required by the chi square design. For this reason it is probable that the 
value of the chi square statistic has been inflated. A more conservative test of this prediction is 
to make two pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (this was the method of 
analysis used by Mani and Johnson-Laird). The first comparison is between verbatim recognition 
scores for the determinate and indeterminate description (N = 36, Z=2.25, one-tailed p=0.012). 
The second comparison is between gist recognition scores for the determinate and indeterminate 
description (N = 36, Z=1.85, one-tailed p=0.032). Even adopting this conservative method of 
testing this prediction it is clear the results support the spatial mental model account. People 
show significantly higher gist recognition for the determinate descriptions and significantly 
higher verbatim recognition for the indeterminate descriptions. 
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the effect of reordering on memory was analyzed separately for gist and verbatim 
recognition. Figure 4.9 shows mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition for stable and 
reordered descriptions. Differences were tested using the Wilcoxon test. While verbatim 
recognition for stable descriptions was greater than that for reordered descriptions this did not 
reach significance (N = 36, Z=1.37, two tailed p=0.17). For gist recognition the effect of 
reordering was reversed, though this too did not reach significance (N = 36, Z= -1.68, two-tailed 
p=0.093). 
The effects of reordering were more marked for some descriptions than others. During the 
analysis it was noticed that the effect was more consistent for the matching descriptions than for 
the non-matching descriptions. This finding is difficult to explain in terms of the number of 
matching diagrams subjects were exposed to in phase 1 (the only consistent difference between 
the matching and non-matching condition). The matching/non-matching variable also has no 
influence on the construction of the recognition test materials. The findings were also stable 
across the one and three diagram conditions. This is particularly strange as the subjects in these 
two conditions saw different diagrams (and of course different numbers of diagrams). 
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Figure 4.9: Mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition for stable and reordered descriptions. 
A more plausible explanation is that the results were due to differences in difficulty between 
descriptions which were coincidentally more pronounced among the descriptions used in the non- 
matching conditions. This is borne out by the variation in levels of recall for the non-matching 
descriptions in Experiment 5 which used the same descriptions and involved some of the subjects 
as Experiment 4 (see Experiment 5 below). Figure 4.10 shows levels of verbatim recognition for 
the matching and non-matching descriptions. 
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Figure 4.10: Mean percentage verbatim recognition for stable and reordered descriptions 
Verbatim recognition on the matching descriptions is significantly impaired by reordering (N = 
36, Z=3.02, two-tailed p=0.0025). For the non-matching descriptions verbatim recognition for 
the reordered description is higher than that for the stable descriptions (though this effect is 
not significant). Gist recognition for the matching and non-matching descriptions follows the 
same pattern with matching gist recognition also being significantly impaired by reordering (N = 
36, Z=2.63, two-tailed p=0.0086). 
In addition to comparing different levels of verbatim and gist recognition the level of 
association between the two variables was also examined. Verbatim and gist recognition were 
correlated using Spear-man's Rho. A significant relationship between gist and verbatim 
recognition was obtained (Rho = 0.431, N= 36, two-tailed p=0.011). This indicates that 
verbatim recognition may form the basis of gist recognition for some subjects (though it could also 
indicate that verbatim recognition is a by-product of gist recognition). 
Individual differences 
Retrospective protocols 
Written reports made by subjects immediately after the recognition task were classified 
according to a several pre-defined categories; visuo-spatial strategy, spatial strategy, verbal 
strategy or familiarity strategy. The term strategy is used here to include both explicit 
recognition strategies as well as a preference for certain types of information for the purposes of 
establishing recognition. The use of a visuo-spatial strategy was recorded when subjects reported 
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visual imagery of the objects from the original descriptions (e. g. mental pictures or images). 2 The 
use of a spatial strategy was recorded if subjects indicated they had attempted to recall the 
relative positions of objects from the original descriptions (e. g. choosing one object as a reference 
point and remembering where other objects were in relation to it). The use of a verbal strategy 
was recorded if subjects attempted to recall sentences, key phrases or whole descriptions from the 
original description. The use of a familiarity strategy was included for those subjects who 
reported that some descriptions 'felt' or 'sounded' more familiar, but who did not explicitly 
report recognizing the text or relative positions of objects from the original descriptions. Some 
subjects reported using more than one of the above strategies. Where possible it was noted which 
if any of the above strategies was the primary strategy described. The percentage distribution of 
the different primary strategies is summarized in Figure 4.11 below. The table also shows the 
presence or absence of spatial, verbal or familiarity strategies according to the primary strategy 
used by each subject. 
Primary 
Strategy 
Spatial 
Strategy 
present 
Verbal 
Strategy 
present 
Familiarity 
Strategy 
present 
Visuo-spatial 28% 100% 50% 40% 
Spatial 33% 100% 42% 33% 
Verbal 8% 33% 100% 00/0 
Familiarity 14% 100% 0% 100% 
Other/Unclear 17% 67% 67% 17% 
Figure 4.11: The distribution of different primary and secondary recognition strategies 
Data from subjects reporting primary spatial or visuo-spatial strategies were analyzed further. 
There were no significant differences in recognition scores between subjects reporting spatial 
strategies and those reporting visuo-spatial strategies. Direct comparison of spatial or visuo- 
spatial strategies with other strategies was not possible because of the small group sizes. 
The relationship between protocols and recognition performance 
For each subject in the experiment recognition performance was classified as being consistent with 
memory for the structure of a spatial mental model or memory for an episodic construction trace. 
Each subjects' performance was scored as 'for', 'against' or 'neutral' with respect to each 
One subject reported visual imagery of the text of the description itself; this was classified as a 
verbal strategy. 
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classification. These classifications took account of the direction of differences in levels of 
recognition for descriptions but not magnitude. For this reason they are less sensitive to patterns 
in the data than statistics used for the overall analyses. For example it is likely that they 
inflate the number of 'neutral' classifications by not taking into account the magnitude of any 
differences. Memory for the language of the description was not classified in this way for three 
reasons. Firstly, only three subjects reported using a verbal strategy. Secondly, scoring memory for 
the language of the descriptions without taking into account the magnitude of any differences in 
recognition proved to be very difficult. Thirdly, the spatial mental model account predicts high 
verbatim recognition scores (though only for indeterminate descriptions) resulting in a 
considerable overlap between the two classifications. 
Memory for a spatial mental model was indicated by an interaction between determinacy 
and type of recognition; gist recognition should be higher than verbatim for determinate 
descriptions and verbatim higher than gist recognition for indeterminate descriptions (Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982). For purposes of scoring this was considered as two criteria. If a person's 
performance was consistent with at least one of these criteria (e. g. determinate gist was higher 
than verbatim recognition) this was scored as memory 'for' a spatial mental model. If 
performance was inconsistent with at least one of these criteria (e. g. determinate verbatim was 
higher than determinate gist) it was scored as 'against' memory for a spatial mental model. If 
neither criteria was supported by recognition performance, or if one criterion was consistent and 
the other inconsistent with recognition performance, this was scored as 'neutral' with respect to 
memory for a spatial mental model. 
Determining memory for an episodic construction trace (i. e. for the construction of a 
spatial mental model) was based on whether reordering a description reduced recognition 
performance (Payne, 1993). It was scored 'for' if verbatim recognition was higher for stable 
descriptions than for reordered descriptions. It was scored 'against' if reordered verbatim was 
higher than stable verbatim recognition. If stable and reordered verbatim recognition were equal 
this was scored as 'neutral'. 
Figure 4.12 shows the classification of the subjects according to whether they showed 
evidence of remembering a spatial mental model broken down by primary strategy described in 
the retrospective protocol. The data are consistent with the view that the majority of subjects 
exhibited some memory for a spatial mental model. There is little evidence of an interaction 
between the primary strategy reported and memory for a spatial mental model (except possibly 
for those reported strategies classified as verbal). One surprising finding is that three subjects 
showing patterns of recall going against memory for a spatial mental model reported visual 
imagery for individual objects. 
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Figure 4.12: Evidence of memory for a spatial mental model (SMM) by primary strategy. 
A possible explanation is that they had memorable or vivid visual imagery, but did not image 
the spatial or structural relationships between items in the description. This kind of occurrence is 
quite frequent when reading for pleasure. People often spontaneously experience vivid visual 
imagery, but it is relatively rare for that imagery to accurately reflect the spatial relationship 
contained in the story they are reading. 
Figure 4.13 shows evidence of memory for an episodic construction trace according to the 
primary strategy reported by a subject. 
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Figure 4.13: Evidence of memory for an episodic construction trace (ECT) by primary strategy. 
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As might be expected memory for the episodic construction trace shows a similar pattern to 
memory for a spatial mental model, except that there are fewer 'neutral' classifications. One 
important difference is that two of the three people reporting verbal strategies show evidence of 
basing recognition on memory for an episodic construction trace. 
Looking at the recognition performance in detail supports the pattern of results obtained 
in the overall analysis. It also appears to support the view that subjects who report visuo- 
spatial or spatial strategies are likely to have constructed and remembered spatial mental 
models, or an episodic construction trace (or both). However, it is difficult to reach any strong 
conclusions where classifications of recognition test performance and retrospective protocols 
result in such small cell sizes. 
Working memory and recognition performance 
A sample of subjects were also tested for their backward digit span and reading span in order to 
determine if either of these measures of working memory capacity was a good predictor of recall 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Thirty-five subjects were tested for backward digit span. Twelve 
subjects were also tested for reading span. Backward digit span and reading span appeared to be 
independent (Rho = 0.039). Backward digit span correlated significantly with gist recognition 
(Rho = 0.398, two-tailed p=0.02) but not verbatim recognition (Rho = 0.044, two-tailed p=0.80). 
This is inconsistent with a strategy where subjects engage in verbal rehearsal of the sentences 
after reading them. It suggests, instead, that verbal working memory resources (e. g. the 
articulatory loop) may be involved in holding verbal information while a spatial mental model 
is constructed. This is consistent with several other findings in the mental models literature 
(Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Morra, 1989; Oakhill & Johnson- 
Laird, 1984). 
Reading span showed a negative relationship with scores for determinate descriptions 
on the phase 1 matching task and with determinate gist recognition. This relationship was 
significant between reading span and determinate matches (Rho = -0.775, N= 12, two-tailed p= 
0.02). For reading span and determinate gist recognition this trend did not reach significance 
(Rho = -0.524, N= 12, two-tailed p=0.12). Reading span showed no evidence of a positive 
association with any of the remaining recognition scores. There is therefore no evidence that 
reading span is involved in the retention of spatial descriptions. In fact, the evidence suggests 
that subjects with high reading spans were worse at matching determinate descriptions in phase 
1. One possible explanation is that subjects with low readings spans compensated for this by 
concentrating harder or taking longer to read the descriptions. Subjects with high reading spans 
may have felt matching the determinate descriptions to be sufficiently easy not to expend much 
effort (remember that all the subjects scored over fifty percent in the phase 1 diagram matching 
task). 
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4.1.3 Discussion 
When people are asked to compare spatial descriptions with diagrams they learn information 
about those spatial descriptions. If, at a later stage, they are given a surprise recognition test it 
has been proposed that they may show evidence of three types of memory; memory for the 
language of the description, memory for the construction of a spatial mental model or memory for 
a spatial mental model itself. In this experiment there was an interaction between type of 
recognition memory and the determinacy of the description. For determinate descriptions gist 
recognition was higher than verbatim recognition. For indeterminate descriptions verbatim 
recognition was higher than gist. 
This finding replicates the crossover interaction obtained by Mani and Johnson-Laird 
(1982). It partially contradicts the results obtained by Payne (1993) even though the materials 
were closely based on those used in his studies. Mani and Johnson-Laird explained their findings 
as supporting the view that people attempt to construct a spatial mental model but abandon this 
attempt if becomes too difficult (e. g. when they realize the description is indeterminate). Hence 
for determinate descriptions recognition is based primarily on memory for a spatial mental 
model which can not differentiate between the original and inferable description. When people 
realize that a description is indeterminate and abandon spatial mental model construction 
Johnson-Laird argues that they concentrate on remembering the language of the description 
instead (Johnson-Laud, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). However, the high level of gist 
recognition for the reordered indeterminate descriptions in the present experiment suggests that 
some people are able to construct a spatial mental model of an indeterminate description. 
Johnson-Laird (1983) discusses a number of ways a spatial mental model can represent 
indeterminacy. An alternative explanation of verbatim recognition scores for indeterminate 
descriptions being higher gist recognition scores also suggests itself. People may continue to 
attempt to construct spatial mental models, but, in doing so, they take longer and have to reread 
the original description several more times. Thus raised verbatim recognition for indeterminate 
descriptions may be the result of a specific attempt to learn the description or a by-product of the 
difficulty of spatial mental model construction for indeterminate descriptions. While it is likely 
that both accounts have something to offer, the relatively high gist recognition scores for the 
indeterminate descriptions favour the latter. 
Reordering the original descriptions reduced verbatim recognition levels, however, this 
effect was significant only for the matching descriptions. Examination of performance for the 
non-matching condition suggests that these descriptions may have varied greatly in difficulty. 
If this was the case any differences between these descriptions would be harder to detect. When 
the original description is reordered the overlap between the episodic construction trace of the 
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original description and the target in the recognition test is reduced (Payne, 1993). So the 
evidence from this experiment shows only mixed support for the view that people remember an 
episodic construction trace. Analysis of individual differences shows that many people do show 
evidence of remembering an episodic construction trace and that there may be some association 
between memory for a spatial mental model and memory for an episodic construction trace. One 
other finding also supports the view that some people remember constructing a spatial mental 
model. Gist and verbatim recognition scores are correlated with each other. Memory for a spatial 
mental model does not support verbatim recognition and verbatim recognition is usually higher 
than gist recognition. It is therefore likely that at least some gist recognition can be accounted for 
by memory for an episodic construction trace (the stable original is ranked first and then it is 
realized that the inferable describes the same configuration and it is ranked second). 
The argument that people remember an episodic construction trace depends to some extent 
on a lack of evidence that people remember the language of the descriptions. Several findings 
indicate support for the assertion that people are not basing recognition on a representation of 
the language of the text. Firstly, gist recognition for determinate descriptions exceeds verbatim 
recognition. Secondly, the observation that reordering depresses verbatim recognition for any of 
the descriptions is difficult to account for in terms of memory for the sentences of the description. 
Hundreds of verbal learning experiments have been carried out in psychology which show that 
people can and do recognize individual sentences taken from a text. Lastly, only three subjects 
reported trying to remember the language of the descriptions in any way (and two of those 
subjects showed evidence of remembering an episodic construction trace). 
The overall pattern of results provides some support for the hypothesis that people 
remember both the construction of a spatial mental model and the structure of the spatial mental 
model. The lack of differences between the one diagram and three diagram condition makes 
discussion of the influence of repeated presentation difficult. It appears that presenting the 
spatial descriptions more than once does not greatly influence quantity or quality of learning. 
The relationship between reading span and performance may shed some light on this 
observation. Reading span correlates negatively with determinate performance on the matching 
task. It is possible that those with higher reading spans were more confident on the matching 
task and hence spent less time reading the easier, determinate descriptions. If this is the case it 
suggests that in self timed tasks such as these people read the descriptions until they feel 
comfortable that they can remember them. Presenting descriptions three times does not 
significantly help them because they spend less time on each description than those in the single 
presentation condition. 
The positive relationship between gist recognition and backward digit span may seem 
surprising. The lack of a relationship between verbatim memory and backward digit span also 
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suggests that few if any of the subjects were actively attempting to learn the language of the 
descriptions. However, a number of other studies have shown a relationship between measures of 
short-term verbal memory and memory for a spatial mental model (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; de 
Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Mona, 1989; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984). As high digit 
span appears to improve gist retention, this suggests that the articulatory loop may help hold 
information from the description and so 'free up' general working memory resources for spatial 
mental model construction and consultation (also see section 2.2.2). 
This experiment provides support for the notion that people can and do remember the 
structure of a spatial mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). It also 
provides partial support for the hypothesis that people remember the process of construction of a 
spatial mental model. Unfortunately there is also evidence that memory for descriptions may be 
strongly influenced by the difficulty of the particular descriptions used in this and other 
experiments (Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). The next two experiments (5 and 6a) 
examine memory for individual descriptions in more detail. 
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4.2 Experiment 5 
This experiment investigates free recall in a drawing task for the eight spatial descriptions used 
in Experiment 4. Immediately after taking part in Experiment 4 thirty people were asked to 
draw out the items from each spatial description in positions consistent with the original 
description they had read. The experiment had three main aims. Firstly, to discover whether 
determinacy influences recall as well as the recognition of spatial descriptions. Secondly, to 
examine the relationship between spatial mental model construction order and drawing order 
using simpler stimuli than those used in Chapter 3. Thirdly, to investigate the relationship 
between spatial mental model construction order and levels of recall. 
Experiment 4 has provided strong evidence that many, if not all, of the subjects 
constructed or attempted to construct a spatial mental model consistent with each of the spatial 
descriptions they read. The account of spatial mental model construction outlined in Chapter 2 
predicts that both drawing order and probability of recall should reflect the order in which 
items are integrated into a spatial mental model (Payne, 1993; Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; 
Tversky, 1991). These predictions do not differ for accounts of recall based on the structure of a 
spatial mental model and those based on memory for its construction e. g. in the form of an 
episodic construction trace. The classic account of memory for a spatial mental model (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laud, 1982) might also predict a difference in drawing order and 
recall between determinate and indeterminate descriptions. Recall for determinate descriptions 
should reflect the construction and retention of a spatial mental model. Recall for indeterminate 
descriptions may show the same pattern or it may reflect memory for the language of the 
description. 
A lack of a drawing order effect, or lack of a relationship between spatial mental model 
construction order and probability of recall would call into question the interpretation of the 
studies reported in Chapter 3. It would also support interpretations of drawing recall that 
postulate a representation such as an image that does not retain the order of its construction 
(Kulhavy et al., 1993; Kulhavy et al., 1993; Tversky, 1991). It would also be possible to obtain 
other effects related to the serial position of items in recall or drawing order. Obtaining a classic 
serial position effect (depressed recall or delayed drawing order for items in the middle of the 
description) or a recency effect might favour explanations of recall in terms of a propositional 
representation of the language of the descriptions. For a more detailed discussion of these 
arguments refer to Chapter 3. 
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4.2.1 Method 
Subjects 
Thirty of the thirty-six subjects from Experiment 4 also agreed to take part in this experiment. 
Materials 
For each of the eight spatial descriptions used in Experiment 4 an empty grid made up of six 
blank boxes was prepared. The six boxes were made up of either two rows and three columns or 
three rows and two columns as appropriate for the permissible spatial layouts of each 
description. Each grid was given one of the headings used in the eight original descriptions (e. g. 
'Tableware' or 'Transport') indicating the appropriate items to be entered into the grid. 
Procedure 
This experiment was carried out as soon as each subject had completed Experiment 4. None of the 
subjects in Experiment 4 were expecting to be tested for a second time. The delay between 
presentation and test was thus determined by how long each subject took to complete Experiment 
4. Subjects took approximately thirty to forty minutes to complete phases 2 and 3 of Experiment 4. 
Where subjects were tested for backward digit span or reading span these tests were performed 
after the Experiment 5 had been completed. Subjects were given a series of empty three by two 
grids labelled for each of the eight description categories from Experiment 4. They were asked to 
produce spatial configurations of objects consistent with the original descriptions received in 
Experiment 4. The majority of subjects chose to write the names of items into the grids, though 
several subjects preferred to sketch the objects. The experimenter determined in which order the 
drawings were made by prompting each subject with the category type of each description in a 
random order. Within each configuration a record of the drawing order of the objects was made 
by the experimenter (refer to Experiment 1 for the procedure used to record drawing orders). 
4.2.2 Results 
Drawing recall of spatial descriptions 
Scoring 
Subjects' drawings were scored on a number of measures; object recall, relation recall and drawing 
order. Object recall was scored if a given object was present in the appropriate description. 
Relation recall was scored if, for a given sentence in the original description, both objects were 
located correctly with respect to each other. For each description a record was made if all objects 
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were correctly placed in the drawing (a completely correct drawing received a score of '1', an 
incomplete or inaccurate drawing received a score of '0'). In addition, for each description 
drawing order was measured by calculating Kendall's tau for each drawing order with respect to 
the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. For an illustration of how spatial 
mental model construction order was determined refer to Chapter 2 (note the spatial descriptions 
contained only asymmetric spatial relations). In the case of these descriptions the predicted 
spatial mental model construction order is '2-1-3-4-5' where each number indicates the serial 
position of that item in the original description. 
The influence of differences between descriptions on recall 
During the analysis of Experiment 4 it became apparent that there were strong effects of item 
difficulty on the overall results, in particular for the non-matching descriptions. Many subjects 
reported that one description was much easier to 'visualize' than the others ('Landmarks'), 
whilst other descriptions were consistently reported as being more difficult to imagine ('Garden 
Tools' and 'Plants' in particular). These impressions are supported by levels of recall on the 
drawing task. Figure 4.14 below shows the percentage of completely correct drawings by 
condition (note that each condition is associated with only a single description and hence 
category). Of particular interest is the difference between the reordered and stable descriptions 
despite the fact that this variable is not implicated in the drawing task. 
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Figure 4.14: The Percentage of correct drawings by description type. 
These scores were compared across items using Wilcoxon tests for all thirty subjects. The 
proportion of correct drawings for the 'Garden Tools' (DNS), 'Landmarks' (DNR) and 'Plants' 
(INS) descriptions were significantly different from the overall mean (Z = -3.03, two-tailed p= 
0.0025; Z= -2.51, two-tailed p=0.012 and Z= -3.75, two-tailed p=0.0002 respectively). These 
results support the interpretation of the effect of reordering in Experiment 4. It may be that the 
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lack of an effect of reordering for the matching descriptions may be caused by differences in 
memorability between the descriptions. This possibility is explored more fully in Experiment 6a. 
For the majority of the remaining analyses data are averaged over several descriptions 
to minimize the differences due to the content of the descriptions themselves. However, the 
remaining analyses involve comparisons within descriptions for the order or probability of 
recall. For this reason the large differences in recall between particular descriptions should not 
greatly influence the results. 
Overall object recall 
Percentage object recall for determinate and indeterminate descriptions was calculated for each 
object in the eight descriptions. From these a mean level of recall for the item in each serial 
position was obtained. Averaging recall over all eight descriptions reduces the influences of 
distinctiveness of individual items or association between pairs of items. These are summarized 
by item in Figure 4.15. 
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Figure 4.15: Percentage recall of objects by order and description type. 
The predicted pattern of results for the mental models and episodic construction trace account 
(mean recall decreasing in the order second object, first object, third object, fourth object and fifth 
object) was analyzed using the Page test for ordered alternatives (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). 
This was found to be significant for the overall pattern (L = 1450, N= 30, Z estimate = 3.65, one- 
tailed p<0.0002) as well as separately for the determinate (L = 1437.5, N= 30, Z estimate = 3.20, 
one-tailed p<0.0013). There was also a trend in this direction for the indeterminate 
descriptions, though this did not reach significance (L = 1393.5, N= 30, Z estimate = 1.59, one- 
tailed p=0.057). 
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The findings for object recall thus seem to support the prediction that the probability of 
recalling an object from early in the spatial mental model construction is higher than that for 
objects later in the construction process. This relationship is particularly marked for the first two 
objects in a determinate description. This supports the view that later objects added to a spatial 
mental model improve recall for objects, because spatial mental model construction for the 
determinate descriptions proceeds until all five objects are added to the model. Spatial mental 
model construction for the indeterminate descriptions is likely to break down when the 
indeterminacy is reached (at the third, fourth or fifth object). This may also explain the weaker 
relationship between spatial mental model construction order and recall for the indeterminate 
description. 
Overall relation recall 
The percentage recall of each relation for determinate and indeterminate descriptions was 
calculated for all descriptions. These are summarized in Figure 4.16 below. 
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Figure 4.16: Percentage recall of spatial relations by order and description type 
These data was analyzed using the Page test for ordered alternatives. The predicted trend is for 
recall to decrease steadily from the first to last spatial relation. The first relation is predicted 
to be recalled best because it is between the first and second objects integrated into the spatial 
mental model. The resulting test statistic was significant (L = 829, N= 30, Z estimate = 5.00, one- 
tailed p<0.0001). When analyzed separately for the two description types the trend is 
significant for both determinate (L = 822.5, N= 30, Z estimate = 4.59, one-tailed p<0.0001) and 
for indeterminate descriptions (L = 793, N= 30, Z estimate = 2.72, one-tailed p=0.033). Again the 
results are in favour of the predicted relationship between spatial mental model construction and 
recall. This suggests that not only are early objects more likely to be recalled, but that the 
spatial relationships between them are better remembered. 
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Overall drawing order 
It was possible to calculate the Kendall's tau between drawing order and spatial mental model 
construction order for drawings where subjects had recalled at least four objects from the original 
description. The tau values for the incomplete drawings provide a generous estimate of the 
association possible by chance. If tau values for complete drawings (whether correct or incorrect) 
exceed those of incomplete drawings it is possible to argue beyond reasonable doubt that they 
would also exceed those obtainable by chance or by the intrusion of preferred drawing orders. 
Figure 4.17 shows the mean tau values for determinate and indeterminate descriptions according 
to whether subjects drew the description correctly, incorrectly or incompletely (i. e. only four 
items were recalled). 
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Figure 4 , 17, Mean tau values 
for determinate and indeterminate descriptions 
Differences between these tau values were examined using related t-tests. Over all eight 
descriptions the tau values were higher for the correct and incorrect descriptions where all five 
objects were recalled than when only four objects were recalled (t = 2.52, d. f. = 20, one-tailed p= 
0.0093). Tau values for determinate and indeterminate descriptions do not differ significantly. 
These tau values are far higher than would be expected for any chance relationship between 
spatial mental model construction order and drawing order. This suggests that drawing orders are 
influenced by the order of spatial mental model construction. 
Frequency of object occurrence 
A serious methodological problem arises when looking at overall levels of recall (where mean 
object recall is calculated over all eight descriptions for each subject). Predicted spatial mental 
model construction order is partially confounded with frequency (the number of times an object 
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occurs in the description). Within each description one object is mentioned three times and 
another object is mentioned twice. In general, early objects are mentioned more often than late 
objects. For this reason frequency differences are unlikely to be wholly responsible for the 
drawing order effects obtained, though they may contribute to them. It should also be noted that 
the fifth object in the description never occurs more than once yet is most often drawn last and is 
recalled worst. Figure 4.18 shows the overall relationship between frequency and probability of 
recall for determinate and indeterminate descriptions. The figures for objects mentioned only once 
(FQ = 1) are the earliest mentioned object mentioned once in each description. 
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Figure 4.18: Percentage recall by object frequency for determinate and indeterminate descriptions 
This trend is significant for the indeterminate descriptions (L = 376.5, N= 30, Z estimate = 2.13, 
one-tailed p=0.017) but not the determinate descriptions (L = 358.5, N= 30, Z estimate = -0.19, 
one-tailed p=0.42). The frequency of object occurrence is a significant predictor of recall for 
indeterminate descriptions, but not determinate descriptions. This suggests that the recall of 
determinate descriptions is not significantly contaminated by the number times each object is 
mentioned in the original description. 
For individual descriptions the spatial mental model construction order and the order 
predicted by frequency can differ. The remaining results sections examine drawing order and 
probability of recall for individual descriptions where predictions from frequency and spatial 
mental model construction order differ. The best recalled determinate and indeterminate 
description are used to illustrate these patterns. 
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Memory for the determinate 'landmarks' description 
This was the single best remembered description in the drawing task. Figure 4.19 shows mean 
percentage recall by item for the 'Landmarks' description. The trend depicted in the graph 
differs from that predicted by frequency (the most frequently mentioned landmarks were item 1 
followed by item 4). This trend is was analyzed using a trend test for dichotomous data 
(Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1967; Meddis, 1984). Even though for many subjects recall was at 
ceiling this trend was still significant (N = 30, Z estimate = 2.18, one-tailed p=0.015). 
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Figure 4.19: Percentage mean recall by item for the'Landmarks' description 
The drawing orders of items in the 'Landmarks' description were also analyzed. This analysis 
was carried out between items using the Jonckheere trend test. Figure 4.20 shows the mean 
drawing order for all five items in the description. The analysis excludes those subjects who drew 
less than four items. 
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Figure 4.20: Mean serial position in which items in the'Landmarks' description were drawn. 
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This trend was significant (J = 5685.5, N= 27, J* = 7.93, one-tailed p<0.0001). While mean 
drawing order deviates from that predicted by the spatial mental model construction account for 
the first two items it should be noted that the second item was drawn first more often than the 
first item. 
Memory for the indeterminate 'condiments' description 
This was the single best remembered indeterminate description in the drawing task. Figure 4.21 
shows mean percentage recall by item for the 'Condiments' description. The trend depicted in the 
graph is similar to that predicted by frequency (the most frequent condiments in the original 
description were item 2 followed by item 3). This trend was analyzed using a trend test for 
dichotomous data. This trend was not significant (N = 30, Z estimate = -0.22, one-tailed p= 
0.41). 
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Figure 4.21: Percentage mean recall by item for the 'Condiments' description 
The drawing orders of items in the 'Condiments' description were also analyzed. This analysis 
was carried out between items using the Jonckheere trend test. Figure 4.22 shows the mean 
drawing order for all five items in the description. The analysis excludes those subjects who drew 
less than four items. 
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Figure 4.22: Mean serial position in which items in the 'Condiments' description were drawn 
This trend was significant (J = 3783.5, N= 26, J* = 1.66, one-tailed p=0.049). While mean 
drawing order deviates from that predicted by the spatial mental model construction account for 
the first two items it should be noted that the second item was drawn first more often than the 
first item. 
Which items are drawn first? 
The spatial mental model account predicts that the second item from the original spatial 
descriptions should be drawn first. Figure 4.23 shows the frequency with which the first item 
drawn is the first (item 1), second (item 2) or other item from the original description. 
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Figure 4.23: Frequency (FQ) with which the first, second or any other item is drawn first 
(determinate descriptions only). 
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Figure 4.24 shows the frequency with which items are drawn first for the indeterminate 
descriptions. 
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Figure 4.24: Frequency (FQ) with which the first, second or any other item is drawn first 
(indeterminate descriptions only). 
For the determinate descriptions the second item is most likely to be drawn first. For the 
indeterminate descriptions the first item is more likely to be drawn first. However, the 
differences are quite small and the overall pattern does not reach significance. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
There is a strong relationship between drawing recall and the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction for determinate descriptions. This is shown both in the drawing orders people 
adopt when asked to draw out the spatial descriptions they have read and probability that a 
particular spatial relationship or item is recalled. The earlier an item is integrated into a 
spatial mental model the more likely it is to be recalled, and, if recalled, the earlier it is drawn. 
This is consistent with research that proposes memory for determinate spatial descriptions is 
based on memory for a spatial mental model or for its construction (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). It also supports other research that proposes that drawing a 
spatial description involves mentally reconstructing a spatial mental model of a learned 
environment (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). Two alternative explanations of ordinal 
patterns of recall can be rejected. There is no evidence of a recency effect or of depressed recall for 
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items in the middle of the determinate descriptions. Therefore an explanation in terms of a 
classic serial position effect, for example, for a list of items or for the propositions of a text is not 
supported (Craik, 1970; Freebody & Anderson, 1986). Nor is the pattern of recall for determinate 
descriptions predicted by the frequency with which objects in a given description are mentioned. 
Therefore the results cannot be explained in terms of frequency. 
Order of spatial mental model construction is a poorer predictor of the probability of 
recall than frequency for indeterminate descriptions. Although there is also a relationship 
between the order of spatial mental model construction and drawing recall, overall tau values for 
the drawing orders of indeterminate descriptions do not differ significantly from those of the 
determinate descriptions. Also drawing orders for the best remembered indeterminate 
descriptions are significantly related to the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. It therefore appears that drawing order but not probability of recall are consistent 
with the construction and retention of spatial mental models. An obvious explanation for this 
difference is that the analysis of drawing orders excludes those cases where fewer than four of 
the five items in the descriptions are recalled. Where indeterminate descriptions are best 
remembered patterns of recall are more consistent with the construction of a coherent and 
relatively complete spatial mental model. The probability that a given spatial relation from 
the original description is recalled is also related to the order of spatial mental model 
construction. This makes sense if the spatial properties of the drawing are influenced by memory 
for a spatial mental model. Where a complete or coherent spatial mental model was not 
constructed other factors, in particular frequency, determine whether an object is recalled. The 
influence of frequency on recall for indeterminate descriptions, but not determinate descriptions, 
suggests that people may be remembering the language of the description. Items mentioned in 
more than one sentence are more likely to be recalled. This is consistent with the interaction 
between determinacy and gist or verbatim recognition obtained in Experiment 4 (Mani & Johnson- 
Laird, 1982). 
This experiment has replicated a number of findings obtained with the more elaborate or 
complex spatial descriptions used in Chapter 3 (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991). One 
finding, however, has not been replicated. The spatial mental model account predicts that for 
these spatial descriptions the second item should be drawn first. While the second item was 
drawn first for most of the determinate descriptions and many of the indeterminate descriptions 
these differences were not significant. The overall probability of recall for the second item in a 
description was also higher than for any other item for both determinate and indeterminate 
descriptions. The evidence is thus consistent with the findings obtained in Chapter 4. One 
problem may be that exposure to reordered and inferable descriptions (in most cases with 
different first sentences) in the surprise recognition test (Experiment 4) may have introduced 
more error into the data. Another is that frequency may influence whether an item is drawn first 
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or second (even though there is no evidence that frequency influences other measures of recall for 
the determinate descriptions). 
Overall the data support the hypothesis that people remember the structure of a 
spatial mental model and the process of its construction. The findings are complementary to the 
studies described in Chapter 3. In particular they support the conclusions of Experiment 4. 
However, they also confirm the suggestion that simple spatial descriptions of the type used here 
or by Johnson-Laird (1983) and Payne (1993) can vary considerably in memorability. 
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4.3 Experiment 6a 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate differences in difficulty in remembering 
different spatial descriptions of the kind used in this Chapter and in a number of other studies 
(Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1984; 
Payne, 1993). A number of subjects mentioned that one description 'Landmarks' was particularly 
easy to visualize or picture and hence to remember subsequently. It is therefore reasonable to 
predict that measures of imagery values for items in the spatial descriptions may influence 
memorability. 
This study was made up of two stages. In the first stage imagery, concreteness and 
meaningfulness values were obtained for the nouns contained in the eight spatial descriptions 
used earlier in this chapter. These values were then correlated with the number of correctly 
drawn descriptions in Experiment 5 and the verbatim and gist recognition scores obtained for each 
description in Experiment 4. In the second stage twenty-four new spatial descriptions (twelve 
determinate and twelve indeterminate) were generated. These spatial descriptions were then 
rated for difficulty by a sample of subjects from Experiment 4. The purpose of this was to select 
eight spatial descriptions which are neither particularly easy nor particularly difficult to 
remember for use in Experiment 6b. 
4.3.1 Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-four rating questionnaires were sent out for stage two of the experiment. Eighteen people 
completed and returned the rating questionnaires. All the subjects had taken part in Experiment 4 
or the pilot experiment for Experiment 4. Ten of the questionnaires were for indeterminate 
descriptions and eight for determinate descriptions. 
Materials and procedure 
The materials used in stage one of the experiment came from one of two sources. The eight spatial 
descriptions were taken from Experiment 4. The imagery norms were taking from those published 
by Paivio, Yuille and Madigan (1968). It should be noted that these norms were not produced by a 
British sample. However, all the nouns were common and were of everyday objects. In addition, 
there is evidence that the imagery norms do not differ greatly from those of British subjects (see 
Morris & Reid, 1972). Imagery norms were not available for all of the nouns in all of the 
descriptions (in fact for the 'Garden Tools' description no imagery norms were available). Where 
norms for several nouns were available the mean value was taken for the correlation. 
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Determinate template 1 
The A is to the left of the B 
The C is to the right of the B 
The D is in front of the A 
The E is in front of the B 
Determinate template 2 
The A is behind the B 
The A is to the left of the C 
The A is to the right of the D 
The D is behind the E 
Determinate template 3 
The A is to the left of the B 
The B is behind the C 
The D is to the left of the C 
The E is in front of the C 
Determinate template 4 
The A is in front of the B 
The A is behind the C 
The A is to the left of the D 
The E is behind the D 
The materials used in stage two were generated especially for this experiment. Twelve 
determinate descriptions were generated using the four determinate descriptions from 
Experiment 4 as templates (see Figure 4.25 for the four templates obtained). These were turned 
into descriptions by using twelve common categories which contained at least five relatively 
common objects. Objects were randomly assigned to each of the five serial positions in a 
description. Twelve indeterminate descriptions were generated by changing one spatial relation 
in each of the determinate descriptions. A rating questionnaire was constructed for the twelve 
determinate and the twelve indeterminate descriptions. People were asked to rate each of the 
twelve descriptions according to how difficult it was to understand the spatial relationships 
between objects in the description. They were provided with a rating scale from one ('very 
difficult') to seven ('very easy'). 
4.3.2 Results 
The relationship between imagery norms and memorability 
Values for imagery, concreteness and meaningfulness were correlated with the number of 
correctly drawn descriptions (Experiment 5) and the level of gist and verbatim recognition 
(Experiment 4) for seven of the eight spatial descriptions used earlier in this chapter. The 
subsequent correlations are depicted in Figure 4.26. 
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Figure 4.26: Correlations between imagery values and memory scores. 
These figures were obtained using the Pearson product-moment correlation. The only positive 
correlations are between meaningfulness and gist recognition or drawing recall. The relationship 
between meaningfulness and the number of correctly drawn descriptions is significant (r = 0.727, N 
= 7, one tailed p<0.05). There is also a significant negative relationship between concreteness 
and gist recognition (r = 0.895, N=7, one tailed p<0.005). However, it should be noted that 
small data sets (N = 7) greatly reduces the power of the statistical test used. 
Ratings for the determinate descriptions 
Ratings for the determinate descriptions were analyzed by ranking the ratings within subjects. 
Figure 4.27 shows the mean rank and standard deviation for all twelve of the determinate 
descriptions (in decreasing order of difficulty from top to bottom). 
Determinate Mean Rank Standard Template 
description Deviation 
Transport 3.38 2.53 2 
Stationery 4.56 1.86 2 
Tools 4.81 3.08 3 
Tableware 5.06 2.71 4 
Chess Pieces 6.25 3.67 4 
Musical Inst. 6.31 2.63 3 
Creatures 6.31 1.80 4 
Clothing 6.31 1.80 2 
Furniture 6.50 3.46 3 
Buildings 7.00 3.24 1 
Fruit 8.44 2.20 1 
Condiments 9.19 2.05 1 
-0.205 -0.667 0.727 
-0.483 -0.107 -0.331 
-0.128 -0.895 0.482 
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Also indicated are the templates from which each description was generated. The determinate 
descriptions eventually used in Experiment 6b are in italics. The 'Creatures' description was not 
included in order to make it possible to select the indeterminate 'Creatures' description (see 
below). For the determinate descriptions there was clearly a marked difference in difficulty 
between items. There is some evidence that the way the description is phrased also influences 
perceived difficulty. Template 1 seems to be easiest, while template 2 seems to be hardest. 
Ratings for the indeterminate descriptions 
Rating for the indeterminate descriptions were analyzed in the same manner as the determinate 
descriptions. Figure 4.28 shows the mean rank and standard deviation for all twelve of the 
indeterminate descriptions (in decreasing order of difficulty from top to bottom). The range of 
perceived difficulty is smaller than that for the determinate descriptions. The variance within 
descriptions, though, appears to be greater. As with the determinate descriptions certain 
templates appear to produce more difficult descriptions than others. Template 2 appears to be 
relatively difficult and template 4 relatively easy (the templates for indeterminate 
descriptions differ from those of the determinate descriptions by a single altered spatial 
relation). 
Indeterminate Mean Rank Standard Template 
description Deviation 
Transport 3.75 2.14 2 
Condiments 5.06 1.79 1 
Stationery 5.20 3.08 2 
Clothing 5.81 2.97 2 
Furniture 6.19 2.84 3 
Musical Inst. 6.31 2.98 3 
Buildings 6.38 2.93 1 
Fruit 6.44 3.36 1 
Creatures 6.88 2.93 4 
Chess Pieces 6.93 4.46 4 
Tools 7.00 2.83 3 
Tableware 8.13 2.03 4 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
When people are asked to rate simple determinate or indeterminate spatial descriptions the 
perceived difficulty of descriptions can vary considerably. For some descriptions these ratings 
are relatively consistent while others (especially some of the indeterminate descriptions) can 
produce very inconsistent ratings. The ratings obtained in this study were used to select ten 
spatial descriptions for Experiment 6b. The easiest determinate and the easiest indeterminate 
description were taken for use as practice items. Four determinate descriptions from the middle 
of the rankings were taken for the experiment proper. Four indeterminate descriptions were 
taken from the middle or the high end of the rankings to make certain that particularly 
difficult indeterminate descriptions were not used. Care was taken to avoid choosing 
indeterminate and determinate descriptions with the same category name to avoid confusion. 
One indeterminate description ('Chess Pieces') was excluded because of the very high variance 
among the ranks assigned to it. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no evidence that imagery or concreteness (Paivio et al., 
1968) were good predictors of recall or recognition for the descriptions used in Experiment 4. It is 
possible that the available norms are not sufficiently spread out to obtain reliable correlations 
because all the nouns used were concrete and high in imagery value. Also, the size of the sample 
may have contributed to the lack of a significant correlation (though it could not explain the 
apparent negative relationship between imagery and recall). There is some evidence to suggest 
that meaningfulness is related to recall for the spatial descriptions. Meaningfulness is measured 
by the number of associated words which can be written down for a given word within a certain 
time limit. It is possible that the advantage of well remembered descriptions like 'Landmarks' 
is that the different items in the description are higher in activation or association strength in 
long-term memory. Imagery may increase the association between elements in long-term memory 
when it relates two or more items together (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Marschark, 1985; 
Marschark & Surian, 1989). The negative correlation between concreteness and gist recognition 
scores from Experiment 4 is also interesting. A similar negative correlation was obtained by 
Richardson (1987) between concrete versions of a three-term series task and reasoning 
performance. Richardson interpreted that finding as evidence that people utilized an amodal 
representation during reasoning. Presumably a very concrete representation interferes or competes 
with the amodal representations which people use to reason with (e. g. a concrete representation 
may require greater effort to construct, but provide no additional help in solving the three-term 
series problem). Such an interpretation would also be consistent with the abstract, structural, 
characteristics of a spatial mental model (see section 2.1.4), but not with the use of visual 
imagery. Of course other factors, such as the way a given description is structured, probably also 
influence the actual and perceived difficulty of a given description. 
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4.4 Experiment 6b 
This experiment attempted to replicate and extend the findings obtained in Experiment 4. A 
number of important changes were made to the materials and procedures used in this study. The 
spatial descriptions used in the study were chosen from those rated in Experiment 6a in order to 
minimize differences in perceived difficulty between them. In Experiment 4 there were no 
differences in memory for descriptions that had been presented once or three times. In this study 
rather than manipulate the number of presentations it was decided to limit the amount of time a 
person could take with each description. To this end, mode of presentation was manipulated in 
order to investigate memory for a spatial mental model. The eight spatial descriptions used in 
the experiment were also divided into two sets. These two sets were counterbalanced for mode of 
presentation, order of presentation and for reordering in the phase 2 recognition task. 
Half the spatial descriptions were presented, as before, in a written form. The remaining 
descriptions were read out loud to the subjects. It was predicted that people who heard the 
descriptions would have less time to elaborate their representation and hence tend to remember 
only the process of spatial mental model construction, for example in the form of an episodic 
construction trace (Payne, 1993). Descriptions which are read should provide more opportunity 
for elaboration and, as in Experiment 4, both the spatial mental model and the construction 
process should be remembered. Where both spatial mental model and episodic construction trace 
are remembered reordering should depress verbatim recognition more than gist. The inferable 
description has the same trace overlap as the reordered original and therefore the episodic 
construction trace should not support gist memory. 
4.4.1 Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-seven members of staff or postgraduate students from the Open University volunteered to 
take part in the experiment. Each subject was offered two pounds in return for taking part. The 
age range of the subjects was from early twenties to mid forties. 
Design 
Two tasks were used in this experiment; a diagram matching task (phase 1) and a surprise 
recognition task (phase 2). There were three within subjects factors; mode of presentation 
(whether the spatial descriptions were read or heard), determinacy of the spatial descriptions 
(determinate or indeterminate) and the stability of the recognition items (whether the original 
description was stable or reordered in the recognition test). The two dependent variables were 
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verbatim recognition and gist recognition (see the results section for details of how these were 
scored). The eight spatial descriptions were randomly assigned to these eight conditions. 
Materials 
Ten spatial descriptions were used in the experiment. They were constructed according to the 
procedures described by Payne (1993). Eight descriptions were chosen in order to minimize 
differences in memorability from a set of twenty-four items previously rated for difficulty (see 
Experiment 6a). The easiest determinate and easiest indeterminate description were chosen as 
the two practice items. The eight remaining spatial descriptions were divided into two sets (1 
and 2) each containing two determinate and two indeterminate descriptions. Materials for the 
phase 1 diagram matching task were constructed slightly differently than in Experiment 4. One 
incorrect and one correct diagram was created for each description presented in the experiment. 
The correct diagrams depicted a configuration of five objects consistent with the four spatial 
relations of the original description. The incorrect diagram depicted the same array with one 
alteration. The alteration was consistent with three of the four spatial relations of the original 
spatial descriptions but violated the remaining spatial relation. 
For phase 2 two sets of recognition materials were prepared. For set A half the 
determinate and half the original indeterminate spatial descriptions were randomly selected 
and reordered. In set B the reordered items from set A were replaced with the stable original 
descriptions. The remaining original descriptions were then reordered. As in Experiment 4 the 
recognition materials consisted of an original description (stable or reordered), an inferable 
description and two foils. The reordered original, inferable and two foils were constructed in the 
same way as those in Experiment 4 (Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). Each recognition 
item (apart from the stable or reordered originals) contained one sentence in common with the 
original description. A trace overlap of one was preserved between the original description and 
the reordered original, inferable and the two foils. 
Procedure 
The same general procedure as that in Experiment 4 was adopted (Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; 
Payne, 1993). Slight changes were made to the instructions for phase 1. Before carrying out the 
two practice trials subjects were given a sheet of paper explaining how the diagrams for the 
phase 1 matching task were depicted. In particular it was indicated that spatial relations such 
as 'in front of' did not include 'diagonally in front of'. It was also indicated that where a given 
spatial relation between two objects was used it was possible for there to be an intervening object. 
For the practice items and for the initial set of descriptions in the diagram matching task (set 1 
or set 2) the mode of presentation was kept constant (the descriptions were either read or heard). 
For the second set of descriptions (either set 1 or set 2) a different mode of presentation (read or 
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heard) was used. Where descriptions were read the subject was presented with a card containing 
the description and asked to indicate when he or she was ready to proceed with the diagram 
matching task. Where descriptions were heard the experimenter read each description twice, in 
order. The experimenter paused at the end of each sentence and when the subject indicated they 
were ready went on and read the next sentence. In the practice trials and in the main experiment 
each subject saw two diagrams for each spatial description. One diagram was correct and one 
incorrect. The two diagrams were presented in a random order immediately after the 
appropriate original spatial description had been read or heard. Subjects were asked to respond 
'good match' or 'bad match' for each of the ten spatial descriptions presented in the practice task 
and the rest of phase 1. 
The procedure for the phase 2 recognition test also differed only slightly from that in 
Experiment 4. Each subject was presented with one of two sets of recognition materials (set A or 
set B) to ensure that each original description was presented in both stable and reordered forms 
during the recognition task. Before phase 2 the recognition materials were shuffled to ensure 
that the items in the recognition task was completed in a random order. Mode of presentation, 
the order of descriptions sets (1 or 2) in phase 1 and the recognition materials in phase 2 (set A or 
B) were counterbalanced between subjects. This and the random ordering of descriptions within 
phase 1 and 2 controlled for consistent time differences between learning and test conditions. 
4.4.2 Results 
Performance on the diagram matching task 
Overall performance (79%) on the diagram matching task was lower than that of subjects in 
Experiment 4. Out of twenty-seven subjects four people scored lower than fifty percent when 
matching either the determinate descriptions, the indeterminate descriptions or both. These four 
subjects were excluded from the remaining analyses. 
Overall recognition performance 
Mean recognition scores are summarized by description type in Figure 4.29 below. As before 
chance performance is 25% for verbatim recognition and 16.7% for gist recognition. The pattern of 
results is relatively complex. For this reason, levels of gist and verbatim recognition performance 
are analyzed in more detail below. 
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Description e Verbatim Gist 
Determinate Stable 58.7 % 73.9 % 
Reordered 58.7% 60.9 % 
Indeterminate Stable 73.9 % 50.0 % 
Reordered 30.4 % 34.8 % 
Figure 4.29: Mean percentage verbatim and gist recognition by description type 
Is there an interaction between determinacy and type of recognition memory? 
Overall recognition performance showed a pattern consistent with memory for a spatial mental 
model; gist memory was higher for determinate descriptions and verbatim memory was higher 
for indeterminate descriptions. Figure 4.30 shows the interaction between determinacy and gist or 
verbatim recognition. 
However, this analysis gives a misleading picture of recognition performance for 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions. Close inspection of Figure 4.29 above will reveal 
that memory for the reordered indeterminate descriptions is barely above chance. It is possible 
that this floor effect is partially concealing an interaction between determinacy and type of 
recognition memory. In addition to the overall analysis reported above recognition performance 
was analyzed separately for stable and reordered descriptions. 
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Figure 4.30: Mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition by We of description. 
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Figure 4.31 below depicts the crossover interaction for stable descriptions only. The significance 
of this interaction was tested using a chi square design (refer to Experiment 4 for a detailed 
discussion of the scoring and analysis of the interaction predicted by Mani and Johnson-Laird). 
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Figure 4.31: Mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition by type of description (stable 
descriptions ). 
The analysis compares the frequency with which determinate and indeterminate descriptions 
supported gist or verbatim recognition (as before, data points were pooled across subjects as well 
as across descriptions). The contingency table for the chi square test is shown in Figure 4.32 below: 
Type of recognition: 
Verbatim Gist 
Type of description: 
Determinate 4 11 
Indeterminate 13 3 
Figure 4.32: The frequency of verbatim or gist recognition for determinate and indeterminate 
descriptions (stable descriptions only) 
Because of the low frequencies in two of the cells these data were analyzed with the Fisher 
Exact test. This confirmed that this pattern of cell frequencies was significant (N = 31, one tailed 
p=0.0031). This replicates the finding from Experiment 4 that gist recognition scores are higher 
for determinate descriptions and verbatim recognition scores are higher for indeterminate 
descriptions. 
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Does reordering depress recognition memory? 
The overall effect of reordering on memory was analyzed separately for gist and verbatim 
recognition. Figure 4.33 shows mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition for stable and 
reordered descriptions. Differences were tested using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. 
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Figure 4.33: Mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition for stable and reordered descriptions 
This was significant for both verbatim (N = 23, Z=2.55, two tailed p=0.011) and for gist 
recognition (N = 23, Z=2.12, two-tailed p=0.034). There is also evidence of an interaction 
between the stability of the recognition test item and determinacy. This interaction is 
investigated further in the next section. 
The effect of reordering on determinate and indeterminate descriptions 
Examination of Figure 4.29 above shows that reordering appears to depress verbatim recognition 
virtually to chance levels for the indeterminate descriptions and to have little or no effect on 
determinate verbatim descriptions. This pattern, however, does not occur for gist recognition 
suggesting that there is a three-way interaction between determinacy, reordering and type of 
recognition. Because of the difficulties of analyzing three-way interactions using non-parametric 
methods analyses of two-way interactions were carried out separately for gist and verbatim 
recognition scores. This was done using post-hoc non-parametric factorial analysis of variance 
(Meddis, 1984). Figure 4.34 shows the interaction between determinacy and reordering on 
verbatim recognition performance. 
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This interaction on verbatim recognition performance was significant on a post-hoc test for an 
interaction (H = 7.79, N= 23, Hcrit = 6.25, one tailed p<0.05). 
Figure 4.35 depicts the level of determinate and indeterminate gist recognition scores for 
reordered and stable descriptions. There is a significant main effect of determinacy (H = 12.54, N 
= 23, Hcrit = 7.79, p<0.01) and of reordering on gist recognition (see previous section). However, 
there is no evidence of a significant interaction between the two (H = 0.096, N= 23, Hcrit = 7.79, p 
= n. s. ). 
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Figure 4.35: The effects of reordering and determinacy gist recognition. 
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Recognition memory for heard descriptions 
Figure 4.36 shows the pattern of verbatim and gist recognition for the different types of spatial 
descriptions that were heard by subjects. The recognition scores are similar to those for overall 
recognition (see Figure 4.29 above). There is one important difference. Unlike the overall 
recognition scores reordering depresses verbatim and gist memory for both determinate and 
indeterminate descriptions. 
Description type Verbatim Gist 
Determinate Stable 69.6 % 82.6 % 
Reordered 60.9 % 60.7 % 
Indeterminate Stable 78.3 % 52.2% 
Reordered 34.8 % 30.4 % 
Figure 4.36: Mean percentage verbatim and gist recognition by description e (heard 
descriptions only. 
Recognition for the reordered indeterminate descriptions is barely above chance. For this reason 
recognition memory for the reordered descriptions was not included in the analysis of the 
interaction between determinacy and type of recall. The crossover interaction predicted by the 
spatial mental model account (high gist memory for determinate descriptions and high verbatim 
memory for the indeterminate descriptions) is present for the stable descriptions. This was tested 
using a chi square design (see above). This interaction was confirmed as significant for the stable 
descriptions using the Fisher Exact test (N = 17, one-tailed p=0.036). 
However, unlike the overall scores verbatim memory does not show a significant 
interaction between determinacy and reordering (L = 16, N= 23, Z=1.63, two-tailed p=0.10). 
The effect of reordering to reduce verbatim recognition (N = 23, Z=2.72, one-tailed p=0.033) and 
gist recognition (N = 23, Z=2.27, one-tailed p=0.012) is significant with the Wilcoxon signed- 
ranks test. The three-way interaction present in the overall analysis is not indicated in 
recognition performance when the descriptions are heard. 
Recognition memory for read descriptions 
Recognition memory for the descriptions read by subjects also shows similarities with overall 
recognition scores (see Figure 4.37 below and Figure 4.36 above). Again, however, it differs in one 
major respect. Verbatim recognition for reordered determinate descriptions is actually superior to 
that for stable determinate descriptions. This interaction between determinacy and reordering is 
significant for verbatim recognition (L = 24, N= 23, Z=2.45, two-tailed p=0.014) but not for gist 
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recognition. Therefore it appears that the three-way interaction between determinacy, type of 
recall and reordering found in the overall analysis is present in performance for read descriptions 
but not for heard descriptions (refer to Figures 4.29,4.36 and 4.37). 
Description type Verbatim Gist 
Determinate Stable 47.8 % 65.2 %a 
Reordered 56.5 % 60.9 % 
Indeterminate Stable 69.6 % 47.8 % 
Reordered 26.1 % 39.1 % 
Figure 4 . 37. Mean percentage verbatim and gist recognition 
by description tvne (read 
descriptions only, 
The effect of reordering on recognition was analyzed using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. For 
read descriptions reordering does not depress gist recognition (N = 23, Z=0.85, two-tailed p= 
0.40) or verbatim recognition significantly (N = 23, Z=1.56, two-tailed p=0.12). Only for read 
indeterminate descriptions does reordering significantly depress verbatim recognition (N = 23, Z 
= 2.53, two-tailed p=0.023). 
Memory for the language of the description 
When levels of verbatim recognition for reordered descriptions are above chance this does not 
necessarily imply that the language of the description has been remembered. However it is 
possible to estimate by how much verbatim memory exceeds chance under certain circumstances. 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
D Predicted verbatim racnnnitinn 
Figure 4.38: Observed and predicted verbatim recognition for reordered descriptions. 
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This is because where gist recognition for reordered descriptions exceeds verbatim recognition (as 
in this experiment) it indicates memory for a spatial mental model. Where gist recognition is 
present verbatim memory should be scored 50% of the time by chance. Where gist recognition is 
not present verbatim memory arises 25% of the time by chance. Figure 4.38 shows the levels of 
verbatim recognition predicted by chance and those actually observed for reordered descriptions > 
only. Only for determinate descriptions does verbatim recognition for reordered descriptions 
exceed that which can be accounted for by the observed level of gist recognition. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Constructing spatial mental models of spatial descriptions in working memory can result in the 
retention of three different kinds of memory trace; memory for the language of the description, 
memory for the construction of a spatial mental model or memory for the structure of a spatial 
mental model. In this experiment people who are presented with spatial descriptions are able to 
remember the structure of a spatial mental model. For determinate descriptions recognizing the 
structure of a spatial mental model is easier than recognizing the language of the original 
description. For indeterminate descriptions (where constructing a spatial mental model is 
difficult if not impossible) recognizing the language of the original description is easier than 
recognizing the spatial situation it describes. This crossover interaction is difficult to explain 
without proposing at least two different kinds of representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). One representation preserves the structure of the described 
situation, the other representation preserves information about the spatial description. The 
interaction is obtained even when descriptions are controlled for perceived difficulty, items on 
the recognition test are controlled for trace overlap or when the descriptions are heard rather 
than read. 
The effects of reordering on memory for the spatial descriptions in this experiment differ 
according to the determinacy of the description, whether gist or verbatim memory is analyzed 
and whether the descriptions are read or heard. For indeterminate descriptions reordering 
disrupts verbatim recognition almost to chance. In fact if gist recognition levels are taken into 
account verbatim recognition for reordered indeterminate descriptions is below chance in every 
case. 3 When descriptions are heard, reordering significantly depresses both gist and verbatim 
recognition memory for all descriptions (though only indeterminate verbatim recognition is 
- On average gist recognition should produce verbatim recognition fifty percent of the time. Chance 
verbatim recognition is 25%. The overall reordered indeterminate gist recognition is 34.8%. This predicts that 
verbatim recognition should be at (34.8 * 0.5) + ((100-34.8) * 0.25) = 33.7%. The actual level is 30.4%. 
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reduced to chance levels). When descriptions are read, reordering significantly depresses 
recognition memory for indeterminate descriptions. However, determinate descriptions that 
were read by subjects show no significant reductions in either verbatim or gist recall. 
These results suggest that memory for indeterminate descriptions (whether they are 
read or heard) is almost entirely based on a memory trace that is disrupted by reordering. This 
cannot be memory for the structure of a spatial mental model because a reordered description still 
describes the same situation. Nor can it be memory for the language of a description because 
reordering leaves the propositions of a description intact. However, a representation of the 
process and hence order of spatial mental model construction such as the episodic construction 
trace is disrupted by reordering the original description (Payne, 1993). The interaction between 
determinacy and type of recall indicates that memory for determinate descriptions appears to be 
based primarily on memory for the structure of the situation referred to by the description (Mani 
& Johnson-Laird, 1982). However, when a description is heard reordering also depresses gist and 
verbatim recognition for determinate descriptions. When a description is read reordering has 
little or no effect on recognition for determinate descriptions. 
These findings fit well with the spatial mental model account outlined in Chapter 2. 
When people read or hear descriptions they attempt to construct a spatial mental model. For 
determinate descriptions the spatial mental model they construct is coherent and complete. For 
indeterminate descriptions the spatial mental model they attempt to construct is often 
inconsistent or incomplete. At a later stage they are a given a recognition test. For the 
determinate descriptions they are able to identify those descriptions which are consistent with 
their memory of the spatial mental model they constructed. For the indeterminate descriptions 
few people will have been able to cope with the indeterminacy of the description. As they read 
the alternatives in the recognition test they attempt to construct spatial mental models of them. 
Where an original description has not been reordered the attempt to construct a spatial mental 
model will remind them of their previous attempt to construct a spatial mental model. Where 
the original description has been reordered the attempt to construct a spatial mental model 
during recognition will not remind them of their previous attempt to construct a spatial mental 
model. 
The different effect of reordering on determinate recognition depending on whether a 
description is read or heard is harder to explain. It cannot be the case that reading determinate 
descriptions provides more opportunity for an elaborate spatial mental model to be constructed; 
recognition memory for read descriptions is slightly worse than that when descriptions are 
heard. Also there is no obvious reason why good memory for a spatial mental model should 
prevent people remembering the process of its construction. Perhaps the opposite, that hearing a 
description results in a more elaborate spatial mental model is the case. Unfortunately this 
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explanation is problematic because it suggests that the construction of a spatial mental model is 
less likely to be remembered than the mental model itself. This is contradicted by recognition 
performance for indeterminate descriptions which appears to consist almost entirely of memory 
for an episodic construction trace. An alternative explanation rests on the possibility that there 
is something about hearing a description that promotes retention of an episodic construction trace 
or something about reading a description that interferes with it. 
Hearing a description ensures that each sentence is presented in order, while when a 
description is read some sentences may be read out of sequence. When hearing a description a 
person may concentrate harder on their attempt to construct a spatial mental model; they cannot 
deviate from the original order in any way. On rereading a description people may skip 
sentences that describe spatial relations they are sure about, they may even reread the whole 
description out of order e. g. in reverse. It is not suggested that people set out to read the 
description out of sequence but that once they have established the spatial relations between 
objects in a description they may rehearse, refresh or check their spatial mental model by 
reading sentences out of sequence. This may result in a less coherent episodic construction trace. 
The process of rereading may also improve memory for the language of the text, though there is 
no direct evidence for this. These differences may not be marked for indeterminate descriptions 
because of the difficulty in constructing a spatial mental model. When reading an indeterminate 
spatial description people may prefer not to deviate from the original order because the 
indeterminacy only arises later in the description (either in the second, third or fourth sentence). 
Thus hearing a spatial description may promote the retention of a single coherent episodic 
construction trace. Reading a spatial description may enable some readers to deviate from the 
spatial mental model construction order as they refresh or check the spatial mental model they 
have constructed. An alternative explanation is that reading, but not hearing, a description 
interferes with the spatial mental model construction process. However, this explanation does 
not explain why reading an indeterminate description would not interfere with spatial mental 
model construction. 
In this experiment people who read or heard spatial descriptions comprehend them by 
attempting to construct spatial mental models consistent with the information contained in the 
descriptions. If the spatial description was determinate they appear to remember the structure 
of the spatial mental model they constructed. They also show some evidence of memory for the 
language of the description. If the description was indeterminate they remember their attempt 
to construct a spatial mental model. They also show some evidence of memory for a spatial 
mental model of the indeterminate description, but no evidence of memory for the language of the 
description. For determinate descriptions there is no direct evidence that retention of an episodic 
construction trace precedes retention of the structure of a spatial mental model. The level of 
recognition memory for indeterminate descriptions suggests that retention of an episodic 
construction is possible even when little or no memory for a spatial mental model is observed. 
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4.5 General Discussion 
The three experiments reported in this chapter investigate the recognition and recall of short 
descriptions containing the spatial relations between five objects. It has been argued that, in 
each case, the findings support the account of spatial mental models outlined in Chapter 2. In 
that account three ways of remembering a spatial description were proposed. The following 
three sections briefly discuss the evidence in favour of each of the accounts. The predictions made 
by the three accounts are summarized in Figure 4.4 (repeated here for convenience). 
What is remembered: Prediction: 
The language of the description i) No effect of reordering. 
(comprehension processes) ii) Verbatim recognition higher than gist. 
An episodic construction trace i) Reordering reduces recognition. 
(construction processes) ii) Verbatim recognition higher than gist. 
The structure of a spatial mental model i) High determinate gist recognition. 
(consultation processes) ii) High indeterminate verbatim recognition. 
Figure 4.4: The predictions from three different accounts of memory for spatial descriptions. 
4.5.1 Memory for the language of a description 
In both Experiment 4 and 6b gist recognition scores are significantly higher than verbatim 
recognition scores for the determinate descriptions. This finding is inconsistent with an account 
which proposes that people remember only the sentences of the description (or a propositional 
representation based on those sentences). Further evidence against the view that people 
remember the language of the description is given by the positive correlation between backward 
digit span and gist recognition scores. If people learn and remember the sentences of the 
description measures of verbal short-term memory such as backward digit span should be 
correlated with verbatim recognition scores. In addition very few subjects reported remembering 
or trying to remember the language of the descriptions. The evidence suggests that remembering 
the sentences of a description is not a deliberate strategy adopted by many subjects. 
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While there is little evidence that remembering determinate descriptions involves 
memory for the language of the descriptions, this may not be the case for indeterminate 
descriptions. Memory for the language of the descriptions presented in Experiment 4 and 6b is 
indicated by the level of verbatim recognition for the reordered descriptions. The reordered 
descriptions exclude the possibility that verbatim recognition may be based on memory for an 
episodic construction trace (this point is addressed more fully in section 4.5.2 below). In 
Experiment 4 verbatim recognition scores slightly exceed gist recognition scores for the reordered 
indeterminate descriptions, though this difference is not significant (see Figure 4.6). In 
Experiment 5 the probability of recalling an object from an indeterminate description is predicted 
by the number of times that an object was mentioned in the original description. This is consistent 
with a propositional representation where objects mentioned in more than proposition are more 
likely to be recalled. Unfortunately, such a finding is consistent with memory for the sentences of 
the description or with an episodic construction trace. 
A more serious problem for any account which proposes that spatial descriptions are 
retained in a form close to that of the original language is that the sentences of indeterminate 
descriptions are not always remembered. In Experiment 6b verbatim recognition scores for the 
reordered indeterminate descriptions are barely above chance. This finding is a serious blow even 
to an account of memory for spatial descriptions which argues that the language of the 
description is retained only if a spatial mental model can not be constructed. It also rules out the 
Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) explanation of why verbatim recognition scores exceed gist 
recognition scores for indeterminate descriptions. It is not the case that people always switch to 
remembering the sentences of a description when spatial mental model construction is difficult or 
impossible. A similar finding has been observed by Gernsbacher (1990; 1991) who has shown that 
scrambling a story (which would make constructing a mental model more difficult) does not 
necessarily improve memory for the language of the story. A more plausible explanation is that 
people continue to attempt construction of a spatial mental model. Such an explanation could 
explain high verbatim recognition in the stable indeterminate descriptions in terms of people 
remembering their (probably unsuccessful) attempt to construct a spatial mental model. In 
conclusion, there is little evidence that people remember the language of the descriptions they 
have read. 
4.5.2 Memory for an episodic construction trace 
Memory for an episodic construction trace can be demonstrated if reordering a description impairs 
memory for that description in a recognition test. Reordering impairs recognition memory because 
it reduces the overlap between the operations used to construct the original, stable description 
and those used to construct the reordered description. Evidence for the effect of reordering is 
particularly strong when the original description was heard by subjects (as for half the 
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descriptions in Experiment 6b). This is consistent with the fact that when a description is heard 
it is virtually impossible for a listener to deviate from the order the description is presented in. 
When the description is written down it is possible for subjects to read sentences out of the 
original sequence (as they may have done for some descriptions in Experiment 6b). For the 
descriptions which were read by subjects the effect of reordering is significant for only some of 
the descriptions. In Experiment 4 only the matching descriptions showed an effect of reordering 
(this may have been due to differences in difficulty for the non-matching descriptions). In 
Experiment 6b only the indeterminate description read by the subjects showed a significant effect 
of reordering. Taken together these results support the conclusion that people do remember the 
process of spatial mental model construction, and that this memory may take the form of an 
episodic construction trace (Payne, 1993). 
However, the results obtained in Experiment 5 are problematic for the episodic 
construction trace hypothesis (though not necessarily for the view that people remember the 
process of spatial mental model construction). As predicted, objects and spatial relations from 
determinate descriptions are more likely to be drawn (and to be drawn earlier) if they are 
integrated into a spatial mental model early in its construction. The problem for the episodic 
construction trace is that this does not always appear to be the case for the indeterminate 
descriptions. Indeterminate descriptions show only a weak relationship between the probability 
of recalling an object and the order of spatial mental model construction. By contrast number of 
times an object was mentioned in the original description is a significant predictor of recall from 
an indeterminate description. This result suggests that recall for indeterminate, but not 
determinate descriptions, may be based on a propositional representation such as an episodic 
construction trace or memory for the sentences of the description (refer to section 4.5.1 above). 
The differences between memory for the indeterminate and determinate descriptions can 
not be accounted for by the current version of the episodic construction trace hypothesis. This is 
because the current version of the episodic construction trace hypothesis records operations in 
much the same way for both determinate and indeterminate descriptions. If the episodic 
construction trace is the source of all order effects in recall obtained in this thesis (like those 
discussed in Experiment 5 and those in Chapter 3) then those order effects should be obtained for 
both determinate and indeterminate descriptions. The picture is complicated slightly by the fact 
that drawing orders for the indeterminate descriptions do appear to show an above chance 
relationship with the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Indeterminate 
descriptions also show a significant relationship between memory for spatial relations and 
predicted spatial mental model construction order. One possible interpretation is that 
determinate descriptions result in a stronger episodic construction trace, but this explanation is 
inconsistent with the evidence that indeterminate descriptions are influenced more strongly than 
determinate descriptions by reordering. The conclusion favoured here is that memory for spatial 
mental model construction order is a result of a combination of both construction and consultation 
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processes (see 2.5.1). The basis of this interpretation is that determinate descriptions differ from 
indeterminate descriptions only in the extent to which it is possible to complete spatial mental 
model construction for them. A more detailed version of this explanation is considered in 
Chapter 6 (see sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.5). 
4.5.3 Memory for the structure of a spatial mental model 
Memory for the structure of a spatial mental model is indicated by gist recognition where subjects 
'recognize' an inferable description in a recognition test. The inferable description describes the 
same arrangement of objects as the original description subjects were presented with. In 
Experiments 4 and 6b the inferable description shares only one sentence with the original 
description, and only one of the operations used to construct a spatial mental model from the 
inferable description overlaps with the operations used to construct a spatial mental model from 
the original description. In both experiments gist recognition scores are higher than verbatim 
recognition scores where the description supports the construction of a single, coherent spatial 
mental model (i. e. where the description is determinate). This pattern is reversed for 
indeterminate description where more than one spatial mental model can be constructed. 
This interaction is very difficult to explain except by appealing to two kinds of 
representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). The first kind of 
representation, a spatial mental model, preserves the structure of the situation conveyed by a 
description. The second kind of representation must support verbatim recognition memory for the 
description, though it need not preserve the language of the description (see 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 
above). Further support for this distinction was obtained in Experiment 5. The order and 
probability of recall in a drawing task was significantly related to the order of spatial mental 
model construction, but only for the determinate descriptions. For the indeterminate descriptions 
the number of times an object was mentioned in a description was a better predictor of recall than 
spatial mental model construction order. Again, these findings are consistent with the view that 
people construct and remember spatial mental models when they are presented with determinate 
descriptions. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In the introduction to this chapter a hypothesis about the time course of memory for spatial 
descriptions was proposed. No direct evidence was obtained to suggest that the structure of a 
spatial mental model is only retained after an episodic construction trace has been formed. 
However, poor recognition for reordered indeterminate descriptions in the final experiment 
suggests that it is possible to retain an episodic construction trace without remembering the 
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structure of a spatial mental model, provided spatial mental model construction is difficult or 
incomplete. Two experiments have shown that people are able to remember both an episodic 
construction trace (Payne, 1993) and the structure of a spatial mental model (Mani & Johnson- 
Laird, 1982). A third experiment demonstrated that drawing order and the probability of recall 
from determinate spatial descriptions can be predicted by the order of spatial mental model 
construction. This supports the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3 that drawing a remembered scene 
involves reconstructing a spatial mental model (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991) and 
that items integrated into a spatial mental model early in its construction are remembered better 
(Denhiere & Denis, 1988; Gernsbacher, 1991). 
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Chapter 5- The long-term retention of spatial 
information 
This chapter investigates memory for spatial information in the form of maps, routes and verbal 
descriptions at retention intervals of months rather than minutes or hours. Many studies of very 
long-term memory have focused on knowledge gained during high school or university education 
(Bahrick, 1983; 1984; Cohen, 1989; Cohen, Conway, & Stanhope, 1992). A number of studies have 
investigated the retention of spatial information over intervals of months or years but these 
have focused almost exclusively on knowledge gained by navigation through the environment, 
typically a university campus (Bahrick, 1983; Herman, Cachuela, & Heins, 1987; Herman, Kail, 
& Siegel, 1979). The purpose of the experiments reported in this chapter determine whether the 
notion of a spatial mental model is a useful construct in predicting and explaining the retention of 
spatial information over very long retention intervals. Ecological validity is also an important 
reason for looking at the very long term retention of spatial information. Many areas of cognitive 
psychology rely on studies of long-term memory over very short retention intervals, minutes or 
sometimes hours. In real life the execution of plans, for navigation and many other activities 
require the retention of spatial information over periods of days, weeks and years. So it is 
important that findings from short retention intervals can be extended or mapped onto evidence 
from studies using very long retention intervals. 
Bahrick (1984) showed that deeply learned knowledge could remain stable over very 
long periods of time. His interpretation of this finding in terms of a 'permastore' has been 
challenged by Ulric Neisser. Neisser interpreted the same findings in terms of the retention of a 
schematic knowledge which permits specific details to be reconstructed. Studies by Cohen, 
Conway and Stanhope (1992) in several different areas of formal education have confirmed that 
high-level schematic knowledge is well-preserved. However, the same studies have also shown 
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that certain kinds of specific information, such as names, can be well remembered; a finding 
which is difficult to account for in terms of schema reconstruction. 
5.1 Very long term memory for pictures and places 
Several early studies of very long-term retention of spatial information explored recognition 
memory for pictures. Shepard (1967) presented a number of subjects with up to 600 pictures. With 
a mean duration of presentation of 5.9 seconds recognition memory was very high. On a forced 
choice recognition test median accuracy was 98.5% on an immediate test, 100% after two hours, 
93% after 3 days, 92% after 7 days and 57% after 120 days. While experiments like those of 
Shepard show that visual memory for a picture is excellent they say very little about memory 
for the spatial or structural characteristics of the pictures. 
1 
Virtually all other studies of very long term retention of spatial information have 
focused on memory for places acquired from navigation (Bahrick, 1983; Chase, 1983; Herman et 
al., 1979; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). The most comprehensive study of this kind by Harry 
Bahrick (1983) looked at 851 students' memories of Delaware up to fifty years after leaving the 
city. Bahrick found that most spatial knowledge was learned in the first three weeks and that 
when other factors (such as access to a car) were taken into account there were no reliable gender 
differences in spatial learning or memory. Knowledge of landmarks and buildings was gained 
more quickly than for the street network. This probably reflects the needs of the student 
population and the unsystematic arrangement of Delaware street names. 
2 The rate of forgetting 
was related to the rate of acquisition with street names and street order forgotten faster than 
landmark or building knowledge. A more recent experiment looked at memory for an unfamiliar 
outdoor environment learned in one or two short trips over a period of five months (Herman et al., 
1987). Taking a second trip through the environment did not improve bearing or distance 
estimates in the environment. Bearing and distance estimates of eight and eleven year olds 
declined from the spring to autumn retention interval, while those of nineteen year olds did not. 
These results were interpreted in terms of older subjects possessing more advanced and more 
flexible 'co-ordinate frames'. In other words retention is preserved through better integration of 
spatial information during encoding. An alternative explanation, that adults were better at 
using landmark pictures as retrieval cues was also considered. 
Nearly all of Shepard's materials depicted a single clear object. This, coupled with the short 
presentation times, might suggest that it is primarily the visual rather than the spatial or structural 
characteristics that are forming the basis of recognition. 
Bahrick cites research by Devlin (1976) where people show superior memory for street names and 
locations. Devlin's study was carried out in the town of Idaho Falls where streets are organized alphabetically. 
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What changes are likely to occur in spatial representations over time? The integration of 
spatial information into a single, coherent structure appears to be an important factor in the 
retention of spatial information. Information which is better integrated should be better 
retained. For landmarks acquired in a particular sequence (e. g. from a description or from 
traversing an actual route) this may mean that early landmarks are better remembered than 
later ones. An integrated spatial representation may also preserve global spatial relations 
better than local ones (because global spatial relations can usually be derived from several 
different local spatial relations). 
5.2 Recall, reconstruction or guesswork 
A major methodological problem in studies of long-term memory for meaningful information has 
already been hinted at. Recall may be strongly influenced by long-term memory schemas. 
Schematic knowledge may have driven the original learning episode or it may be used to 
reconstruct details. Generate-recognize theories of recall (Jones, 1978; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979) 
suggest a mechanism for this recall process (see section 1.6.2). Highly typical items are likely to 
be remembered better because they can be easily generated from schematic knowledge. Once 
generated they may be recognized or rejected. Indirect recall routes, such as generate-recognize, 
are also more likely to be employed when direct recall routes (Jones, 1978; 1982; 1987) are less 
accessible (e. g. at very long retention intervals). A different, but related problem is the possible 
use of 'guesswork' strategies by subjects. The use of indirect (generate-recognize) recall routes may 
be difficult to distinguish from guesswork, for instance when the to-be-remembered material 
contains a high proportion of typical items. 
The studies reported below attempt to account for schema-based recall and the use of 
guesswork strategies where subjects may mistake typicality or plausibility for genuine 
recognition. In all three experiments reported below errors of commission and errors of omission 
are reported separately. Guesswork might be indicated by errors of commission for typical items. 
Whereas schema-based recall might be indicated by errors of omission for low typicality items. 
In addition, for Experiment 7 probability of landmark recall is compared with typicality and 
frequency ratings carried out for the study. In Experiment 8 performance of experimental subjects 
was compared with that of a second group of subjects who had not taken part in the original 
learning episode. This second group of 'baseline' subjects were given explicit guesswork 
instructions (i. e. told to draw or generate plausible or typical items on each experimental task). 
They thus acted as a baseline for the level of 'recall' which could be predicted by guesswork 
strategies. 
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5.3 Very long term memory for spatial mental models 
Common findings from studies of long term retention in spatial and non-spatial domains suggest 
that the ability to integrate information into structured, stable knowledge structures is very 
important. An experiment by Waddell and Rogoff (1987) provides further support for this view. 
They found that intentional strategies relating object information to spatial location improved 
memory for location information. However, the role of schematic information at retrieval cannot 
be ruled out as a factor in superior memory for organized information. A number of studies have 
shown that schemas can influence recall or recognition even when activated after encoding has 
taken place (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Pichert & Anderson, 1977). 
If the construction or elaboration of a spatial mental model are significant processes in 
the integration of knowledge structures during learning there may be evidence of these processes 
even at very long retention intervals. The spatial mental model account would propose that the 
order of spatial mental model construction would reflect the degree of integration and 
elaboration of elements in a given spatial mental model (refer to the discussion of these issues in 
Chapter 2 and the experiments reported in Chapters 3 and 4). The spatial mental model should 
preserve structural or spatial information important for the original learning episode. 
Information incidental to the requirements of the original learning episode (e. g. about the 
language of a description where the original learning episode requires the manipulation or 
retention of spatial information) should be worse preserved than information which is 
integrated into a spatial mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). This 
is because the construction and elaboration of a mental model (spatial or otherwise) requires both 
time and effort (de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher, 1991; 
Tardieu et al., 1992; Wilson et al., 1993). 
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5.4 Experiment 7 
This experiment is a long-term follow-up of memory for spatial information originally learned in 
the form of short narratives. In the original study (Experiment 1, presented in Chapter 3) subjects 
were presented with short stories describing a village called 'Lower Barking'. The mean 
retention interval between the original learning episode and the subsequent follow-up was just 
over seven months. In the original experiment half the subjects received scrambled stories, while 
the remaining half received intact, unscrambled stories. Of the unscrambled stories one half 
were written from a route perspective and the other half took a survey perspective (see Taylor & 
Tversky, 1992a; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). In this follow-up only subjects who received 
unscrambled stories were tested. In the original experiment recall of landmarks in a drawing task 
was at ceiling for subjects in the unscrambled conditions but not for the subjects in the scrambled 
conditions. For this reason only the unscrambled conditions were re-tested for this experiment. 
In this study subjects from the original experiment were tested in two ways. Firstly, they 
were asked to recall information from the original study episode by drawing the learned 
environment from memory. Secondly, they were asked to perform a recognition test for the 
original sentences in the story they had read. The recognition test consisted of eighteen sentences 
in a random order; six verbatim sentences from the original text, six paraphrases of sentences 
from the original text and six inference sentences. The inference sentences contained spatial 
relations that were not explicit in the original texts but which were accurate with respect to the 
spatial layout of the village they described. All eighteen sentences took the same perspective 
(route or survey) as the text read by a given subject in the original experiment. 
The spatial mental model account outlined in Chapter 2 proposes that recall from long- 
term memory should be related to the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Two 
measures of such an order effect are possible; the drawing orders of items where recall is close to 
ceiling or the probability of recalling an item where memory is below ceiling. A second 
prediction from the spatial mental model account is that (for determinate descriptions) memory 
for the language of a description will be poorer than memory for the spatial relations. This is 
because people will tend to abandon any effort to remember the language of a description if they 
are able to construct a single, coherent model of the situation (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982). Results from Experiment 6 (see Chapter 4) suggest that there are also 
situations where memory for an indeterminate description is not based on a representation of the 
language of a description. Instead memory for indeterminate descriptions may rely primarily on 
memory for the construction of a spatial mental model or even for the structure of a spatial 
mental model. A final prediction is that long-term memory for a spatial mental model should not 
differ between route and survey versions of the text. A spatial mental model is a perspective free 
representation (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a; Tversky, 1991), though it is possible to generate 
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perspective from a spatial mental model. By contrast an image or possibly a representation of 
the language of the text may preserve information from the original text perspective. 
5.4.1 Method 
Subjects 
Sixteen subjects (eleven male and five female) took part in the experiment. All sixteen subjects 
had taken part in a previous experiment requiring them to read and remember a short narrative 
describing a village (see Experiment 1 in Chapter 3). The mean retention interval between the 
original learning episode and the subsequent follow-up was 220 days (the standard deviation 
was 25 days). Nine of the subjects had been given the survey perspective version of the narrative 
presented in Experiment 1 and seven had been presented with route perspective version. All 
seventeen subjects had been presented with unscrambled versions of the original texts (i. e. the 
narratives had been presented in the original or natural order). An additional ten subjects 
provided ratings for the eight landmarks used in this experiment. 
Materials 
Subjects were provided with a blank sheet of paper in the first test stage. In the second, final test 
stage each subject was presented with a recognition test (note that none of the subjects received a 
recognition test in Experiment 1). The recognition test materials consisted of eighteen sentences 
describing the village mentioned in the original stories that subjects had read (see Experiment 1, 
Chapter 3). Two sets of recognition materials were prepared, one for each of the two perspective 
versions (survey or route) used in the original texts. Each set of recognition materials contained 
six verbatim sentences, six paraphrase sentences and six inference sentences. The verbatim 
sentences were taken at random from the original route or survey version of the narrative that 
subjects had read. The paraphrase sentences were based on six sentences chosen at random from 
the original narrative. The paraphrases incorporated word or phrase substitutions that 
preserved the meanings of the original sentences. The inference sentences described spatial 
relationships between landmarks in the village which were not explicitly mentioned in the 
original narrative. Thus all of the eighteen sentences described genuine spatial relationships 
between landmarks in the village. For the survey perspective recognition materials all eighteen 
sentences took a survey perspective. For the route perspective recognition materials all eighteen 
sentences took a route perspective. The eighteen sentences were presented in a random order on a 
single sheet of paper. An example of each type of sentence for both the survey and route text is 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Verbatim sentence (survey text). 
On the northern comer of the main road and Dog Kennel Lane stood the village Post 
Office. 
Paraphrase sentence (survey text) 
Dog Kennel Lane ran all the way round the Common in the centre of the village. 
Inference sentence (survey text) 
The Deserted Farmhouse was Northwest of St. Malcolm's Church. 
Verbatim sentence (route text) 
To Eric's left, on the corner of the main road and Dog Kennel Lane, stood the village 
Post Office. 
Paraphrase sentence (route text). 
Eric slowed down as he drove into the village from the West, here the main road had 
made aT -junction with Dog Kennel Lane. 
Inference sentence (route text) 
Eric drove past the Post Office as he went round Dog Kennel Lane. 
Figure 5.1: Examples of the recognition test materials for route and survey text 
In addition to these materials ratings were obtained for the four buildings and the four 
roads in the original texts. These ratings were obtained from a sample of nine people who were 
not being tested for long-term retention. They were asked to rate the eight landmarks according 
to how 'typical' and how 'common' they were for a traditional English village. 
Procedure 
There were two stages to the experiment. Before beginning the first stage subjects were asked to 
think back to the original experiment they had taken part in. They were reminded that it had 
involved reading a short narrative describing a village called 'Lower Barking'. The first test 
stage involved attempting to draw the village from memory. Subjects were asked to draw as 
many roads and buildings as they could remember and, where possible, to label landmarks as 
they drew them. In stage two subjects were asked to perform a recognition test. Each subject was 
given an appropriate set of recognition materials (sentences with a either a route or survey 
perspective). For each sentence they were asked to circle the response 'yes' or 'no' according to 
whether they recognized the exact wording of the sentence and not simply if they thought the 
sentence was true. Prior to taking part in the experiment ten of the sixteen subjects had also 
completed a Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire or VVIQ (Marks, 1973). 
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5.4.2 Results 
Scoring 
Scoring free recall in a drawing task is difficult. As in previous experiments (see Chapter 3) 
subjects were instructed to label roads or buildings as they drew them. Unfortunately, and in 
contrast to the results of previous experiments reported here, most subjects were unable to label 
many of the features or landmarks that they drew, and it was not possible to identify the 
majority of the unlabelled landmarks. Memory for road names was particularly poor. For this 
reason it was not possible to analyze drawing orders. Nor was it possible to analyze spatial 
location because the majority of roads (which connect the other landmarks) were not labelled. 
Instead the initial analysis was confined to landmarks and features that subjects were able to 
label. Two types of scoring were employed. The first was exact or verbatim recall of a landmark 
that was drawn. Exact landmark recall was scored if the original landmark name was 
reproduced verbatim (e. g. 'Rose and Crown Inn' or 'Dog Kennel Lane'). The second scoring 
procedure was for partial recall. Partial recall was scored if part of the exact name or a closely 
associated name was produced (e. g. 'Pub' for 'Rose and Crown Inn', 'Greyhound Lane' for'Dog 
Kennel Lane'). 
Recalling landmark names 
Figure 5.2 shows recall of landmark names in subjects drawings according to how they were 
classified (exact recall, partial recall, errors of commission or unclassified): 
Number of Exact recall Partial Errors of Unclassified 
landmarks recall Commission 
drawn 
Recall 8.75 8.7% 28.2% 13.4% 49.7% 
Overall levels of recall for the landmarks is difficult to judge accurately. Nearly half the 
landmarks drawn were not labelled and only in a small number of cases were landmark names 
recalled accurately. Partial recall however, is over twice as high as the proportion of errors of 
commission (this is significant using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test; N= 16, Z=2.95, one-tailed 
p=0.0016). This suggests that in most cases subjects are able to discriminate between plausible 
landmarks and landmarks that were actually present. 
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Subjects who had read route versions of the text did not differ significantly from subjects 
who read survey versions in their memory for landmarks. This was true for the proportion of 
exactly recalled names (Mann-Whitney U= 28.5, N= 16, Z=0.34; two-tailed p=0.73), partially 
recalled names (U = 25.5, N= 16, Z=0.66; two-tailed p=0.51), errors of commission (U = 25.5, N= 
16, Z=0.86; two-tailed p=0.39) and unclassified landmarks (U = 24, N= 16, Z=0.83; two-tailed 
p=0.41). There is no evidence of any difference in accuracy between subjects who read the route 
text and those who read the survey text version. 
Recalling landmark names 
Figure 5.3 shows the probability that the name of a landmark was recalled plotted against the 
order items were presented in the original unscrambled survey or route text. These figures are 
given separately for exact recall and partial recall. The spatial mental model account predicts 
that items mentioned earlier in the original text will be remembered best. 
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Figure 5 .3 The probability 
that exact or partial landmark names are recalled against serial 
position of the landmark in the original text. 
Exact landmark name recall is very poor. Nor is there any evidence of any trend relating serial 
position of landmarks in the text and probability of recalling the exact name. Partial recall of 
landmark names is significantly greater. There is no evidence of a trend between probability of 
recall and the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. In fact, partial recall of 
landmark names appears to be negatively related to the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. However, it is possible this may be the result of a coincidental relationship 
between the typicality of a landmark and their position in the text. Figure 5.4 shows the 
probability of recalling each landmark in the original text independently of serial position in 
the text. 
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From Figure 5.4 it appears that highly typical or schema consistent landmarks such as the pub, 
post office and church showed higher levels of recall and in particular partial recall. To test 
this the probability of partial recall was tested against two ratings; how typical and how 
common a given landmark was for a traditional English village. Ratings for typicality and 
commonness both predicted very similar orders of recall (see Figure 5.5). 
3 
Landmark: How typical (mean rating): How common (mean rating): 
Pub 1.11 1.33 
Church 1.11 1.88 
Post Office 1.67 2.11 
Farm House 2.67 3.00 
Old Farm Lane 3.00 3.77 
Church Lane 3.11 2.89 
Main Road 4.22 5.00 
Dog Kennel Lane 5.67 6.56 
Figure 5.5: Mean ratings for typicality and commonness of the eight landmarks 
3 Ratings made for the buildings used generic category names (pub, church and so on) because this 
was the criterion of successful partial recall. Rating for the roads did not because it is not clear what generic 
category a road name like Dog Kennel Lane or Old Farm Lane could be classified under. 
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This trend predicted by the typicality ratings was analyzed using a post hoc trend text for 
dichotomous data (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1967; Meddis, 1984). This post hoc test was 
significant (H = 28.16, d. f. = 7; one-tailed p<0.005). This results suggests many subjects were 
using a schema-based strategy to generate highly typical landmarks such as the pub. Some 
subjects may also have been using a guesswork strategy, because nearly fourteen percent of 
landmarks drawn were errors of commission (see Figure 5.2). The typicality ratings account very 
well for the data, with the notable exception of 'Dog Kennel Lane'. Anecdotal evidence from 
subjects' verbal reports suggest that those subjects who did remember 'Dog Kennel Lane' found the 
name particularly memorable because it was so unusual and hence distinctive. 
Recalling the road layout 
Scoring 
The two scoring procedures used above take into account only part of the information recalled by 
subjects due to the large proportion of landmarks left unclassified. The majority of these 
unclassified landmarks were unlabelled roads drawn by subjects (and so are not included in Figure 
5.4). Both the route and survey versions of the original story described a circular road ('Dog 
Kennel Lane') which surrounded the village common. Radiating from the central road were three 
other roads (the 'Main Road', 'Old Farm Lane', and 'Church Lane'). This distinctive road layout 
suggested a third scoring procedure. Each of the free recall maps drawn by the subjects was 
classified as correct (if three roads radiating from a central, circular road were drawn) or 
incorrect (if any other arrangement of roads was drawn). In addition, the incorrect layouts were 
classified as errors of omission (if one or more roads was missing), errors of commission (if 
additional roads were added) or other (if the road layout did not incorporate a circular central 
road with other roads branching off it). The scoring procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
Error of omission Correct road layout 
Figure 5.6: Examples of road layouts drawn by subjects. 
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Error of commission 
Memory for the road layout 
Figure 5.7 below shows the proportion of drawings classified according to the scoring procedure 
described above. All but one of the subjects either drew the road layout correctly or made errors of 
commission or omission (i. e., missing out or adding a single branching road). This would suggest 
that they retained some information about the structure of the road layout. The high proportion 
of errors of commission suggests that this may also have been influenced by schematic knowledge 
(e. g. about common road layouts such as crossroads). 
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Figure 5 . 7. Percentage correctly recalled road 
layouts. errors of omi ion rrors of commission and 
other (unclassified) errors. 
Route and survey perspective conditions did not differ greatly in their memory for the road 
layout. This was confirmed with a Chi Square test on the drawing classifications shown above 
between the survey and route conditions (Chi Square =1.67, d. f. = 2, two-tailed p=0.43). 
Recognition memory for the language of the text 
Scoring 
Recognition scores were calculated out of six for each sentence type (verbatim, paraphrase or 
inference). Correct recognition was scored if a subject responded 'yes' to a verbatim sentence or 'no' 
to a paraphrase or inference sentence (subjects were instructed to respond 'yes' only to sentences 
they recognized as having exactly the same wording as the original story they had read). 
However, it was not possible to determine recognition accuracy from raw scores (because of 
probable biases to 'yes' or 'no' responses). For this reason a measure of signal detection was 
adopted. In order to avoid making strong assumptions about the distribution of responses in this 
sample a non-parametric measure of signal discriminability was employed (Altham, 1973; 
Hammerton & Altham, 1971). This measure 'C' is monotonically related to d'. Where 
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Error of Correctly Error of Other error 
omission drawn commission 
discriminability is perfect C=1, where responses are random C=0 and for consistent error C= -1. 
Using raw recognition scores it was possible to generate discriminability scores for each subject 
between verbatim and paraphrase and verbatim and inference sentences. These are referred to as 
C (paraphrase) and C (inference) respectively. 
Discriminating verbatim sentences from paraphrase and inference sentences 
As outlined in the scoring procedure described above measures of recognition accuracy were 
calculated for each subject. These resulted in C (paraphrase) and C (inference) values which 
show the level of discriminability between verbatim sentences and paraphrase or inference 
sentences respectively. Figure 5.8 shows mean C (paraphrase) and mean C (inference) for the 
recognition scores produced by subjects. 
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Figure 5.8 Mean discriminability (C) in recognition performance between verbatim sentences and 
paraphrase or inference sentences. 
C scores for the recognition test are very close to zero, suggesting that subjects are not able to 
discriminate between verbatim sentences and paraphrase or inference sentences (in fact there is a 
slight tendency for subjects to prefer paraphrases over verbatim sentences). The possibility that 
discriminability between verbatim and inference sentences was above chance was tested using 
the binomial test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). This test assumes that under the null hypothesis 
discriminability is equally likely to be above or below zero. This test does not take account of the 
magnitude of these differences, however, because the overall mean is so close to zero it is 
extremely unlikely that these difference would have a significant effect. Discriminability was 
not significantly greater than zero for C (inference) scores (N = 16, one-tailed p=0.61). Therefore 
there is no evidence that subjects were able to discriminate between verbatim sentences and 
paraphrase or inference sentences on the recognition test. 
There were no significant differences on recognition between subjects who had route and 
survey versions of the text for C (paraphrase) scores (Mann Whitney U= 28, N= 16, Z=0.39, 
two-tailed p=0.70) or C (inference) scores (U = 29, N= 16, Z=0.27, two-tailed p=0.79). Thus 
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text perspective did not appear to influence subjects ability to discriminate verbatim sentences 
from either paraphrase or inference sentences. 
Correlations 
Neither retention interval nor age of subject correlated with the measures of landmark recall or 
recognition discriminability used above. Vividness of visual imagery (VVIQ scores) did not 
correlate significantly with exact recall of landmark names (Spearman's Rho = 0.349, N= 10, 
two-tailed p=0.324), partial recall (Rho = 0.255, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.47) or errors of 
commission (Rho = 0.441, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.21). Note that high vividness is associated 
with low VVIQ scores. Similarly low correlations are obtained between VVIQ scores and 
discriminability between verbatim and paraphrase (Rho = -0.294, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.41) or 
verbatim and inference sentences (Rho = -0.427, N= 16, two-tailed p=0.23). There is no evidence 
that vivid imagers remember more landmark names (in fact high vividness scores are weakly 
associated with poor landmark recall). Nor is there a significant relation between sentence 
discriminability and vivid imagery. 
5.4.3 Discussion 
The spatial mental model account generated three predictions about the long-term retention of 
information derived from texts. The first prediction was that probability of recalling landmarks 
in a drawing task should reflect the order of spatial mental model construction. However, the 
probability that landmarks (in this case roads and buildings) were recalled in the drawings 
made by subjects was not related to the spatial mental model construction order. Instead ratings 
of how typical or common the items were shown to be strong predictors of the probability that a 
given landmark was recalled. High typicality or schema consistent landmarks (in the case on an 
English village a pub or a church) were many times more likely to be recalled than low 
typicality items such as 'Old Farm Lane'. These findings provide support for the involvement of 
schematic knowledge in reconstructing information during recall (e. g. Bartlett, 1932; Anderson 
and Pichert, 1978; Brewer and Treyens, 1981). The low proportion of errors of commission suggest 
that the mechanism for this reconstruction process may be a generate-recognition recall procedure 
(Jones, 1978; Jones, 1982; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). People use schematic knowledge to generate 
possible landmarks, but are nevertheless able to reject plausible but inaccurate alternatives such 
as 'school' or 'garage'. It appears that the influence of schematic knowledge on the probability 
of recall makes it very difficult to detect order effects on the probability of recall. It also 
suggests that the drawing and recall order effects in Experiment 1 (see Chapter 3) cannot be 
explained in terms of the typicality or perceived frequency of the landmarks themselves. Thus 
there is no direct evidence that people are influenced by the order of spatial mental model 
construction. Subjects made relatively few errors of commission, though, suggesting that some 
memory for the original learning episode remained. 
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The second prediction was that memory for the language of the text should be less well 
retained than memory for a spatial mental model. Partial support for this prediction is 
obtained. Discrimination between verbatim and both paraphrase and inference sentences is at 
chance on the recognition test. However, to confirm this prediction would require direct evidence 
that what subjects do recall is based on memory for a spatial mental model. 
The third prediction was that the perspective taken by the original text should not 
influence memory for spatial information. Text perspective had no effect on any of the recall or 
recognition scores used in this study. It is possible that differences may have been obscured by the 
small sample sizes or the poor recall or recognition performance of subjects. There is certainly no 
evidence of any dramatic differences in recall or recognition between subjects. Similarly, there 
appears to be no influence of age of subject, retention interval or vividness of visual imagery as 
rated by the VVIQ (Marks, 1973). While these factors may influence spatial memory or memory 
for landmark names these results suggest that their influence is relatively small. 
Poor recall for landmark names in the drawing task (almost half of the features drawn 
were unlabelled) may have resulted in recall of spatial information being underestimated. A 
different scoring procedure - memory for the distinctive road network - showed that nearly every 
subjects recalled the road network (provided errors of omission or commission of a single road are 
included). Determining whether this level of recall is possible by chance is difficult. Memory for 
the road layout would be consistent with memory for an image or for a spatial mental model. 
However, the large proportion of errors of commission (in this case the addition of a single road) 
would suggest a structural or spatial representation rather than a visual one. 
This experiment provides mixed evidence for the predictions based on the spatial mental 
models account. Recognition memory for the language of the text is very poor. Text perspective 
does not influence recall or recognition. There is no support though for the most important 
prediction that recall on the drawing task would be influenced by the order of spatial mental 
model construction. Whether a landmark is consistent with schematic knowledge about the 
environment being drawn is a far better predictor of recall. There are very few errors of 
commission in recalling landmark names suggesting that subjects maybe adopting a generate- 
recognition recall route (Jones, 1978; Jones, 1982; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). In addition, memory 
for landmark names and for the road network suggests that recall may be based on a spa tial 
representation derived from the original text. This representation may be in the form of a 
spatial mental model or possibly an image. Future experiments will have to take greater account 
of the role of schematic knowledge on reconstruction or recall in order to determine any direct 
evidence that subjects are able to remember a spatial mental model at retention intervals of 
several months. 
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5.5 Experiment 8 
Experiment 7 failed to produce direct support for the proposal that spatial mental models 
influence spatial memory at very long retention intervals. In this experiment a number of 
different tests are employed in order to avoid some of the methodological problems associated 
with studying memory at very long retention intervals. This was accomplished by following up 
subjects who had taken part in an experiment requiring them to learn a map of a university 
campus and a route taken across the same map. Subjects were tested between thirteen and 
nineteen months after they had originally learned the map and the route. The original 
experiment investigated differences in people's ability to integrate route information with 
survey information derived from the map. The route was presented either in a verbal form (a 
sequence of sentences) or in a visual form (a sequence of landmarks). In the original study mode of 
presentation of the route had little or no effect on recall. The only significant difference between 
the two conditions was that people who had received the verbal version of the route were 
quicker to answer written questions about the spatial information they had learned (Baguley, 
1992). 
5.5.1 A brief description of the original task 
The original task was divided into five stages. In the first stage of the experiment subjects were 
asked to study a map of an imaginary university campus. Each subject was given four minutes to 
study the map. In the second stage the subjects were asked to study a route taken across the same 
imaginary university campus. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of two groups for the 
experiment. Both groups were presented with an identical map in stage one. In stage two, 
however, the route was presented in a different format for each group. The first group received 
the route written as a short descriptive text. The second group received the route in a visual form 
(as a series of landmarks connected by arrows). In both conditions subjects were given three 
minutes to learn the route. The map learning and route learning stages were followed by three 
test stages which were identical for the two conditions. The two conditions differed only in the 
presentation of the route in a verbal or a visual form. 
In stage three subjects were asked to list, in order, the named features on the route. In 
stage four subjects were given a questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of fifteen multiple 
choice questions involving information about both the original map and the route. In the fifth 
and final test stage subjects were given a copy of the original map and asked to draw the route 
upon it. In addition subjects were asked to describe what they were thinking as they marked the 
route on the map and a verbal protocol was recorded. 
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Subjects receiving the route in a written form were significantly quicker in answering the 
questionnaire in the second test stage. One possible explanation of this effect was that these 
subjects gained a reading time advantage from the written questionnaire, through already 
having formed a textbase of the route (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). There were no other significant 
differences between the two conditions. 
5.5.2 The experiment 
The purpose of the study was two-fold. Firstly to establish whether it is possible to 
eliminate or otherwise take account of the influence of schematic knowledge on recall. Secondly, 
to discover whether recall is influenced by the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. 
One problem with testing the long-term retention of meaningful spatial information (e. g. 
a map rather than an arbitrary spatial array) is to determine what level of performance is 
possible by chance or though guesswork. People may consciously decide to guess or their memory 
for a real university campus might influence the memory for the experimental situation just as 
knowledge about typical landmarks influenced recall for the village in Experiment 7. To help 
eliminate this possibility performance of subjects in this study was compared with the 
performance of subjects who had not learned the original map or route. These subjects were to 
provide a 'baseline' of performance. The baseline subjects were given 'guesswork' instructions in 
place of instructions to remember the original learning experience. The guesswork instructions 
were for subjects to complete the task with the most plausible or likely responses. 
Four different tasks were adopted in order to minimize the involvement of schematic 
knowledge by testing memory in different ways. Generate-recognition recall routes (Jones, 1978; 
Jones, 1982; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979) probably inflate recall for schema consistent landmarks 
or features. Providing cues in some tests or assessing recognition memory on others should reduce 
the impact of generate-recognition routes on recall. In addition performance of subjects in the 
baseline condition should provide an indicator of the level of recall or recognition performance 
possible by chance. The first task was a repetition of the free recall drawing task in Experiment 
7. The second task assessed recognition memory for fifteen of the landmarks on the original map. 
The third task assessed cued recall for the location of landmarks from the original university 
campus map. This was done by providing subjects with landmark names and asking them to place 
these name labels in the appropriate location on an unlabelled map of the university campus. 
The fourth and final task was for subjects to draw the route they had learned onto an intact copy 
of the original map. Only in the first task are subjects required to generate landmark names. 
Hence for the remaining three tasks intrinsic cues (direct cues relating to information encoded in 
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the original study episode) are available. This should reduce the impact of extrinsic cues (not 
encoded in the original study episode) such as those generated using schematic or background 
knowledge (Jones, 1978; 1982; 1987). 
Memory for a spatial mental model should be reflected in several ways. Landmark 
names and locations should be recalled and recognized above chance (as determined by 
performance in the baseline condition). This is necessary, but not sufficient to demonstrate 
memory for a spatial mental model. Memory for the route should also reflect the predicted order 
of spatial mental model construction. Landmarks entered into a spatial mental model early on 
should be better recalled than those integrated into the representation at a later stage. As in 
previous experiments the order of spatial mental model construction may also influence drawing 
orders adopted by subjects (Taylor & Tversky, 1992a). Finally, the recall of the route should not 
be influenced by the mode of route learning. If verbal and visual conditions differ in the extent to 
which the route is recalled these differences could be explained in terms of memory for the 
visual aspects of the picture or for the language of the verbal. If route recall for both the verbal 
and visual conditions show the trend predicted by the order of spatial mental model construction 
this would support a common amodal, relatively abstract form of representation such as a mental 
model. 
5.5.3 Method 
Subjects 
The twenty-five subjects for the experiment consisted of volunteers of varied age and background 
(most were graduate students or staff from the Open University). Seventeen subjects (seven male 
and ten female) had participated in a map learning experiment between thirteen and nineteen 
months previously. The remaining eight subjects (five male and three female) had not taken part 
in the original experiment and were unfamiliar with the experimental materials prior to the 
present experiment. 
Design 
The experiment investigated the long term retention of spatial information. Between subject 
factors were whether subjects had learned the map and route in the original experiment 
(experimental or baseline) and the original experimental route-learning condition (verbal or 
visual). Performance was compared over a number of measures of recall and recognition of spatial 
or spatially related information obtained from each of the three test stages. 
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Materials 
Subjects were tested using three sets of materials to be used in the second, third and fourth test 
stages, respectively. The first consisted of a list of forty-five feature or landmark names, of 
which fifteen were taken from the original campus map. The second was a copy of the original 
map with the names of all the buildings and roads deleted. To go with this map a set of thirteen 
labels was produced which could be placed on appropriate locations on the map. The final item 
was an intact copy of the original map. 
Procedure 
Instructions for the experiment differed between experimental conditions. Subjects who had 
taken part in the original experiment were asked to remember the original study episode. They 
were reminded that the experiment had involved learning a map of an imaginary university 
campus and a route taken across that map by a character called Jerry. In the first test stage (free 
recall) they were asked to draw as much of the original map as they could from memory. In the 
second test stage (landmark recognition) they were given a list of forty-five features that might 
be found on a university campus. Subjects in the experimental condition were asked to circle those 
landmarks they recognized from the original experiment. In the third test stage (landmark 
location) they were given a copy of the map with the building and road names removed. They 
were then asked to place a set of thirteen labels according to their original locations on the 
campus. In the fourth and last test stage (route recall) subjects were asked to draw the route on a 
complete copy of the original map. 
Instructions to the baseline subjects made no reference to the original experiment. Instead 
they were given 'guesswork' instructions. In stage one these subjects were asked to draw a typical 
example of a university campus. In stage two these subjects were asked to select the fifteen most 
likely features to be found on a map of a typical university campus. In stage three they were 
asked to place feature labels on the most appropriate or likely locations on the campus map. In 
the final stage the baseline subjects were asked to draw a likely or plausible route between any 
two campus locations of their choice. On those occasions where subjects did not indicate the 
direction of the route in their drawings this was recorded by the experimenter. 
5.5.4 Results 
Data from this study were analyzed in two ways. Firstly, data from the experimental condition 
were compared with those from the baseline condition. Data from the baseline condition are 
analyzed as if they had taken part in the original study. For example, responses are classified 
as incorrect or correct according to the same criteria used for those in the experimental condition 
even though there is no objective sense in which the baseline subjects can be said to have made an 
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error. Secondly, data from the experimental condition are analyzed separately to establish 
trends or patterns consistent or inconsistent with the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. 
Free recall 
Scoring procedures 
All the maps obtained during free recall were analyzed using three sets of measures. The first 
measure was accuracy of object location. This was classified by dividing the original map into 
quadrants. Any labelled objects located on the map were then categorized as either correctly 
located (correct) or incorrectly located (incorrect). Some objects and features were unclassified 
(either because they were not labelled or because they were in two or more quadrants). Other 
features were not present on the original map and were classified as errors of commission 
(commissions). 
The second measure was accuracy of recall for feature or landmark names. These were 
classified as either correct, partially correct, or errors of commission. A label was recorded as 
partially correct when it was semantically related to an item on the original map or contained a 
significant part of a correct item label (e. g. "quadrangle" for "croquet lawn" or "union building" 
for "students union"). 
The third measure was obtained by asking two Judgesto independently rate the maps 
according to how similar they were with the original map. Judges were told that all the maps 
came from a single memory experiment, and were asked to concentrate primarily on the spatial 
information contained in the drawings. Ratings were carried out on a scale of 1 (containing 
virtually none of the original spatial information) to 10 (containing virtually all of the original 
spatial information). Inter-rater reliability was high (Spearman's Rho = 0.888, N= 25, two- 
tailed p<0.0005). The map rating scores were obtained by taking the average rating of the two 
judges for each drawing. 
Measures of free recall 
Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to test for significant differences between the 
experimental and baseline conditions. 
Free recall of landmark location 
Figure 5.9 below shows the mean number of landmarks drawn, the percentage located in the 
correct or incorrect quadrant and the proportion of errors of commission or unclassified items. 
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Number of Correct Incorrect Errors of Unclassified 
landmarks Quadrant Quadrant Commission 
drawn 
Experiment 7.88 30.6% 15.0% 9.7% 44.8% 
Baseline 12.0 4.2% 18.9% 35.4% 41.7% 
Subjects in the baseline condition drew significantly more landmarks than those in the 
experimental condition (U = 13.5, N= 25, Z=3.20, one-tailed p=0.0007). The experimental group 
scored more correct quadrant items than the baseline group (U = 24, N= 25, Z=2.63, one-tailed p 
= 0.0043). The experiment group also made significantly fewer errors of commission (U = 15, N= 
25, Z=3.16, one-tailed p=0.0008). There were no significant differences between the baseline 
and experimental conditions on the proportion of incorrect locations or unclassified items. Subjects 
in the experimental condition drew fewer landmarks, but those landmarks were more likely to be 
correctly located than would be indicated by use of a guesswork strategy. They also made 
proportionately fewer errors of commission than would be expected if a guesswork strategy were 
used. 
Landmark naming 
Figure 5.10 below shows the mean number of landmarks named by subjects, the percentage 
correctly or incorrectly named and the percentage errors or commission. 
Meannumber Correct Names Partially Errors of 
of landmarks Correct Names commission 
named 
Experiment 7.71 43.5% 33.6% 22.8% 
Baseline 12.25 28.6% 16.3% 55.1% 
Subjects in the baseline condition named significantly more landmarks than those in the 
experimental condition (U = 7.5, N= 25, Z=3.55, one-tailed p=0.0002). Subjects in the 
experimental condition produced proportionately more correct names (U = 33, N= 25, Z=2.04, 
one-tailed p=0.021), partially correct names (U = 23.5, N= 25, Z=2.61, one-tailed p=0.0046) 
and proportionately fewer errors of commission (U = 16.5, N= 25, Z=3.03, one-tailed p=0.0012) 
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than would be suggested by a guesswork strategy indicated by the performance of the baseline 
condition. 
Map similarity ratings 
The mean map similarity rating for the experimental condition was 4.8 compared with 2.0 for 
the baseline condition. This difference was statistically significant (U = 12.5, N= 25, Z=3.19, 
one-tailed p=0.0007). Independent judges rated maps drawn during free recall by subjects in the 
experimental condition as being more similar than those of subjects asked to draw a typical 
university campus. 
Place name recognition 
Scoring procedures 
Landmark names circled on the recognition task were classified as correct, partially correct or 
incorrect according to the features present on the original map. Partially correct items were those 
which contained a significant part, but not all, of a feature name on the original map (e. g. 'Union 
Shop' for 'Students Union') or which were longer or more detailed than the original item (e. g. 
'Science Library' for 'Library'). 
Recognition performance 
Levels of performance for the experimental and baseline groups on the recognition task are shown 
in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11: Mean per en}age *ýognition of landmark names 
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Correct Partially Correct 
Between group differences were analyzed using the Mann-Whitney U test. No significant 
differences arose for the recognition scores of partially correct items. However, the experimental 
condition showed significantly higher recognition than the baseline subjects where the 
landmark names were exactly as presented in the original learning episode (U = 12, N= 25, Z= 
3.194, one-tailed p=0.0007). This would suggest that partial recall is more readily influenced by ' 
background knowledge. Partially correct names may provide extrinsic cues (Jones, 1978; 1982) but 
recognition under these circumstances may be easily confused with plausibility or familiarity 
from other contexts (Mandler, 1980). By contrast, exact names provide intrinsic cues for 
recognition and may reduce confusion by providing unique contextual information. 
Recall of landmark location 
Scoring procedures 
Two scoring procedures were used. The first simply recorded the number of correctly placed objects 
for each subject. The second procedure was a measure (to the nearest half centimetre) of the 
distance of each object placed on the map from the correct location. Distances were measured from 
the centre of each of the features located on the map. Using this metric two scores were 
calculated. The first was the mean error distance taken over thirteen features on the map. The 
second was the mean error distance for the incorrect items only. 
Recall of landmark location 
The mean scores for each subject group on the landmark location task are shown in Figure 5.12. 
Differences were analyzed using unrelated t-tests. 
Correctly located Mean distance Mean distance 
items error error 
(all items) (incorrect items) 
Experiment 25.5% 7.07 cm 9.12 cm 
Baseline 14.4% 7.83 cm 9.22 cm 
Subjects who took part in the original experiment scored significantly better on the number of 
correct object locations than the baseline subjects (t = 2.52, d. f. = 22, one-tailed p=0.0099). The 
scores for mean error (taken over all items) showed a similar pattern; experimental subjects 
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scored lower than baseline subjects (t = 2.00, d. f. = 22, one-tailed p=0.029). However, there were 
no significant differences for the mean error distance of the incorrect items. 
Route recall 
Scoring procedures 
The chief problem in scoring the drawing of the route was that, provided subjects recalled the 
start and end point, many of the intervening points could be inferred by a simple strategy e. g. 
taking the most direct route that avoids obstacles. The first measure of route recall was made by 
scoring the correct start and end locations (these were taken to be either the actual start and end 
points or the nearest feature to them i. e. the 'medical centre' for the start location or the 'zebra 
crossing' into Mandela Park for the end location). The second measure of route recall was based on 
the number of buildings recalled as being entered during the route. Because not all the intervening 
buildings on the route were entered it is not possible to guess which buildings were entered by 
remembering the start and end points of the route. 
Comparisons with baseline subjects 
Means of the recall scores for the route drawing task are presented in the Figure 5.13. Differences 
were analyzed using Mann-Whitney U tests. 
Start of route End of route Meannumber Buildings Buildings 
of buildings entered entered (errors 
entered (correct) of commission) 
Experiment 62.5% 62.5% 2.75 86.4% 13.6% 
Baseline 0% 0% 2.00 56.3% 43.8% 
Recall of the starting location of the route was significantly higher for the experiment than the 
baseline group subjects who were at floor (U = 24, N= 25, Z=2.87, one-tailed p=0.0021). Recall 
of the end point of the route was significantly higher than that achieved by subjects using a 
guesswork strategy (U = 24, N= 25, Z=2.87, one-tailed p=0.0021). There was no significant 
difference in the number of buildings entered on the routes drawn by the experimental and 
baseline subjects. However subjects in the experimental condition identified significantly more 
correctly entered buildings (U = 26, N= 25, Z=2.41, one-tailed p=0.008) and made significantly 
fewer errors of commission (U = 36.5, N= 25, Z=1.90, one-tailed p=0.029) than indicated by the 
guesswork strategy employed by the baseline subjects. 
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Spatial mental model construction order and route recall 
Scoring 
Route recall was compared with the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. The 
spatial mental model construction order predicts that items integrated early on into a spatial 
mental model are more likely to be recalled. Unfortunately a simple analysis of recall against 
the order of landmarks in the route is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, the original route 
differentiates between buildings which are entered and those which are 'passed by'. It is highly 
likely that memory for a landmark may differ for those buildings that are entered and those 
which are not. Secondly, it is not always easy to determine whether or not a building which is 
not entered lies on any given drawing of the route. For example does a route which passes within 
one centimetre of the edge of a building or one which passes with two centimetres count as being 
"on" a route? Restricting the route to buildings actually entered is certainly less arbitrary than 
determining the route by a fixed distance from the edge or centre of a building. For this reason the 
analysis is confined to those four buildings which were entered. In order, these are the 'medical 
centre', the 'library', the 'post office' and the 'students union'. 
The spatial model account predicts that the earlier buildings on the route are more 
likely to be recalled than the later items. It also predicts that the order of route recall should be 
influenced by the spatial mental model construction. However, the analysis of drawing orders 
will be influenced by the probability that a given landmark is recalled. This is because when 
only a single landmark is recalled it will always be drawn first. Previous analyses of drawing 
order were only carried out when drawing orders were at or close to ceiling and so avoided this 
problem. An alternative procedure for scoring drawing order which avoids this problem is to 
classify each landmark as being drawn in the first or last half of the route. If a landmark is 
drawn exactly in the middle of a route it is excluded from the analysis. This scoring procedure is 
conservative (it does not use all the available information the data), but is not biased by high or 
low levels of recall for particular landmarks. For example, if only one landmark is drawn it is 
excluded from the analysis, because it is neither in the first or last half of the route. If three 
landmarks are drawn the first landmark is scored as being drawn in the first half of the route 
and the third landmark as being drawn in the last half of the route (the second landmark is 
ignored). 
Probability of route recall and spatial mental model construction order 
Figure 5.14 shows the mean percentage recall of the four entered buildings for the experimental 
and baseline conditions. 
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Figure 5.14: Mean percentage recall for the four buildings entered on the route for the 
experimental and baseline condition. 
Percentage recall for the four landmarks was compared with the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction using a trend test for dichotomous data (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 
1967; Meddis, 1984). This trend was significant for the experimental condition (N = 17, Z=3.01, 
one-tailed p<0.0013) but not for the baseline condition (Z = 0, N=8, one-tailed p=0.50). This 
result is consistent with the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Recall for the 
library is higher than predicted, though performance in the baseline subjects suggests that this 
may be inflated by guesswork by some subjects. 
Figure 5.15 shows levels of recall for the four buildings entered on the route according to 
the original mode of presentation of the route (z'crbal or visual). 
% 
Figure 5.15: Mean percentage recall for the four buildings entered on the route for the verbal and 
visual mode of route learning 
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1 (Medical Centre) 2 (Library) 3 (Post Office) 4 (Students Union) 
2 (Library) 3 (Post Office) 4 (Students Union) 
These data were also compared with the predicted order of spatial mental model construction 
using trend tests for dichotomous data. Levels of recall in the visual condition were significantly 
related to the predicted order of spatial mental model construction (N = 7, Z=3.19, one-tailed p 
< 0.0013). Recall for the verbal condition showed the same trend but it did not reach significance , 
(N = 10, Z=1.22, one-tailed p=0.11). However, it should be noted that five of the subjects in the 
verbal condition recalled all four entered buildings. This ceiling effect would make it difficult to 
detect significance. The order of spatial mental model construction is a significant overall 
predictor of recall of salient route landmarks. 
Order of route recall and spatial mental model construction order 
The position each landmark occupied in the drawing order of the route was classified as falling 
into the first or last half of the route (see the scoring procedures described above). This scoring 
procedure ensures that probability of recall and drawing order are not confounded. Otherwise the 
best remembered landmark, which is more likely to be the only landmark recalled, is more 
likely to be drawn first. Figure 5.16 shows the percentage chance that an item is drawn in the 
first, rather than the last, half of the route (scores are depicted separately for the verbal and 
visual conditions). 
100 
90 
80 
10 70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Figure 5.16: Percentage chance that a given landmark is drawn in the first half of a route 
This trend in the predicted direction (decreasing from left to right) was tested between items 
using the using the Jonckheere trend test. The resulting test statistic was significant (J = 308, N= 
17, Z approximation = 2.95; one-tailed p=0.0016). No analysis was carried out for the baseline 
condition because only two guessed more than one correct landmark. Also, one landmark was not 
generated by any of the baseline subjects. The same analysis was carried out separately for 
visual and verbal modes of route presentation. These trend tests were significant for both the 
verbal (J = 151.5, N= 10, Z approximation = 2.27; one-tailed p=0.012) and the visual (J = 27.5, N 
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Medical Centre Library Post Office Students Union 
= 7, Z=2.12; one-tailed p=0.017) conditions. These results suggest that the order of spatial 
mental model construction is a significant predictor of the drawing order of landmarks when the 
route is recalled, and this result is independent of the probability that a given landmark is 
recalled. Nor does it matter whether the route was presented in the original learning episode in 
a visual or a verbal form. 
Correlations 
No correlations were planned on the effects of retention interval or age on memory for spatial or 
spatially related information. For this reason and because of the large number of possible 
correlations among the data a stricter significance level (0.01 rather than 0.05) was used to 
determine significance. There were no significant correlations at this level between retention 
interval and measures of recall or recognition. This is not surprising as the effects of retention 
interval are usually most marked in the first few hours, days or weeks after a learning episode 
rather than months or years (Baddeley, 1990). Similarly there was no significant correlation of 
age with most measures of recall or recognition. though there was a trend for older subjects to 
have poorer free recall for landmark names than younger subjects (Rho = -0.653, N= 17, one- 
tailed p=0.0057). This is consistent with studies that show that people and place names can be 
particularly difficult to remember for older adults (Cohen, 1990; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986). 
5.5.5 Discussion 
Well over a year after learning a map of a university campus and a route taken across that map 
memory is reliably above chance when contrasted with subjects using guesswork strategies. This 
is particularly striking as the experimental context is relatively impoverished compared to the 
kinds of real world situations where spatial or other information is retained for long periods of 
time (Bahrick, 1983; 1984; Cohen et al., 1992). On measures of free recall such as the drawing 
task the most salient difference between experimental and baseline conditions was in the 
proportion of errors of commission. Subjects in the experimental condition produced similar 
numbers of correct landmark names and located a similar number of landmarks in the correct 
quadrant. However, they drew and labelled significantly fewer landmarks. This resulted in 
fewer errors of commission and indicated that, in most cases, they were able to discriminate 
between plausible landmarks and landmarks depicted on the original map. These results provide 
support for the interpretation of the drawing task data in Experiment 7. They are consistent with 
a generate-recognition recall route (Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). The extent to which schema 
consistent landmarks were more likely to be generated as errors of commission is less clear. A 
number of subjects reported confusions with a familiar university campus (e. g. the Open 
University campus at Walton Hall) suggesting that episodic memory was also a source of 
intrusion errors or interference. More recent schema theories have proposed that episodic memory 
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may be embedded within event or place schema under certain circumstances (Cohen, Kiss, & Le 
Voi, 1993; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Schank, 1982). 
The most striking finding is that the order of spatial mental model construction is a 
significant predictor of both recall of landmarks and, independently, of the order in which those' 
landmarks are drawn. One possible objection to these findings is that the analysis was confined 
to buildings entered on the route. This was necessary for several reasons. Determining whether a 
landmark is part of a route in any other way would have entailed adopting arbitrary criteria for 
inclusion. Using the criteria of entering a building is simple to score and is not arbitrary. Mental 
models are representations of structural relations (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1989; 
Tversky, 1991). Entering a building is a clear example of a spatial and hence structural 
relationship. Passing or being in the vicinity of a landmark is difficult to quantify in terms of 
structural relations. Even if it were possible to quantify these relationships there is still a strong 
case to be made that buildings actually entered on the route are likely to better remembered than 
other landmarks through being both the immediate physical and psychological location of the 
protagonist. Such locations receive greater activation, are better primed and more easily 
remembered according to several mental models theorists (Bower & Morrow, 1990; de Vega, 1992; 
Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Glenberg et al., 1987). 
The order and probability of recall are both significantly related to the order of spatial 
mental model construction. Mode of route learning does not appear to be implicated in the order of 
probability recall or drawing order. Where the original presentation of the route was visual 
both probability of recall and drawing order are predicted by the order of spatial mental model 
construction. Where the original presentation of the route was verbal the order landmarks are 
entered on the route is significantly related to the order of spatial mental model construction. 
The probability of recall for landmarks in the verbal route learning condition is also consistent 
with the spatial mental model account though it does not reach significance (however only four 
subjects contributed to the analysis because of ties). The ordinal relationships obtained for 
landmark recall on the route drawing task are very difficult to explain in terms of memory for 
the form the route was originally presented in (memory for what are described as 'comprehension 
processes' in Chapter 2). There is no a priori reason why either a representation of the language 
of the verbal route should result in superior memory for buildings entered early on in the route 
than those entered later in the route. Similarly, there is no reason for a visual image of the route 
to result in better memory for buildings early in the route. Therefore it is unlikely that these 
results reflect memory for the characteristics of the visually presented route as well as memory 
for the language of the verbally presented route (these issues are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3). A more parsimonious explanation would be in terms of an amodal representation 
which preserves the structure of the route (Tversky, 1991). This is consistent with work which 
shows that people construct an integrated representation of the structure of a situation (i. e. a 
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mental model) whether it is derived from a text or from a picture story (Gernsbacher, 1985; 1990; 
1991). 
This experiment has provided the first direct evidence of memory for a spatial mental 
model at retention intervals of many months rather than hours or days. These findings were 
obtained with relatively rich and meaningful material albeit with very brief learning periods 
of minutes rather than weeks or years as in some studies (Bahrick, 1983; Herman et al., 1979). 
Using such rich materials may provide an opportunity for greater elaboration and improved 
retention not afforded by simpler materials. Alternatively, simpler materials may not be as 
greatly influenced by background or schematic knowledge at retention. The next experiment 
explores the very long term retention of simpler, less meaningful spatial arrangements. 
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5.6 Experiment 9 
The two previous experiments in this chapter have reported findings about the very long-term 
retention of maps or spatial narratives. In this experiment memory for less meaningful spatial 
information is explored. Subjects from Experiment 4 (reported in Chapter 4) were tested on their 
recall and recognition for two of the spatial descriptions they had learned at a retention 
interval of ten to twelve months. The two descriptions chosen were the best remembered 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions from the original experiment (this was determined 
by selecting the determinate description with the highest gist recognition and the indeterminate 
description with the highest verbatim recognition). The two best remembered descriptions were 
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it was likely that other descriptions from the original 
experiment might not be remembered at all. This would make it more difficult to detect small 
differences in memory. Secondly, descriptions in the original experiment differed markedly in 
how well they were remembered. This would make it problematic to compare memory for 
different descriptions if some were reordered and some were not. 
Each subject was asked to carry out two tasks. First they were asked to recall any of the 
names or spatial relations from the two descriptions chosen from the original experiment. These 
descriptions were identified by their category title ('Landmarks' or 'Condiments'). Secondly, 
they were given a recognition test similar to the one used in the original experiment. The 
recognition test contained four different descriptions (the original description, an inferable 
description and two incorrect descriptions or foils). As before, subjects were asked to rank all four 
descriptions according to how similar they were to the original description. Half the subjects 
received the original descriptions in the correct order on the recognition test, while the 
remainder were given them in a different order. All the descriptions on the recognition test 
(apart from the original descriptions which had not been reordered) were constructed to have an 
episodic construction trace overlap of 1 with the original description (Payne, 1993). 
The spatial mental model account makes several clear predictions. Firstly, the recall of 
object names and spatial relationships should reflect the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction. In the drawing recall task of Experiment 5 this was confirmed for 
determinate but not indeterminate descriptions. For indeterminate descriptions recall was better 
predicted by the frequency an item was mentioned in the original description (see sections 4.2 and 
4.2.3). Secondly, memory for the structure of a spatial mental model is indicated if gist 
recognition exceeds verbatim recognition. The spatial mental model account predicts that gist 
recognition scores should be higher than verbatim recognition scores for the determinate 
description. Thirdly, memory for the process of spatial mental model construction (the episodic 
construction trace) is indicated if reordering reduces verbatim or gist recognition (Payne, 1993). 
This is because reordering reduces the overlap between the operations used to construct the 
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original descriptions and the operations used to construct the reordered description. These 
predictions have been discussed in more detail earlier in the thesis (refer to sections 2.4.5 and 
4.1). 
The strongest evidence of memory for the structure of a spatial mental model is shown if 
there is an interaction between the type of recognition and the determinacy of the description. If 
gist recognition is higher than verbatim for determinate descriptions, but verbatim recognition is 
higher than gist for indeterminate descriptions this requires a representation of the structure of 
the situation and a representation of the language of the description (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani 
& Johnson-Laird, 1982). Mani and Johnson-Laird have proposed mental models are remembered 
better because of depth or amount of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975; 
Mani & Johnson-Laud, 1982). If this view is correct then the interaction they report may not be 
present at very long-retention intervals because the level of verbatim recognition for 
indeterminate descriptions may have fallen to chance. 
5.6.1 Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-nine subjects who had previously taken part in Experiment 4 (see Chapter 4) took part in 
this experiment. 
Materials 
Two sets of recognition materials (1 and 2) were created for this experiment. The materials were 
based on the recognition test materials used in phase 2 of Experiment 4. In set 1 the original 
descriptions were in the same order that they had been presented in phase 1 of Experiment 4. In 
set 2 the original descriptions were reordered. Unlike the materials used in Experiment 4 only 
two descriptions were included in each set. The two descriptions contained in each set were 
'Landmarks' (the determinate description with the highest level of gist recognition in 
Experiment 4) and 'Condiments' (the indeterminate description with the highest level of 
verbatim recognition). Set 1 thus contained stable versions of the original 'Landmarks' and 
'Condiments' description. While set 2 contained reordered versions of the original 'Landmarks' 
and 'Condiments' description. 
As in Experiment 4 three alternative descriptions were presented along with the stable 
or reordered original description. The three alternative descriptions consisted of an inferable 
description and two foils. The inferable, foils and reordered original descriptions were 
constructed to have an episodic construction trace overlap of one with the original description 
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(Payne, 1993). The inferable and foil sentences shared a single intact sentence with the reordered 
or stable original descriptions. Both sets of recognition materials were organized so that the 
original and inferable descriptions were in different positions (labelled A, B, C or D) in the 
recognition materials. 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into two stages. In stage one every subject was asked to try and 
remember the original learning episode (phase 1 of Experiment 4). They were reminded that the 
experiment involved reading spatial descriptions off index cards and remembering them for later 
in the experiment. They were then asked to try and remember two of the descriptions from the 
original experiment. Half the subjects were asked to remember the 'Condiments' description first. 
The remaining subjects were asked to recall the 'Landmarks' description first. The only cue 
provided was the category title of the description. They were told to write down any of the 
names of the items in the experiment and any of the of the spatial relations between those items 
that they could remember. 
In stage 2 they were reminded that they had been given a recognition test in the original 
experiment. They were told they would be given a similar recognition test for the two 
descriptions they had just tried to recall. In each case they were asked to rank four descriptions 
(labelled A, B, C and D) from 1 to 4 according to how similar they were to the original 
description they had read. In each case they were informed that one of the descriptions 
contained all four sentences from the original description, but that those sentences may have been 
in a different order. They were asked to rank all four descriptions even if they were not certain of 
the choices they had made. Half the subjects were given the set 1 recognition materials. The 
remainder were given the set 2 recognition materials. The order of presentation within each set 
was the same order in which subjects had attempted to recall the two descriptions (i. e. either 
'Landmarks' first or 'Condiments' first). This order was counterbalanced with the recognition 
materials used (set 1 or set 2). 
5.6.2 Results 
Free recall 
Scoring 
Subjects responses were classified according to whether they correctly recalled the names of 
items from the spatial descriptions they had been presented with in Experiment 4. Where more 
than one correct name was produced scores were also obtained for the recall of spatial relations 
196 
present in the original verbal description. A name was classified as correctly recalled if it 
contained part or all of the original name or if it was a synonym for that item (e. g. "Mountains" 
or "Hills" were both acceptable alternatives for 'Mountain'). Other responses were classified as 
errors of commission. A spatial relation was classified as correctly recalled if it matched a 
spatial relation explicitly mentioned in the original description (that is if the names were 
classified as correct and if the spatial relationship between the two objects was consistent with a 
sentence in the original description). 
The determinate description (Landmarks): Indeterminate description (Condiments): 
The city is in front of the mountain. The sugar is in front of the ketchup. 
The city is behind the lake. The ketchup is to the right of the salt. 
The city is to the left of the forest. The ketchup is to the right of the pepper. 
The desert is behind the forest. The salt is behind the mustard. 
Inferred spatial relations: Inferre d spatial relation: 
Mountain and Lake. Mustard and sugar. 
Mountain and Desert. 
Corresponding spatial layout: Correspo nding spatial layouts: 
Pepper Salt Ketchup 
Mountain Desert Mustard Sugar 
City Forest or 
Lake Salt Pepper Ketchup 
Mustard Sugar 
Figure 5.17: Spatial relations between objects in the two descriptions recalled in Experiment 9. 
Errors of commission in the recall of spatial relations are not reported because the 
proportion of errors of commission increases as more correct object names are recalled. For 
example, if one correct spatial relationship is recalled and four correct names this could result in 
one correct spatial relation being scored and three errors of commission. This is problematic 
because someone who recalled fewer correct items would result in fewer errors of commission. 
Instead, inverse spatial relations are reported (i. e. those occasions where a spatial relation is 
recalled which is the exact inverse of an actual spatial relation). For example someone who 
recalled that "The Forest was to the left of the City" would be scored as an inverse spatial 
relation (because it was actually to the right of the city). In addition to the recall of the 
relations explicitly mentioned in the spatial descriptions it is also possible to score recall for 
inferred spatial relations. Figure 5.17 depicts the spatial relationships between objects in the 
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determinate and indeterminate description used in this experiment (objects in italics are 
connected by an inferable spatial relation). Inferred relations are true of the description but not 
explicitly mentioned in it. There are two such inferred relations for a determinate description 
and only one for an indeterminate description. 4 
Free recall of names 
Scores were obtained for the percentage recall of all five items from each of the two target 
descriptions. Errors of commission were also noted. Figure 5.18 shows number of items recalled and 
the percentage of correct items and the proportion of errors of commission for the determinate 
('Landmarks') and indeterminate descriptions ('Condiments'). The median number of errors of 
commission is also shown. 
Number of Percentage Percentage Errors of 
item names correct errors of commission 
commission (median) 
Determinate 2.276 65.2% 34.8% 0 
Indeterminate 2.793 91.4% 8.6% 0 
The proportion of errors of commission for the determinate description appears to be very high. 
However, as the median number of errors of commission shows, this figure is inflated by a few 
subjects who make large numbers of errors of commission. If the analysis is confined to those 
subjects who recall at least one correct item from the determinate description the proportion of 
errors of commission drops to 14. %. Thus it appears that those subjects who are not remembering 
any items from the original experiment are generating most of the errors of commission. This may 
be because they are not able to recall any items or perhaps because they have been unable to 
identify the original study episode. This effect is more pronounced for the 'Landmarks' 
description than the 'Condiments' description. This probably reflects the large number of common 
landmarks and the small number of common condiments not actually used in the descriptions (in 
fact only one common condiment "vinegar" was ever produced as an error of commission). Where 
4 This is not strictly true, because it is also possible to infer relationships which are not simple 
relations such as 'front', 'behind', 'left' or 'right'. However, including diagonal relations such as 'in front and 
to the left hand side of' ould complicate the analysis considerably. It would also be particularly difficult for 
the indeterminate description where more than one diagonal relation could be inferred between the same two 
objects. 
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subjects are able to recall at least one correct item the proportion of errors of commission is very 
small. 
It was predicted that the probability that a given item is recalled should reflect its 
position in the order of spatial mental model construction. Figure 5.19 shows the probability of 
recall by the predicted order of spatial mental model construction for the determinate 
'Landmarks' description. The trend predicted by the spatial mental models account is decreasing 
from left to right. These data were analyzed using a non-parametric trend test for dichotomous 
data (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1967; Meddis, 1984). The predicted trend was significant (N = 
29, Z=2.890; one-tailed p=0.0019). This pattern cannot be accounted for in terms of the frequency 
that items were mentioned in the original description because 'City' was mentioned three times, 
'Forest' twice and 'Mountain' only once (the exact opposite of the actual pattern of recall). Nor 
can frequency of usage explain the observed levels of recall; 'City' is the most frequent item 
followed, in order, by 'Forest', 'Lake', 'Mountain' and 'Desert' (Kucera & Francis, 1967). 
Therefore it appears that the order of spatial mental model construction does predict the 
probability that an item from a determinate description is recalled up to a year after the 
original learning episode. 5 
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Figure 5.19: Percentage recall for items in the determinate d scription (the p dicted trend is 
decreasing from left to right) 
5 Only memory for 'City' does not conform to the predicted trend, however, a number of apparent 
errors of commission such as "Tower", "Building" and "Castle" were classified as incorrect even though they 
might be considered plausible alternatives for 'City'. 
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The same prediction was also tested for the indeterminate description. Figure 5.20 shows 
the mean percentage recall for each item in the indeterminate description. The predicted order 
of spatial mental model construction is from left to right. 
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Figure 5.20: Percentage recall for items in the indeterminate description (the predicted trend is 
decreasing from left to right). 
From Figure 5.20 it is clear that, if anything, probability of recall is negatively related to the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction. Analysis of this trend shows that this 
negative relationship is close to significance (N = 29, Z=2.697; two-tailed p=0.070). Unlike in 
the drawing recall task of Experiment 5 the number of times an item is mentioned in the original 
description is not a good predictor of recall; 'Ketchup' occurred three times, 'Salt' twice and 
'Pepper', 'Sugar' and 'Mustard' only once. Word frequency was also considered as a possible 
influence on recall (Kucera & Francis, 1967). However, it is not a significant predictor of recall 
(N = 29, Z=0.81, one-tailed p=0.21). A plausible alternative is that the pattern of recall is 
predicted by the degree to which an item is a good exemplar or the target category (this could 
also be interpreted as the extent to which the items are consistent with a 'Condiments' schema). 
This hypothesis would be consistent with excellent memory for 'Pepper' and 'Salt' and poor 
memory for 'Sugar'. It would also be consistent with the generate-recognize recall route that was 
proposed to account for free recall data in Experiments 7 and 8 (Jones, 1978; Watkins & Gardiner, 
1979). As in Experiment 5 there is no evidence of a positive relationship between the order of 
spatial mental model construction and probability of recall for indeterminate descriptions. 
Free recall of spatial relations 
Figure 5.21 depicts the mean percentage of correctly recalled spatial relations for determinate 
and indeterminate descriptions out of the possible total of seven for determinate and six for 
200 
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indeterminate descriptions. Also shown are the proportion of explicit, inferred or inverse spatial 
relations which were generated by subjects. 
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Percentage recall for spatial relations is very low. This is because the majority of subjects 
reported that they could not recall any spatial relations. More correct spatial relations were 
recalled than inverse spatial relations. However, this did not reach significance with the 
Fisher exact test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) either for the total correct (N = 29, one-tailed p= 
0.14) or for the inferred spatial relations (N = 29, one-tailed p=0.087). 
Figure 5.22 shows the percentage recall of the four explicit spatial relations for both 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions. The trend predicted by the spatial mental model 
account is decreasing from left to right. Also depicted is the best remembered inferred relation. 
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Figure 5.22: Mean percentage recall of explicit and inferred spatial relations for determinate 
and indeterminate descriptions. 
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Relation 
The data for the recall of explicit spatial relations were analyzed using a trend test for 
dichotomous data. The trend predicted by the spatial mental model account was significant for 
both the determinate (N = 29, Z=2.00, one-tailed p=0.024) and the indeterminate descriptions 
(N = 29, Z=2.24; one-tailed p=0.013). These results match those obtained for the recall of 
spatial relations in Experiment 5. It is possible that the trend for the determinate description 
may be an artefact of the high recall for early items in the spatial mental model construction 
order. However, this explanation could not account for the trend observed for the indeterminate 
description. 6 Therefore there is an indication that the probability of recall for these spatial 
relations conforms to the order predicted by the spatial mental model account for both 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions. This suggests that some fragments of information 
about the spatial relations in a mental model constructed in working memory may be present in 
long-term memory many months after the original learning episode. 
From Figure 5.22 it is clear that the best remembered inferred spatial relation is more 
likely to be recalled than the fourth spatial relation taken from the original description. This 
would be particularly difficult to account for in terms of memory for an episodic construction trace 
or memory for the language of the text. However, with the Fisher exact test this difference does 
not reach significance (N = 29, one-tailed p=0.059). 7 
Recognition 
Scoring 
As in Experiments 4 and 6b recognition was scored using the procedure described by Payne (1993). 
The chi square analyses carried out in this section require that gist and verbatim recognition 
scores be independent (see Experiment 4 and Experiment 6b). Where this was necessary, cases 
6 Note that the only explicit spatial relations remembered from the indeterminate description are from 
the first and second spatial relations. The indeterminacy of this particular description only arises after the third 
spatial relation has been read. The inferred spatial relation is of course true with respect to either of the 
possible situations described by the indeterminate description. This result is consistent with the spatial 
mental model account. 
1 It should be noted that because very few spatial relations were recalled it was possible that memory 
for inferred spatial relations was independent of memory for explicit spatial relations. When the raw scores 
were checked this was discovered to be the case. In no case was an inferred spatial relation recalled only 
because two explicit spatial relations which formed the premises of the appropriate spatial inference were 
recalled. Where inferred and explicit spatial relations are not independent (as in Experiment 5) it would be 
inappropriate to report recall for inferred spatial relations. This is because if all four explicit spatial relations 
are recalled all the possible inferences will also be 'recalled'. 
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where a given subject was scored for both gist and verbatim recognition were not included in the 
analysis. For the remaining analyses and for the summary statistics these cases are included. 
However, as these cases contribute only to 'tied' scores they would not influence the pairwise 
comparisons carried out in the following sections. 
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Figure 5.23: Mean percentage verbatim and gist recognition for the two descriptions. 
Is recognition above chance? 
Figure 5.23 shows mean percentage gist and verbatim recognition scores for the determinate and 
indeterminate description. Chance recognition performance is 25% for verbatim recognition and 
16.7% for gist recognition. These levels of recognition were tested against chance performance 
using the binomial test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). For the determinate description verbatim 
recognition is above chance but this level does not reach significance (N = 29, p=0.082). The 
probability of determinate gist recognition exceeding fifty percent, as it does, is significant (N = 
29, p=0.000016). 
However, it could be argued that gist recognition may be inflated by verbatim 
recognition performance. One possible check on this is to analyze only those cases where gist and 
verbatim recognition occur independently of each other. In these cases verbatim recognition is at 
19.0% (N = 29, p=0.83). Gist recognition in the absence of verbatim recognition is at 33.3% (N = 
29, p=0.082). This estimate of significance is highly conservative because it assumes that every 
case where gist and verbatim recognition occur together arises only because the subject notices 
that the inferable description describes the same situation as his or her first choice. In other 
words it assumes that where gist and verbatim recognition occur together true gist memory is 
never present. Determinate verbatim recognition is lower than determinate gist recognition and 
is not significantly above chance (on either a conservative or a lenient test). A more plausible 
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interpretation is that gist recognition is not exaggerated by verbatim recognition. In fact the data 
suggest the reverse; above chance gist recognition has inflated determinate verbatim recognition. 
Indeterminate gist and verbatim recognition scores were analyzed in the same way. At 
31% indeterminate verbatim recognition is not significantly above chance (N = 29, p=0.28). Gist 
recognition of the same level is above chance (N = 29, p=0.041). Using the more conservative 
estimate of significance described above neither verbatim (N = 29, p=0.89) nor gist recognition 
(N = 29, p=0.58) is significantly above chance. These data suggest that indeterminate verbatim 
recognition is not significantly greater than chance. Overall, indeterminate gist recognition is 
greater than chance, though it is possible that verbatim recognition scores may have inflated 
gist recognition. 
Overall recognition scores are higher than can be accounted for by chance. There is no 
evidence that verbatim recognition is above chance for either determinate or indeterminate 
descriptions. By contrast there is evidence that gist recognition is above chance for both 
determinate and indeterminate descriptions. These results support the view that the structure of 
a mental model is better remembered than the sentences it is derived from, perhaps because of 
deeper encoding or more elaboration (Craik & Tulving, 1975; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982; Tardieu et al., 1992). 
Is there an interaction between determinacy and gist or verbatim recognition? 
There is little indication of an interaction between gist and verbatim recognition and the 
determinacy of the description in Figure 5.23. It is probable that any interaction may have been 
eliminated through the effect of the long retention interval on verbatim recognition performance. 
The data in Figure 5.23 were analyzed using the Fisher exact test (the chi square test was not 
used because of low expected cell frequencies). As described in the scoring section above only 
independent observations were included in this analysis. The resulting statistic was not 
significant (N = 29, one-tailed p=0.48). At very long retention intervals there is no evidence of 
an interaction between determinacy and type of recall. 
Does reordering depress recognition memory? 
Figure 5.24 depicts the effect of reordering on gist and verbatim recognition for the determinate 
description only. Reordering depresses both verbatim and gist recognition slightly. This 
reduction is not significant for either verbatim recognition (U = 93.5, N= 29, Z=0.59, one-tailed p 
= 0.28), or gist recognition (U = 101.5, N= 29, Z=0.18, one-tailed p=0.43) when analyzed with 
the Mann-Whitney U test. 
204 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1 ", 77 1 
Figure 5.25 depicts the effect of reordering on gist and verbatim recognition for the 
indeterminate description only. Reordering does not depress verbatim recognition for the 
indeterminate description at all (the difference between the two scores is not significant). 
However, this may be because verbatim recognition is at or about chance. Gist recognition is 
depressed by verbatim recognition, though this effect is not significant (U = 85.5, N= 29, Z=1.06, 
one-tailed p=0.14). 
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Reordering does not significantly depress either gist or verbatim recognition scores. These 
results do not favour the hypothesis that recognition is based on memory for an episodic 
construction trace (Payne, 1993). It is possible that some subjects retain memory for the 
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construction of a spatial mental model. Larger sample sizes may find support for this view. 
However, these results would suggest that at long retention intervals memory for an episodic 
construction trace is poorer than that for the structure of a spatial mental model. 
Correlations with backward digit span 
In the original study an association was observed between backward digit span and gist 
recognition scores, but no correlation was shown between reading span and either gist or verbatim 
recognition. The data in this experiment were also correlated with backward digit span using 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Backward digit span was not significantly correlated 
with either gist (Rho = 0.14, N= 29, Z=0.075, two-tailed p=0.45) or verbatim recognition (Rho 
= 0.007, N= 29, Z=0.036, two-tailed p=0.97). 
Correlations with retention interval 
Retention interval was correlated with subjects' ranks for the original and inferable descriptions 
in the recognition task. For the determinate description retention intervals ranging from 308 to 
368 days were significantly correlated with ranks assigned to the original description (Rho = 
0.448, N= 29, Z=2.36, one-tailed p=0.0092) but not for ranks assigned to the inferable 
description (Rho = -0.01, N= 29, Z= -0.055, one-tailed p=0.48). This suggests that verbatim 
recognition for the determinate description is significantly poorer at longer retention intervals. 
Gist recognition, however, remains stable over these retention intervals (roughly ten to twelve 
months). For the indeterminate description neither the ranking of the original (Rho = 0.128, N= 
29, Z=0.68, one-tailed p=0.25) nor of the inferable (Rho = -0.229, N= 29, Z= -1.21, one-tailed p 
= 0.112) is significantly associated with retention interval. 
Closer examination of the data revealed that retention interval and determinate 
verbatim recognition are correlated only for the stable description (Rho = 0.666, N= 15, Z=2.49, 
one-tailed p=0.0064). Figure 5.26 shows determinate verbatim and gist recognition scores for 
stable and reordered descriptions at median or below median retention intervals. Reordering 
more than halves verbatim recognition in these cases. This effect was significant when analyzed 
with the Mann-Whitney test (U = 43, N= 15, Z=1.74, one-tailed p=0.041). In addition, only for 
the stable determinate descriptions and only at the shorter retention intervals is verbatim 
recognition significantly above chance (N = 8, p=0.0042 using the binomial test). Gist recognition 
is not disrupted by reordering. This suggests that some subjects may retain memory for the 
construction of a spatial mental model in the form of an episodic construction trace. However, 
this is limited to shorter retention intervals and only for determinate descriptions. 
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5.6.3 Discussion 
Recall of objects and spatial relations from the determinate description confirms the predictions 
of the spatial mental models account. The probability that a given object or spatial relation is 
recalled is predicted by the order in which items would be integrated into a spatial mental 
model. For indeterminate descriptions, only the recall of spatial relations is predicted by the 
order of spatial mental model construction. This may be because it is possible to construct a single, 
consistent mental model for the first two spatial relations in the indeterminate description. This 
finding replicates the results obtained in Experiment 5 at longer retention intervals. 
Neither the number of times a given item occurs in the original description, nor the 
frequency of the word in common usage (Kucera & Francis, 1967) is a significant predictor of recall 
for either determinate or indeterminate descriptions. These results suggest that recall is based on 
memory for the structure of a spatial mental model. Both an episodic construction trace or 
memory for the sentences of the text would predict that an item mentioned in more than one 
proposition is more likely to be recalled. It is not possible to conclude that either an episodic 
construction trace (Payne, 1993) or a textbase (Kintsch, 1988) are implicated in the recall of 
determinate or indeterminate spatial descriptions. Recall for the determinate description can be 
accounted for by memory for the structure of a spatial mental model. Recall for the indeterminate 
description may be best accounted for in terms of a generate-recognition recall route (Jones, 1978; 
Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). The items in the indeterminate description were drawn from a 
category ("Condiments") with relatively few common members. It is possible that high recall 
for the indeterminate description largely reflects how easily category members are generated 
rather than 'true' recall. 
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There was little evidence of the interaction between type of recognition and the 
determinacy of the description predicted by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982). The interaction 
present in Experiment 4 may have been eliminated by poor verbatim recognition performance for 
both descriptions. Overall verbatim recognition scores were not significantly different from 
chance for either the determinate or indeterminate description. There was evidence, though, 
that gist recognition was above chance for the determinate description and possibly also for the 
indeterminate description. These findings support the hypothesis that the structure of a spatial 
mental model is better remembered at long retention intervals than either the process of its 
construction or the language of the original description. This suggests that mental models may 
indeed be encoded more deeply or elaborated more during the initial learning episode (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). There is certainly evidence that mental models take 
longer to construct than representations of the language of the text (Tardieu et al., 1992). 
Unlike Experiment 4 there is no significant relationship between backward digit span 
and gist recognition. This suggests that verbal short term memory may aid in the elaboration or 
construction of a spatial mental model but that any such effect is relatively small or relatively 
short-lived. Even though overall determinate verbatim recognition is not significantly above 
chance there is a significant relationship between retention interval and the rank assigned to 
the original description. As there is no relationship between the rank assigned to the inferable 
description and retention interval this suggests that at shorter retention intervals (slightly over 
ten months) some subjects retain some memory for the language of the determinate description. 
Closer analysis revealed that this relationship holds only when the original description has 
not been reordered. These results provide some support for the view that verbatim recognition 
scores for determinate descriptions were influenced by memory for an episodic construction trace. 
The correlations between stable verbatim recognition and retention interval are difficult to 
explain purely in terms of memory for the language of the text or for the structure of a spatial 
mental model. However, memory for the process of mental model construction appears to be less 
durable than memory for the structure of a spatial mental model. 
At very long retention intervals there is no evidence that people remember the language 
of the spatial descriptions they have read. There is some indication that memory for the process 
of spatial mental model construction influences determinate verbatim recognition. Recall for 
items from the descriptions and the spatial relations between them as well as high levels of gist 
recognition all support the view that people are able to remember the structure of a spatial 
mental model up to a year after the initial learning episode. 
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5.7 General Discussion 
Three experiments are reported which investigate the role of memory for spatial mental models 
in the very long-term retention of information from spatial descriptions. In the following sections 
issues raised in the introduction to this chapter and during the discussion of the individual 
experiments are discussed. 
5.7.1 Assessing level and type of recall 
In the introduction methodological issues relating to the recall of information from long-term 
memory were discussed. A particular problem for studies of very long-term retention is the role of 
schema in remembering and especially reconstructing the original learning episode. In 
Experiment 7 highly typical (schema consistent) buildings were much more likely to be 
remembered when subjects attempted to recall an English village on a drawing task. Because 
errors of commission were infrequent (even high typicality errors such as school or garage) it was 
suggested that recall was consistent with subjects taking advantage of a generate-recognition 
recall route. High typicality landmarks are more likely to be generated. Once a typical 
landmark is generated the low proportion of errors of commission suggests that subjects appear to 
be able to recognize many of the landmarks which were actually present in the original story 
(Bahrick, 1970; Jones, 1982; Watkins & Gardiner, 1979). 
In Experiment 8 recall and recognition performance of subjects in the experimental 
condition was shown to exceed that of baseline subjects using guesswork strategies. On most of the 
recall tasks subjects in the experimental and baseline conditions 'recalled' similar numbers of 
correct items, but baseline subjects produced very many more 'errors'. Again, this is consistent 
with the generate-recognition recall route. If experimental subjects were able to make greater use 
of direct or intrinsic recall routes this should be reflected in higher raw scores, not just in the 
proportion of correct responses. Intrinsic recall routes use retrieval cues encoded during the 
original study episode while indirect or extrinsic routes (such as generate-recognition) use cues 
that were not encoded during learning (Jones, 1978; 1982; 1987). These results do not exclude the 
use of direct or intrinsic recall routes by subjects, but they do suggest that indirect recall routes 
dominate subject responses at very long retention intervals. 
The interpretation of recall performance in Experiment 9 is less clear cut. For the 
determinate description the trends in the recall of items and spatial relations suggests that 
many subjects were able to use the description title "Landmarks" as a direct retrieval cue for 
information from a spatial mental model. The correct retrieval of items may also have provided 
direct access to some of the remaining landmarks. According to the spatial mental model account 
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items in a description are integrated into a consistent representation in working memory (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983). Hence the spatial mental model account should predict that landmarks in the 
description act as intrinsic cues at recall and that the effectiveness of these cues should reflect 
the order in which items were integrated into the representation (Jones, 1978; 1982). Recall of the 
indeterminate descriptions suggests that indirect, extrinsic cues may be more important in 
recalling individual items (though this may not be the case with the spatial relations). This is 
consistent with the view that subjects are unable or at least less likely to integrate 
indeterminate descriptions into a single consistent representation at encoding. However, this 
interpretation is weakened by the fact that the 'Condiments' category for the indeterminate 
description has a smaller set size than the 'Landmarks' category. The high levels of 'recall' for 
the 'Condiments' description probably reflects the difficulty of generating condiments which 
were not in the original description. 
5.7.2 What kinds of information are preserved? 
The findings reported here are broadly consistent with previous research on memory at very long 
retention intervals. Research on the retention of spatial information (Bahrick, 1983; Herman et 
al., 1987; Herman et al., 1979) suggests that what is remembered reflects the needs and goals 
people have when learning an environment. In a similar fashion, subjects in these studies who 
were originally asked to concentrate on the spatial information in the descriptions they read, 
appeared to retain spatial information better than the language of the descriptions. It has been 
argued that the retention of this spatial information reflects, to a great extent, memory for the 
structure of a spatial mental model. 
Bahrick also noted that the more quickly information about an environment was learned 
the more quickly it was later forgotten (Bahrick, 1983). This is consistent with the evidence that 
subjects retain some memory for an episodic construction trace in Experiment 9. The episodic 
construction trace is presumably encoded at an early stage in the construction of the spatial 
mental model. Further elaboration of a spatial mental model may aid the retention of its 
structure but not its construction. The episodic construction trace, therefore, is more sensitive to 
the effects of retention interval. This is shown by the correlation between stable verbatim 
recognition and retention interval for the determinate description. Where the original 
description was reordered retention interval does not influence recognition. Gist recognition, 
which reflects memory for the structure of a spatial mental model, is stable over these retention 
intervals. This is likely to be because of deeper encoding or elaboration of the structure of a 
spatial mental model during encoding (Craik & Tulving, 1975; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). 
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More generally the results have supported the view that schema can have a dramatic 
influence on recall (Cohen, 1989). In these experiments the influence of schematic knowledge 
appears to be largely during retrieval. Schema consistent items tend to be more likely to be 
generated during recall, but the low proportion of errors of commission suggests that, in most 
cases, subjects are able to reject plausible but incorrect items. This is consistent with experiments 
that show that a change in schema at retrieval can influence recall (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; 
Pichert & Anderson, 1977). Schema theories cannot explain all of the information that subjects 
recall. They cannot explain memory for routes, memory for spatial location, spatial relations or 
the relationship between probability of recall and the predicted order of spatial mental model 
construction. What these things have in common is that they can be integrated into a single 
coherent mental representation during the original learning episode. In fact, some of these, such 
as spatial relations, are properties of an integrated mental representation. 
5.8 Conclusions 
Evidence has been presented from three studies of the very long-term retention of spatial 
information. The findings presented in this chapter primarily reflect two kinds of processes; the 
influence of schemas on retrieval from long-term memory and the retention of the structure of a 
spatial mental model. It is proposed that the notion of an integrated mental representation such 
as a mental model is a useful one for exploring the retention of spatial information at very long 
retention intervals. 
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Chapter 6- Conclusions 
In the first two chapters of this thesis it was proposed that to answer the question 'Are spatial 
mental models represented in long term memory? ' requires three important assumptions. Firstly, 
that it is necessary or useful to postulate at least three forms of 'high-level' representation in 
working memory (Anderson, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Secondly, that one form of high-level, 
dynamic representation in working memory, namely mental models, preserves the "relation- 
structure" of the situations it represents (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Craik, 1943; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Tversky, 1991; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). These 'mental models' can be distinguished from 
representations of language, in the form of linguistic propositions, or representations of the 
perceptual characteristics of situations, such as visual images (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Thirdly, 
that the processes in working memory can profoundly influence how something is represented in 
long-term memory (Craik, 1979; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Marschark & Surian, 1989; Morris et 
al., 1977). 
Spatial mental models are of special interest to cognitive scientists because the 
characteristics of the situations they describe are relatively easy to manipulate and because 
they "happen to be a domain in which the differences between the structure of the world and the 
structure of the text describing it are most readily apparent" (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994). 
Accordingly, the nine experiments presented in this thesis have focused on memory for the 
structure of spatial descriptions. In earlier chapters these experiments have, to some extent, 
stood alone. In this chapter the findings from these experiments will be considered together and 
discussed in terms of the spatial mental modeling processes outlined in Chapter 2. 
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6.1 Spatial mental models and memory for spatial descriptions 
According to the framework outlined in Chapter 2 mental modeling processes can be divided into 
three stages (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Payne, 1993). These stages are 
considered in terms of the special case where a spatial mental model is derived from a verbal 
description. In the first stage, comprehension, the meaning of the spatial relationships in the 
description is accessed and interpreted. In the second stage, construction, tokens corresponding to 
real or imagined entities are placed into the spatial mental model according to the possible 
interpretations of the spatial relationships in the description. Where possible all new tokens 
are added relative to existing tokens in the spatial mental model. In the final stage, 
consultation, information is read off from the spatial mental model or more complex operations 
such as matching or counting are carried out using the representation (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Newell, 1990). Comprehension processes may operate differently or be 
omitted where a spatial mental model is derived from perception or previous experience. 
Construction processes may also operate differently where a spatial mental model is recalled 
from long-term memory. In addition construction processes are also involved in updating spatial 
mental models during the comprehension of complex discourse or when searching for 
counterexamples in deductive reasoning (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; 
Glenberg et al., 1987). Consultation processes are involved in monitoring the construction of the 
spatial mental model as well as in generating inferences during discourse comprehension and 
reasoning (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 1993; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
These three stages of processing operate in a cyclic fashion. In the simplest case the 
acquisition of each new spatial relation requires comprehension, construction and consultation to 
operate in series. In more complex cases mental modeling may require that comprehension and 
consultation processes are repeated in order to check the interpretation of the spatial mental 
model is consistent with the situation described. If the interpretation is considered 
inappropriate, construction processes may have to be altered (e. g. by deleting a token from the 
spatial mental model). In extreme cases construction may even have to be abandoned (Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982; Payne, 1993). It is the cyclic nature of mental modeling that supports many 
of the predictions of memory for spatial descriptions made in this thesis (see section 2.5). 
Empirical support for these predictions has already been discussed in detail in Chapters 3,4 and 
5. The main findings which have emerged from these experiments are summarized in the sections 
which follow. 
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6.1.1 Are drawing orders influenced by the order of spatial mental model 
construction? 
Several experiments reported in this thesis have addressed the question of whether the order in 
which landmarks are drawn in a drawing task is a result of memory for the order of spatial 
mental model construction. The main recall task was to draw the environment described in the 
story, concentrating on the physical and spatial features contained in it. In similar experiments 
by Taylor and Tversky (1992a) people tended to draw landmarks from the description in the 
order those landmarks had been introduced in the text. Taylor and Tversky interpreted this 
finding in terms of subjects reproducing a spatial mental model of the text in the order that it had 
originally been constructed. However, they failed to address the possibility that people recall a 
representation of the language of the text. In order to differentiate memory for the language of a 
text and memory for a spatial mental model several of the experiments reported have 
investigated memory for scrambled texts. When a text is scrambled the predicted order of 
spatial mental model construction and the order landmarks are mentioned in the text differ (this 
argument is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). The main findings from these experiments are 
listed below: 
" When subjects are asked to recall spatial information from an unscrambled story 
drawing orders are significantly related to the predicted order of spatial mental 
model construction (Experiments 1,2,3 and 8). 
" When sentences from a story describing a route are presented in a scrambled order 
subjects' drawings are also significantly related to the order of spatial mental 
model construction (Experiments 2 and 3). 
" The first landmark drawn by subjects in a drawing recall task is predicted by the 
order of spatial mental model construction. This is the case even when the first 
landmark entered into a spatial mental model is not the first landmark 
mentioned in the original story (Experiments 2 and 3). 
" When subjects read determinate spatial descriptions (descriptions which have 
no narrative content) drawing orders are also consistent with the order of spatial 
mental model construction (Experiments 5). 
"A significant relationship between drawing orders and the order of spatial 
mental model construction can still be obtained at retention intervals of over ten 
months (Experiments 8 and 9). 
These findings offer strong support for the view that the order in which landmarks or other 
objects are recalled in drawing tasks is determined by the order of spatial mental model 
construction. Where the predicted order of spatial mental model construction and the order 
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landmarks are mentioned in a story differ the evidence consistently favours the spatial mental 
model account. There is no evidence, in these experiments, that drawing recall is based on 
memory for the language of a text. 
6.1.2 Is the probability of recall in a drawing task influenced by the order of 
spatial mental model construction? 
Craik (1970) has shown that negative recency effects arise in memory for lists in delayed, but not 
immediate, recall. One explanation for this phenomenon is that primacy effects in free recall are 
the product of greater 'semantic' processing for early items in a list (Craik, 1970; Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). Craik proposed that people actively try to transfer early items to long-term 
memory in order to free up working memory capacity for later items. The spatial mental model 
account outlined in Chapter 2 makes a similar prediction, but for slightly different reasons. It is 
argued that when items are integrated into a spatial mental model, early items are elaborated 
to a greater extent that later items. This is because later items are integrated into the spatial 
mental model by relating them to items already present in the representation. Evidence for a 
relationship between order of mention and the probability of recall for items from a spatial text 
has been reported by Denhiere and Denis (1988). When it is possible to form a single, coherent 
representation of the structure of a story, the item mentioned first in a written narrative or 
picture story takes longer to process and is quicker to access (Gernsbacher, 1990; 1991). Several 
experiments reported in this thesis have investigated the probability of recalling items from a 
text or description to test this prediction. Of particularly interest is the probability of recall 
from a text when the order items are mentioned in the text and the predicted order of spatial 
mental model construction differ: 
" When subjects are asked to recall spatial information from an unscrambled route 
text the probability of recall is significantly related to the predicted order of 
spatial mental model construction (Experiment 8). 
" When subjects read scrambled route texts the probability of recall is also 
significantly related to the predicted order of spatial mental model construction 
(Experiments 2 and 3). 
" When subjects read determinate spatial descriptions the probability of recalling 
an object or a spatial relation from a description is significantly related to the 
order of spatial mental model construction (Experiments 5 and 9). 
" When subjects read indeterminate spatial descriptions the probability of 
recalling a spatial relation (but not the probability of recalling an object) is 
predicted by the order of spatial mental model construction (Experiments 5 and 
9). 
215 
" The probability of recalling an object from an indeterminate spatial description 
is predicted by the number of times that object is mentioned in the original 
description (Experiment 5). 
"A significant relationship between the probability of recall and the order of 
spatial mental model construction can still be obtained at retention intervals of 
over ten months (Experiments 8 and 9). 
These results support the prediction that the probability of recalling an item from a spatial 
description or text is influenced by the order in which that item was integrated into a spatial 
mental model. Where text order and the order of spatial mental model construction differ the 
results favour the spatial mental model account. One interesting finding is that the relationship 
between spatial mental model construction order and the probability of recalling an object is not 
obtained for indeterminate descriptions. This result is problematic for an explanation of order 
effects in recall purely in terms of memory for construction processes (e. g. an episodic construction 
trace). This issue is explored further in section 6.1.5 below (also refer to section 4.2.3). 
6.1.3 Does reordering a spatial description impair recognition memory? 
Payne (1993) has argued that memory for the construction of a spatial mental model takes the 
form of an episodic construction trace. An episodic construction trace is a set of propositions where 
each proposition encodes a single operation of an attempt to construct a spatial mental model. 
Payne has argued that if a spatial description is reordered for a recognition test this reduces the 
overlap between the original description and the reordered description, making recognition 
based on an episodic construction trace more difficult. Reordering the descriptions leaves each 
sentence intact and so should not impair memory for the sentences of the description. In addition, 
the reordered description still describes the same arrangement of objects, so reordering should not 
make recognizing the structure of a spatial mental model more difficult. A number of experiments 
in this thesis have addressed the question of whether reordering a spatial description does 
impair recognition memory: 
0 When subjects hear a series of spatial descriptions reordering the descriptions in 
a recognition test significantly reduces recognition memory for both 
indeterminate and determinate descriptions (Experiment 6b). 
" When subjects read a series of spatial descriptions some, but not all, descriptions, 
show a significant effect of reordering (Experiments 4 and 6b). 
" There is evidence that reordering significantly impairs recognition memory even 
after a ten month retention interval (Experiment 9). 
216 
These findings are broadly consistent with the predictions made by the episodic construction 
trace hypothesis . The 
different effects of reordering when a description is read and when it is 
heard are interesting. They may arise, at least in part, because people who read a written 
description are able to deviate from the actual order of presentation (e. g. when the description is 
re-read). 
6.1.4 Do people remember the structure of a spatial mental model? 
Memory for the structure of a spatial mental model is demonstrated when people remember both 
the explicit and implicit spatial relations present in a spatial mental model. One way to 
demonstrate this is to show that, when conditions favour the construction of a single, 
determinate spatial mental model, the structure or 'gist' of the model is remembered better than 
the description itself. Even stronger evidence in favour of the spatial mental model account is 
obtained if it is demonstrated that people remember the language of the description when 
conditions do not favour the construction of a single, determinate spatial mental model (e. g. when 
the spatial description is radically indeterminate). The classic mental models account thus 
predicts an interaction between determinacy of a description and the type of recognition it 
supports (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). Several experiments in this thesis 
have addressed this issue. The main findings are reported here: 
" Gist recognition scores for determinate descriptions are significantly higher than 
those obtained for indeterminate descriptions (Experiment 4). 
" Verbatim recognition scores for indeterminate descriptions are significantly 
higher than those obtained for determinate descriptions (Experiment 4). 
" When the indeterminate and determinate descriptions are controlled for 
differences between items this interaction between determinacy and type of 
recognition supported by a description is still obtained for descriptions which 
have not been reordered (Experiment 5). 
" Reordering indeterminate descriptions on a recognition test can reduce verbatim 
recognition almost to chance (Experiment 6b). 
These results suggest that people do remember the structure of a spatial mental model constructed 
from a determinate description, because determinate gist recognition scores are consistently 
higher than those for indeterminate descriptions. However, the evidence does not favour the 
conclusion that the language of the description is always remembered better for indeterminate 
descriptions than determinate descriptions. This is because reordering an indeterminate 
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description can reduce verbatim recognition to a level barely above chance. Instead, it suggests 
that people remember their attempt to construct a spatial mental model for an indeterminate 
description. 
6.1.5 Discussion 
In Chapter 2 three processing stages involved in spatial mental modeling were outlined. Of the 
three stages, comprehension is the least important for the purposes of this thesis. This is because 
any theory of how spatial descriptions are understood and remembered must propose some form of 
linguistic processing stage as its starting point (Clark, 1969; Johnson-Laird, 1981; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983). Consequently, memory for comprehension processes provides no means of 
discriminating between mental model and alternative accounts of the comprehension of spatial 
descriptions. For this reason the main focus of this thesis has been on memory for mental 
modeling processes of construction and consultation. However, it has been possible to reject 
explanations which propose people only remember the language of the descriptions or texts they 
have read. Explanations based purely on memory for the language of a description have 
problems accounting for several of the findings reported in this thesis. Firstly, it is difficult to 
explain the relationship between the order or the probability of recalling an item in a drawing 
task and the order of spatial mental model construction. This is particularly difficult where 
spatial mental model construction order and the order items are mentioned in the text differ, as is 
the case with scrambled texts (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Secondly, verbatim recognition scores 
are lower than gist recognition for determinate descriptions. This is impossible to account for in 
terms of memory for the language of a description, because it means that people are more likely 
to 'recognize' descriptions containing only one sentence from the original description than those 
containing four sentences from the original description. The final finding against people 
remembering only the language of a description is that reordering makes it harder to recognize a 
description, even though all of the individual sentences remain intact. 
Memory for the processes of spatial mental model construction and consultation is 
central to the account of mental modeling processes outlined in Chapter 2. Previous mental 
models approaches have not required that people remember constructing a mental model. In 
general, they rely on evidence from processing in working memory. For example, evidence that 
reasoning problems which require multiple models are more difficult than those which require a 
single model (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird et al., 
1992). Demonstrating memory for the processes of mental model construction is important because 
it confirms detailed predictions about how that theory is implemented. One recent paper has 
proposed that the process of mental model construction may be the only thing which is retained 
in long-term memory (Payne, 1993). Payne's proposal that people retain an episodic construction 
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trace of the operations used to construct a spatial mental model provides the basis for the 
account of memory for construction processes proposed earlier in the thesis (see section 2.5.1). 
When people are asked to draw spatial layouts learned from spatial descriptions the 
order in which items are drawn and the probability that an item is recalled are both influenced 
by the predicted order of spatial mental model construction. If simple spatial descriptions are 
reordered at test, recognition memory is impaired, suggesting that people remember the 
operations used to construct a spatial mental model. Explanations which do not rely on memory 
for spatial mental modeling processes have difficulty accounting for these observations (Payne, 
1993; Tversky, 1991). On face value both these observations seem to reflect the retention of 
information related to the processes of spatial mental model construction such as an episodic 
construction trace. However, a more detailed examination of this interpretation suggests that 
the current formulation of the episodic construction trace hypothesis (Payne, 1993) has problems 
accounting for some of the results reported here. Payne (personal communication) has noted that 
minor modifications to the episodic construction trace account are required to take account of the 
relationship between drawing recall and the order of spatial mental model construction. These 
might include determining the order in which the first two items are entered into the model and 
assuming that the propositions are not stored in an 'all or none' fashion. A more fundamental 
problem for the episodic construction trace hypothesis comes from differences in drawing recall 
between determinate and indeterminate descriptions in Experiment 5. For determinate 
descriptions the probability of recalling an item was significantly related to the order of spatial 
mental model construction. For indeterminate descriptions this was not the case. The episodic 
construction trace records all the operations in the attempt to construct spatial mental models 
from both determinate and indeterminate descriptions (Payne, 1993). It is therefore difficult to 
explain differences between memory for determinate and indeterminate descriptions by the 
episodic construction trace hypothesis. 
One possible resolution of the problems facing the episodic construction trace hypothesis 
is that the idea that people remember the process of spatial mental model construction should be 
abandoned. This resolution would be unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, reordering a spatial 
description can make it significantly harder to recognize. This finding is very difficult to account 
for, except in terms of memory for the operations used to construct a spatial mental model (Payne, 
1993). Secondly, there is considerable evidence that people can and do remember the structure of 
a spatial mental model. If people remember the structure of a spatial mental model, it is not 
unreasonable to expect them to be able to remember some or all of the operations involved in its 
construction. For these reasons, the resolution favoured here is to explain memory for the order of 
spatial mental model construction in terms of the combination of construction and consultation 
processes (see section 2.5). A 'processing' account of memory for spatial mental models along these 
lines is proposed in section 6.2. 
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6.2 A processing account of the representation of spatial mental 
models in long-term memory 
In Chapter 2 it was proposed that mental modeling consists of three processing stages; 
comprehension, construction and consultation. In this section one kind of theory of memory for 
spatial mental models is rejected and a sketch of a processing model of memory for spatial 
descriptions is described. 
6.2.1 Copy theories of memory for spatial mental models 
A 'copy' theory of memory for spatial mental models assumes that once a mental model is 
constructed in working memory it is somehow copied as a complete, intact entity into long-term 
memory. While no explicit 'copy' theory of memory for mental models has been proposed it could 
be argued that it is implicit in a number of treatments of memory for mental models. One reading 
of the paper by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) is that mental models share the same format in 
long-term memory as in working memory, implying that they are copies of completed working 
memory mental models (Payne, 1993). Other experiments which do not explicitly distinguish 
between the working memory and long-term memory representations of subjects can also be 
interpreted in this fashion (Franklin et al., 1992; Tversky, 1991). A simple copy theory is 
unattractive for several reasons. Firstly, as has already been noted, there is a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that there are multiple forms of representation in working memory, but 
relatively little evidence for this in long-term memory (Anderson, 1983; Denis, 1991; Glenberg & 
Langston, 1992; Kosslyn, 1980; Payne, 1993). Secondly, it seems strange to represent only the final, 
completed mental model in long-term memory. Mental modeling is often an ongoing activity and 
even with a static mental model it is not always obvious when the model is complete. Finally, 
what is stored in long-term memory can be distorted or altered over time by organized knowledge 
structures in long-term memory (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Cohen et al., 1993; Schank, 1982). 
Experiments presented in this thesis have shown the influence schemas can have on recall. This 
suggests that spatial representations in long-term memory are in sufficiently similar format for 
them to be influenced by or confused with other long-term memory traces. For this reason any 
'copy' theory of memory for mental models has to take into account the nature of the working 
memory processes used to construct and consult the representation. A plausible version of such a 
copy theory might consist of 'snapshots' of the mental model construction and consultation 
processes rather than merely a copy of the completed representation. Such a revised copy theory 
would be difficult to distinguish from the processing account proposed here. 
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It could be argued that a simple copy theory such as the one rejected above is unlikely to 
be advanced as a theory of memory for spatial descriptions. However a similar theory of 
memory for images, namely dual-coding theory, has been proposed (Paivio, 1971; 1986; 1991). 
One recent formulation of dual-coding theory could be considered as an alternative explanation 
of memory for spatial mental models. Kulhavy has described a version of dual coding theory 
which acknowledges that images have both visual (feature) and spatial (structural) components 
(Kulhavy, Stock, Peterson, Pridemore, & Klein, 1992; Kulhavy et al., 1993; Kulhavy et al., 1993; 
Kulhavy et al., 1993). It is the structural components of images which lead to better retention 
and which lead to pictures or maps improving memory for text. Kulhavy argues that these 
images are stored as "a more or less unitary chunk" in long-term memory. Furthermore, Kulhavy 
has suggested that these images (derived from pictures or maps) are not built up sequentially 
(Kulhavy et al., 1993). This account shares many predictions with the mental models account 
because both stress the role of structural information in improving retention. Where the two 
accounts differ is on how that structure arises. The Kulhavy account cannot explain why the 
predicted order of spatial mental model construction influences recall, both here and in other 
research (Denhiere & Denis, 1988; Taylor & Tversky, 1992a). It is also difficult to reconcile with 
evidence that 'images' derived from perception are built up sequentially rather than copied 
intact into working memory or long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, & von 
Gierke, 1988). 1 While there is some evidence that such a dual coding approach may successfully 
account for structural information in 'images' derived from pictures it fails to explain how such 
images could be derived from descriptions. A simple 'copy' theory which does not take account of 
cycles of processing in long-term memory fails as a theory of how people remember spatial 
descriptions. 
6.2.2 A sketch of a processing theory of memory for spatial mental models 
A productive theory of memory for spatial mental models needs to combine the attractive 
features of the episodic construction trace hypothesis with a detailed explanation of how 
consultation processes influence long-term memory. In this section a sketch of such a theory is 
provided followed by a discussion of how the sketch needs to be fleshed out. In the theory it is 
assumed that two long-term memory traces are formed; a construction trace and a consultation 
trace. The role of language comprehension processes is deliberately ignored, not because they are 
unimportant, but because several excellent and detailed theories of text processing and memory 
for text already exist (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Garnham, 1987; Gerrig, 1988; Kintsch, 1988; van 
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The two traces are composed of arrays of tokens in a specific spatial 
relationship. They are depicted as arrays for several reasons. The first reason is to stress the 
In the terms of this thesis these spatial `images' correspond more closely to a spatial mental model 
than to a visual image. 
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spatial nature of the working memory processes being recorded in long-term memory. The second 
is that to express the same information explicitly in, for example, a propositional format would 
be extremely inefficient. To express the spatial relationship between two tokens would require at 
least two propositions (e. g. "X is to the right of Y" and "Y is to the left of X"). As the number of 
tokens in the model increases the number of propositions increases rapidly (e. g. for four tokens at ' 
least twelve propositions are required). Thirdly, the consultation trace and the construction trace 
support the recognition and recall of spatial relations from a spatial mental model. It therefore 
makes sense to describe them as high-level structured entities rather than as relatively low 
level propositions which can be used to derive such a higher-order entity. 
The general principles of the sketch are simple. Both the construction trace and the 
consultation trace are recorded in long-term memory as a side effect of conscious, effortful 
processing in working memory (the construction processes and consultation processes described in 
section 2.5.1). The construction trace is a record of the operations applied in order to construct a 
spatial mental model and is largely procedural in nature. The consultation trace is a record of 
additional processing carried out while the spatial mental model is consulted and is largely 
declarative in nature. Each trace is considered to have constituent structure such as the tokens 
present in the model and the spatial or procedural relationships among them. This is an 
important point, because it is assumed that a token such as "mountain" or "pepper" in the model 
can be associated with other elements in working memory or long-term memory. These elements 
can in turn be used to cue or prime retrieval from a construction trace or consultation trace recorded 
in long-term memory (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg et al., 1987; McNamara, Halpin, & 
Hardy, 1992; McNamara, Halpin, & Hardy, 1992; Radvansky et al., 1993; Radvansky & Zacks, 
1991; Wilson et al., 1993). While it assumed that tokens and relations in the trace can differ in 
activation or trace strength this aspect of the model is not explicitly addressed in the sketch 
presented here. It should be noted, though, that the activation or trace strengths of tokens and 
relations is implicit in the arrays of the construction and consultation trace which are stored over 
time. 
The construction trace 
The construction trace is closely based on the episodic construction trace proposed by Payne 
(1993). The first change from the original episodic construction trace account is intended to 
explicitly distinguish between the first and second tokens entered into a spatial mental model. 
This simply requires a separate array to be recorded for each token added to the spatial mental 
model. The second change is more complex. The episodic construction trace records only the 
minimum amount of information about construction operations required to reconstruct a spatial 
mental model (Payne, personal communication). It follows that a construction trace might record 
more information than that preserved in the episodic construction trace. For instance, it could 
record spatial relationships other than those made explicit in the original description. The 
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position adopted here is that the construction trace has a probability of recording existing tokens 
in the trace according to their spatial proximity to the token being added to the model. Any 
tokens explicitly referred to in the sentence of the original description being read are 
automatically recorded in the model. This provides a mechanism for the retention of spatial 
mental model construction order in the construction trace (a mechanism which is not present in 
the episodic construction trace). A detailed description of spatial mental model construction 
order is provided in section 2.5.1. 
To understand the way such a construction trace might work imagine being given a set of 
three objects in a bag; a knife, a fork and a spoon. You are asked to place the fork in front of the 
spoon. You take out the fork and spoon and then place the spoon on the table. Next you place the 
fork in front of the spoon. You are then asked to place the knife behind the spoon and you do so. 
Afterwards you may remember each operation quite clearly, but let us consider the final 
operation. You will almost certainly remember placing the knife behind the spoon. However, it 
is also reasonable to expect you to remember that by placing the knife behind the spoon you also 
placed it behind the fork. The construction trace is procedural in the sense that people are 
remembering how a token was added to a spatial mental model rather than what the resulting 
spatial relationships were (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983; Ryle, 1949). It is this possibility of 
noticing other spatial relationships that this version of the construction trace captures. Rather 
than attempt a detailed explanation of how the construction trace is recorded examples of 
memory for two simple spatial descriptions are described later in this section. 
The consultation trace 
The consultation trace records declarative information that is read from a spatial mental model. 
A spatial mental model is usually consulted for a particular purpose such as making an inference 
(Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989), understanding a story (Bower & Morrow, 1990) or carrying out a 
set of instructions (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). In the consultation of a spatial mental model no 
distinction is made between implicit and explicit information. For this reason, consulting a 
spatial mental model will often result in people 'noticing' spatial relations which are not 
explicit in the original description or in the operations used to construct it (Glenberg & Langston, 
1992). For certain tasks the way people consult a spatial mental model may result in almost 
exclusively recording information which is explicit in the original description. This is unlikely, 
however, because constructing a spatial mental model requires effort and people are not likely to 
do so if they can perform the task by referring to the original description. 2 If anything people 
Reasoning tasks may be an exception to this general principle. According to Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991) people do make errors in deduction when the conclusion is explicit in the premises. This may 
well be because they expect the task to be more difficult than it is and construct one or more mental models 
of the premises in order to reach a conclusion. 
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may be more likely to search for and record novel spatial relations from the spatial mental 
model because it is more useful than information explicit in the original description. 
The most important and difficult aspect of describing the consultation trace is to 
determine what spatial relations are recorded and when. While it is possible to argue that 
consultation processes follow a fixed order like construction processes this would not be consistent 
with the many different purposes a spatial mental model can be constructed for. For the present a 
skeletal outline of the consultation processes required to account for memory for indeterminate 
descriptions will be described. This will be done by distinguishing between the first and 
subsequent cycles of the consultation processes. The first cycle is assumed to consist of reading the 
entire description from start to finish, constructing and consulting the spatial mental model as it 
is read. The subsequent cycles are assumed to take place after construction has been completed 
and hence only involve consultation processes. For the sake of simplicity the first cycle of 
consultation processes are assumed to be devoted entirely to checking the spatial relations 
present in the spatial mental model are consistent with the original description. If a token is not 
added to the spatial mental model, for example because the description is indeterminate, it is, of 
course, not possible to consult the novel spatial relationships that might have become part of the 
model. In subsequent cycles, for each new token which has been added to the spatial mental 
model its spatial relationship with immediately adjacent tokens is consulted and recorded in 
long-term memory. Of particular importance is the first cycle. This is because it is not necessarily 
the case that reading the description from start to finish only involves reading each sentence 
once. In fact it is probable that some sentences, particularly early sentences, are read several 
times in order to check the spatial mental model. For the first cycle of consultation processes it is 
proposed that spatial relations from early sentences in the description are consulted more often 
those later in the description. This is depicted in the two examples which follow by spatial 
relations which occur early in the construction process being followed by a number in brackets 
indicating that they may be recorded several times. This multiple recording of some sections of 
the consultation trace could be considered as multiple representations of these propositions in 
memory or greater activation or trace strength of some long-term memory contents over others. 
Memory for two simple spatial descriptions 
Examples of memory for a simple determinate and a simple indeterminate description are 
presented here to demonstrate how the construction trace and consultation trace are recorded. As 
noted earlier each trace is made up of a number of 'arrays' consisting of tokens and spatial 
relations between tokens. In the construction trace the following notation is also adopted. 
Question marks precede any token for which it is not possible to provide a fixed spatial location 
in the array. Bold lettering indicates a token which has just been added to the spatial mental 
model. Normal lettering indicates a token which is explicitly provided as a reference point in 
the original description (and which is automatically recorded in the trace). Tokens in italics are 
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those which have a probability of being recorded in the construction trace, but which are not 
explicitly provided as reference points in the original description. The two descriptions used are 
shown in Figure 6.1. 
Determinate description: 
The knife is in front of the fork 
The plate is to the right of the fork 
The spoon is to the left of the fork 
The cup is in front of the spoon 
Indeterminate description: 
The duck is in front of the frog 
The mouse is to the right of the frog 
The cat is to the right of the frog 
The dog is in front of the cat 
Figure 6.1: The determinate and indeterminate descriptions used in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. 
Figure 6.2 below depicts a construction trace and consultation trace for the determinate 
description. Figure 6.3 depicts a construction trace and consultation trace for the indeterminate 
description. In both cases only the construction trace and the first cycle of the consultation trace is 
depicted. 
Construction operations Construction trace Consultation trace 
(First Cycle) 
1. Enter fork in model Fork Fork 
2. Place knife in front of fork Fork Fork (4) 
Knife Knife (4) 
3. Place plate to right of fork Fork Plate Fork Plate 
Knife (3) 
4. Place spoon to left of fork Spoon Fork Plate Spoon Fork 
Knife (2) (2 
5. Place cup in front of spoon Spoon Fork Plate Spoon (1) 
Cup Knife Cup (1) 
Figure 6.2: An example of a construction trace and the first cycle of a consultation trace for the 
determinate description in Figure 
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In subsequent cycles the consultation trace can be considered to record all the spatial 
relationships between determinately located pairs of tokens present in the model. 
Construction operations Construction trace Consultation trace 
(First Cycle) 
1. Enter frog in model Frog Frog 
2. Place duck in front of frog Frog Frog (4) 
Duck Duck (4) 
3. Place mouse to right of frog Frog Mouse Frog Mouse 
Duck (3) (3) 
4. Place cat to right of frog Frog ? Cat Mouse ? Cat 
Duck 
5. Place dog in front of cat Frog ? Cat Mouse ? Cat 
Duck ? Dog ? Dog 
Figure 6.3: An example of a construction trace and the first cycle of a consultation trace for the 
indeterminate description in igLare 6.1. 
What is actually recorded in subsequent cycles will depend on how consultation is directed 
towards a particular goal or purpose. Thus the consultation trace in Figure 6.2 only records the 
'essential' operations involved in checking the spatial mental model as it is being constructed. 
Subsequent cycles of the consultation trace for the determinate description in Figure 6.2 would 
record combinations of the possible spatial relationships between tokens in the spatial mental 
model. One plausible way for these to be recorded is for people to consult the spatial mental 
model one token at a time either to determine whether the spatial relations are correct or merely 
to refresh the spatial mental model. For the example in Figure 6.2 this might entail recording 
the spatial relations between fork and each of the remaining tokens in turn. This activity could 
then be repeated for each token in turn (though all possible relationships would be recorded at 
least once by the time the fourth token was reached). This sequence is attractive because it is 
relatively simple and because it is not inconsistent with the kinds of mental or sub-vocal 
rehearsal some people report. People would probably consult their spatial mental models in the 
order of spatial mental model construction either because early tokens have greater residual 
226 
activation from the construction trace or because they are rereading the description. Some people 
may not complete the whole sequence because of time pressures or because they are prepared to 
rely on working memory to recall later spatial relations. If this is the case this would lead to 
better long-term memory for early spatial relations, as has been observed. It should be stressed, 
however, that subsequent processing cycles are neither mandatory nor fixed. People are free to 
consult a spatial mental model in any way they wish. 
The previous example of memory for a determinate spatial description describes the 
typical situation people are faced with when constructing a spatial mental model. Figure 6.3 
above illustrates how the construction trace and the 
first cycle of a consultation trace might be 
recorded for a simple indeterminate description. When people are asked to read and understand 
a radically indeterminate spatial description both the construction and the consultation trace 
will differ. The main difference in the construction trace 
is that what is recorded is not the 
operation of adding a token to a spatial mental model 
but the operation of attempting to add a 
token to a spatial mental model. The main difference in the construction trace is that it is not 
possible to consult spatial relations between indeterminately 
located tokens and other tokens in 
the spatial mental model. These differences are 
based on the view that most people do not 
succeed in resolving the indeterminacy of the 
description, for instance by constructing only one of 
the possible models, by constructing two or more models or 
by annotating their model in some way 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). While some people may adopt these strategies for coping with radical 
indeterminacy evidence from the experiments reported in Chapter 4 suggests that the majority of 
subjects do not or, if they do, are unsuccessful. 
Filling out the detail of the sketch 
The examples presented earlier in this section are intended as the starting points of a theory of 
memory for spatial mental models which could account for the empirical evidence reported in 
this thesis and elsewhere. It has several features in its favour. Firstly, it can account for the 
absence or presence of an interaction between the determinacy of a description and the type of 
recognition performance, gist or verbatim, shown by subjects in several experiments. Where only 
minimal consultation of a spatial mental model is required people may not remember its structure 
(Payne, 1993). Where more extensive consultation of a spatial mental model is expected or 
required by subjects the crossover interaction predicted by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) should 
be and is observed. Secondly, by proposing that spatial mental model construction and 
consultation are ongoing, cyclic processes the sketch is consistent with evidence that the order 
and probability of recall are predicted by spatial mental model construction order. 
It is important to note that differences in probability of recall and drawing order of items 
from determinate and indeterminate descriptions require that consultation processes also reflect 
the order of spatial mental model construction to some extent. This is incorporated in the sketch 
227 
by noting that people will tend to apply consultation processes in order to improve the long-term 
retention of the earlier tokens in spatial mental model construction. People will tend to rely more 
on working memory resources to retain information about later tokens in the construction order 
(Craik, 1970; Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Thus one of the most important characteristics of 
consultation processes is their role in elaborating the structure of a spatial mental model (Craik, 
1979; Glenberg & Langston, 1992). This may seem counterintuitive, as subjects in the experiments 
reported here are only tested after intervening activity has been carried out. The explanation is 
that subjects are not told that they will be tested for delayed recall in any of the experiments 
reported here (the best example of this is the surprise recognition tests used in Chapter 4). 
People are used to relying on working memory resources for recall or recognition in everyday 
activities and it would be unusual for them to not make use of those resources in the experiments 
reported here. 
What modifications need to be made to fill in the detail of this sketch? There are a 
number of features that could be altered in the formation of the construction trace. At present the 
sketch deals only with the simplest case where the construction process is terminated after a 
single cycle. In many cases people will refresh the construction trace by rereading the original 
description or by recalling and 're-running' the operations used to construct the spatial mental 
model. In some cases people may refresh the construction processes in a different order from that 
given in the original description (this is only likely if the entire description is available during 
the whole period of spatial mental model construction). It may also be necessary to argue that 
the first cycle of the construction trace results in a stronger memory trace than later cycles, to 
account for the good retention of construction processes when a description is heard rather than 
read. All these modifications are more or less minor changes to or extensions of the sketch which 
has been presented. There are also, however, more fundamental aspects of the sketch which 
have been left vague or which m ay be inadequate. 
The first of these areas is the notion of activation or trace strength. At present the model 
copes with the notion of activation in three ways. Firstly the activation of arrays in long-term 
memory is partly indicated by the number of times a given array is recorded. Secondly, the 
number of times a given token is recorded in an array trace is also an indication of the level of 
activation of that token in long-term memory. Thirdly, tokens in the construction trace differ in 
activation according to their importance in the operation being recorded. New tokens have 
greater activation than existing tokens. Tokens acting as explicit reference points for new tokens 
have greater activation than those not explicitly mentioned in the relevant section of the 
description. This way of denoting activation or trace strength has considerable heuristic value, 
but should not be thought of as an accurate account of activation in long-term memory. A complete 
account of activation in long-term memory would almost certainly require a computational model 
of construction and consultation processes. 
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A second area which requires clarification is closely related to the issue of activation in 
long-term memory. This is the question of how the arrays which make up each trace are 
organized. One interpretation of the sketch is that each array is a separate long-term memory 
entity. This is problematic because there is considerable evidence that the different arrays can 
cue and be cued by each other (or by other information) in long-term memory. A preferable 
alternative is that the arrays are linked or associated within a larger long-term memory 
structure. Evidence for this view comes from experiments which demonstrate large fan effects 
only for information which can not be organized into a single coherent mental model (Radvansky 
et al., 1993; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). One way of organizing different arrays into a single long- 
term memory representation would be to superimpose successive arrays onto a single 'meta- 
array'. Such a superpositional or distributed representation is often associated with 
connectionist systems (Rumelhart, 1989; Rumethart & Norman, 1983; Rumelhart et al., 1986). 
Unlike distributed connectionist systems, however, the sketch presented here proposes that the 
construction and consultation trace explicitly preserve constituent structure (the tokens and the 
spatial relations between tokens). Distributed connectionist networks have been successful at 
modeling schemas, but it is not certain that they could model memory for spatial mental models 
(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Rumelhart et al., 1986). An intermediate 
solution is that the arrays are organized temporally (from first to last). This solution is 
particularly good at explaining memory for order. The only significant problem with it being 
that construction and consultation processes do not proceed smoothly in a single cycle from first to 
last, but are likely to be repeated. This problem is less significant if it is assumed that identical 
arrays are superimposed on each other within the trace, resulting in increased activation for the 
original array. One way to explore this area may be to investigate long-term memory for the 
consultation processes involved in reasoning, because searching for counterexamples can involve 
constructing, consulting and discarding several mental models. 
The third area of the sketch which is incomplete concerns the precise nature of the 
consultation processes. This aspect of the sketch is incomplete because specifying consultation 
processes operating on a spatial mental model requires a detailed analysis of the purpose for 
which the spatial mental model was constructed. To specify all the possible consultation 
processes requires a description of all the possible ways someone can consult a spatial mental 
model. There are, however, general properties of consultation processes which should be noted. 
People will tend to consult a spatial mental model to derive or generate new information rather 
than to derive information which is already available. This principle is already well known in 
the area of deductive reasoning where people avoid reaching redundant conclusions. If people 
are told "All acrobats are bakers" and "All bakers are chemists" people hardly ever conclude 
that "All acrobats are bakers and all bakers are chemists" even though this conclusion is 
perfectly valid (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The implication is that 
when people have completed construction of a spatial mental model they will often actively 
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search for novel information (rather than information explicit in the premises) when they 
consult their representation. 
The kinds of consultation processes operating on a spatial mental model are heavily task 
dependent. Some tasks will require people to derive a perceptual representation from the 
structure of a spatial mental model. Such a perceptual representation might take the form of a 
visual image (perceptual information could also be retrieved directly from long-term memory). 
Other consultation processes may require people to transform or annotate their spatial mental 
model in some way. In these cases consultation processes interact with construction processes. For 
example, two or three people in Experiment 4 reported constructing a spatial mental model and 
then transforming it into a linear string. Remembering the arrangement of objects simply required 
recalling the overall shape or annotating it. The determinate description above could thus be 
remembered as the string "Spoon, Fork, Plate, NEXT-LINE, Cup, Knife". Annotating a spatial 
mental model is also one way to represent an indeterminate description (though transforming an 
indeterminate spatial mental model into a string rather than array is not a productive strategy). 
To remember the indeterminate description above only two tokens ('Cat' and 'Mouse') need to be 
'tagged' to indicate that their positions can legitimately be switched (it is also important to 
remember that if they are switched the token 'dog' remains in front of 'cat'). 3 Annotated or 
augmented mental models are also postulated for certain kinds of reasoning and problem solving 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Newell, 1990). 
One thing these consultation strategies share is that they are all consistent with the 
sketch of memory for spatial descriptions reported here. In order to transform a description into 
an annotated 'string' requires one to construct a representation of the spatial locations of each 
item in the original description. Similarly, before an indeterminate description can be 
represented as an annotated spatial mental model the mental modeler to needs to notice that the 
description is indeterminate. The obvious way to do this is to attempt to construct an unannotated 
spatial mental model. Many consultation strategies also implicate construction processes in their 
application. It is convenient, though, to distinguish between construction processes (and perhaps 
the first cycle of consultation processes) and later consultation and construction processes which 
are less likely to follow a fixed pattern. This distinction between the construction and 
consultation of a spatial mental model has its parallel in the recent literature on mental models 
in reasoning. Valid deductive reasoning involves searching for counter-examples (a combination 
of consultation and construction processes), but many people only construct a single model of the 
This way of `tagging' or annotating a spatial mental model is the strategy adopted by the author 
when constructing the materials used in Chapter 4. As such it has some introspective validity, but it is likely 
that it requires familiarity with the materials to be able to adopt the strategy readily (though at least one 
subject did report adopting a similar strategy at least some of the time). 
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premises which can lead to errors in reasoning (Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985). Recent mental 
model research has shown that for other forms of reasoning searching for counter-examples is not 
an appropriate strategy (Johnson-Laird, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1994). In solving meta-logical 
puzzles the strategies adopted by subjects are arguably the main focus of experimental research 
within the mental models framework (Byrne et al., 1992; Evans, 1990; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1990; Rips, 1990). This latter research has largely concentrated on working memory 
representation (e. g. one common method is to use protocol analysis). It would be interesting to 
determine whether evidence from studies of long-term memory representations would 
complement the findings obtained so far in this area. 
6.3 Theoretical perspectives on memory for spatial mental models 
The work presented here falls within the mental model 'framework' which proposes that 
people construct and manipulate integrated mental representations of real or imagined situations 
in order to understand and reason. According to this approach mental models provide a 
framework for a number of theories or sub-theories to tackle specific psychological issues such as 
anaphoric reference, deduction or induction (Garnham & Oakhill, 1992; Garnharn & Oakhill, 
1994). This thesis can be considered as contributing to a sub-theory of how people construct and 
manipulate spatial mental models, but the implications of this research are not confined only to 
mental models. The interpretation of, and the assumptions behind, this research share common 
ground with other theories of language comprehension and reasoning and with more general 
strands of research in cognitive psychology. These include work on imagery, depth of processing 
and implicit memory. A selection of these connections form the basis of the brief discussion in this 
section. 
The interpretation of the empirical research reported here is broadly compatible with 
existing accounts of mental or situation models in reasoning and discourse comprehension 
(Garnham & Oakhill, 1994; Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Glenberg et al., 1987; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Tversky, 1991; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). It is also more 
generally related to approaches to reasoning and problem solving which propose integrated 
representations of the task (Evans et al., 1993; Galotti, 1989; Newell, 1990; Potts, 1972). Theories 
of relational reasoning, for example with three-term series problems, using integrated 
representations of the premises have a long history in psychology and have been particularly 
influential in the formation of theories of reasoning based on mental models (see section 1.2.4). In 
the area of psycholinguistics this mental model approach shares many features with 
constructivist approaches to language comprehension (Bransford et al., 1972; Bransford & Franks, 
1971; Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 1977). One recent formulation of the constructivist 
approach to language comprehension deserves particular attention. The structure building 
framework of Gernsbacher (1990; 1991) proposes three processes which make up comprehension. 
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The first process lays a foundation for a coherent mental structure of the discourse. The second 
process maps new information onto an existing structure. The third structure shifts to a new 
structure if the construction of single coherent structure is not possible. Each of these processes is 
controlled by one of two mechanisms: enhancement, which increases activation, and suppression, 
which reduces activation. Evidence for the framework comes from studies showing that items 
mentioned first in discourse are processed longer 'on-line' and remembered better 'off-line'. The 
similarities between the mental models and structure building frameworks are not surprising 
(both emerged from the same constructivist psycholinguistic tradition). What is interesting is 
that the structure building framework makes similar predictions concerning order and 
probability of recall as the thesis presented here. Gernsbacher, however, predicts that there is 
always an advantage for the first item mentioned, whereas the account predicted here proposes 
that in some instances the second item mentioned is the first to be entered into a spatial mental 
model (or into a 'mental structure'). This interpretation, though, is implicit in the framework 
proposed by Gernsbacher provided the item entered first into the structure rather than the item 
mentioned first in the description is stressed. The work by Gernsbacher offers important insights 
into concepts such as activation which have been neglected by the mainstream mental models 
tradition and should be seen as complementary rather than in opposition to the mental models 
framework. 
Theories of imagery can also be related to the mental models approach. These theories 
of imagery fall roughly into two kinds both of which deal with the construction of special- 
purpose representations in working memory. The first kind of imagery theory is exemplified by 
the work of Kosslyn (Kosslyn, 1980; 1981; 1991). Kosslyn describes a computational model of how 
images are constructed and manipulated in a visuo-spatial buffer. Like the account presented in 
this thesis Kosslyn makes no claims that images are represented in a special format in long-term 
memory. Kosslyn does distinguish between the structural and visual aspects of imagery in his 
computational model, but the two interact in order to account for classical imagery effects 
(Kosslyn, 1980). For instance, the Kosslyn model does not distinguish between perceptual 
information retrieved from memory and perceptual information generated from a structural 
representation. In many cases visual and structural information do interact, but it is also possible 
to have a spatial representation which is not visual (Conway, 1983). For example, an auditory 
image can also convey spatial information in the absence of visual imagery. In most cases, 
though, the kinds of 'spatial' images proposed by Kosslyn are very similar to the spatial mental 
models described here, sequentially constructed and manipulated special-purpose 
representations in working memory (Kirby & Kosslyn, 1990; Kosslyn et al., 1988). 
The second kind of imagery theory related to the work presented here is that which 
describes how working memory encoding or elaboration processes could account for the 
memorability of pictures or concrete words. Imagery which links or relates two or more items 
together is shown to lead to better retention than imagery which stresses the visual features of 
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individual words or objects (Bower, 1970; Hunt & Einstein, 1980; Marschark, 1985; Marschark & 
Surian, 1989; Morris & Stevens, 1974; Morris and Reid, 1975). In the work presented here it is 
elaboration (a combination of the amount and the relational nature of the encoding processes) 
which is thought to determine the memorability of items within a single spatial mental model. 
This differs from depth of processing and other elaboration accounts in that it is confined to the 
circumstances where people construct an integrated representation of a situation. No strong 
claims are made to suggest that all imagery or elaboration accounts can be reduced to a single 
explanation based on the construction of a mental model, though in many everyday situations 
people do appear to benefit from the construction of such integrated representations (Cohen, 1989; 
Evans et al., 1993; Garnham & Oakhill, 1994; Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1994). 
While memory for spatial mental models does appear to be related to integrative, 
elaborative processing, there is also evidence, particularly in memory for construction processes, 
that transfer-appropriate processing is important. Unlike the original transfer-appropriate 
processing hypothesis the view of memory for construction processes favoured here is explicitly 
representational and assumes that arrays and tokens in the construction trace can potentially be 
accessed individually as well as by re-activating or re-running the whole operation (Bransford 
et al., 1979; Craik, 1979; Morris et al., 1977). If this were not the case, greater burden would be 
placed on consultation processes to account for memory for the order of spatial mental model 
construction. Construction processes are more constrained than consultation processes and so it is 
more appropriate for some of this burden to met by memory for a construction trace. Recent 
research on implicit memory has revived transfer-appropriate processing explanations 
(Roediger, 1990; Weldon & Roediger, 1987). It is worth considering that memory for construction 
processes may reflect implicit memory involvement in an explicit memory task. It is certainly 
the case that people have explicit recall of spatial relations, but there is little evidence in the 
experiments reported in this thesis that people are consciously aware of recalling the process of 
constructing a spatial mental model. 
6.4 Methodological issues 
In the course of this thesis a number of methodological issues have been addressed. In the sections 
below the key components of these issues will be summarized and discussed. For discussion of 
methodological points relating to individual experiments the reader is referred to the empirical 
work in Chapters 3 to S. 
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6.4.1 Distinguishing between different forms of mental representation 
This thesis has been written within a psychological tradition which proposes that it is possible 
to distinguish empirically between different forms of mental representation. In one sense this is 
less a methodological point than a philosophical one. The most fundamental distinction, 
however, is not been between different forms of representation as such, but between different 
levels of representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Palmer, 1978). It has been argued that it is possible 
to distinguish between different forms of high-level representation using methods available to 
cognitive psychology, at least in working memory. These representations are defined by the 
kinds of high-level processes that they support and the kind of processes that are available to 
act upon them, not by some primitive 'machine code' (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Palmer, 1978). The 
question of what kind of primitive or low-level representations are involved in cognition is one 
that is outside the realms of contemporary cognitive psychology. Answering this question 
requires a solution to the mind-body problem: the central problem of cognitive science (Bechtel, 
1988; Lycan, 1990). The chief defence of the view presented here does not rest on empirical 
findings per se, but on the ability of research which adopts this viewpoint, such as this thesis, to 
be productive and to reach internally consistent findings. 
6.4.2 Distinguishing between working memory and long-term memory 
representations 
Payne (1993) has already provided an eloquent argument on the importance of distinguishing 
between the representation of spatial mental models in working memory and long-term memory. 
These points are addressed earlier in the thesis, but the gist of the argument is worth repeating. 
Most studies of mental models do not force people to remember the mental models they have 
constructed. The majority require people to construct a mental model and, for example, report a 
conclusion reached by consulting it (Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1991). In some cases we have good 
reason to suppose that long-term memory is also implicated, for example because the experiment 
involves reading a long text or consulting a spatial mental model over a long period of time 
(Bower & Morrow, 1990; Kintsch, 1986; Tversky, 1991). Nevertheless, in almost every case, there 
is nothing to prevent people from relying heavily (and in some cases totally) on working memory 
to perform the task. The solution proposed by Payne (1993), and adopted for every experiment 
reported here, is to prevent people using temporary storage capacity in working memory by 
introducing an intervening task. Two types of intervening tasks were used here, usually in 
conjunction. The first type involves presenting a task requiring a second spatial mental model to 
be constructed in working memory. This is particularly useful because mental model construction 
is held by most authors to be very working memory intensive (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Tardieu et al., 
1992). The second type of task involves recalling or recognizing a spatial description presented 
earlier. Both types of tasks can introduce considerable delays between presentation and retrieval 
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and carry a risk of confusion or interference between descriptions or spatial mental models. 
Delays or interference, however, will in general make it less rather than more likely to find 
evidence of memory for any aspect of a spatial description. These experiments can only be 
interpreted in terms of long-term memory or in terms of the retrieval from long-term memory into 
working memory of information derived from the original spatial descriptions. 
6.4.3 Ecological validity 
Ecological validity is an important and sometimes controversial topic in modern cognitive 
psychology and in memory research in particular. Ecologically valid or everyday memory 
studies produce findings which are readily related to real world applications or situations and 
which still emerge when many incidental factors are taken into consideration (Cohen, 1989; 
Cohen et al., 1993). Laboratory studies may lack these advantages, but are often more readily 
generalized to novel situations and controls can be applied to exclude incidental factors which 
are not of direct interest (Banaji & Crowder, 1989). In the empirical work presented here 
ecological validity is of concern in the nature of the materials presented to the subjects and in the 
nature of the tasks employed. Some of the experiments have employed relatively rich and 
meaningful stimuli such as stories with a strong narrative component. Other stimuli have 
employed relatively simple and meaningless stimuli composed of sets of semantically related 
items and spatial relations connecting them. Similar findings have been obtained with both 
kinds of stimuli, though the simpler materials have permitted more precise control of the 
content and order of presentation (for example, compare experiments 3 and 5). 
The similarity in the conclusions from experiments using a range of different materials 
helps guard against problems inherent in both everyday and traditional laboratory studies. The 
tasks subjects perform are ecologically valid only in a limited sense. They all involve 
understanding, constructing and consulting a spatial representation derived from a verbal 
description. This is something that people do frequently and relatively effortlessly. If it were 
not the case people would not be able to provide directions, interpret road signs and so on. Many 
potential difficulties in navigation and spatial cognition are mitigated by redundancy in the 
way we communicate and record spatial information and from the many sources which surround 
us (road signs are usually repeated, directions are often given verbally and as maps, or attempt to 
combine canonical and relative direction information). In this sense the tasks employed in this 
thesis are not always high in ecological validity. Nor were the retrieval situations very high in 
ecological validity (though most subjects preferred drawing spatial layouts to any of the other 
testing situations). Overall then, these experiments could be regarded as fairly traditional 
laboratory studies. Where this research departs from such traditional experimental methods is 
in a deliberate attempt to demonstrate memory for spatial mental models over a range of 
materials, tasks and retention intervals which share a common goal. This goal is to explore the 
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way people construct representations of spatial information and how these representations 
influence long-term memory. 
6.4.4 Strategies and individual differences 
Individual differences are often held to be problematic for many models of cognitive processes to 
deal with. This form of analysis, though, falsely assumes that because a model does not 
explicitly address individual differences it cannot explain any individual differences that do 
arise. Where models in cognitive psychology do seek to explain individual differences they can 
be very successful. For example individual differences in working memory can be very powerful 
predictors of performance in reasoning, problem solving and some areas of language 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Hunt, 1987; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kyllonen & 
Christal, 1990). Individual differences at the level of cognitive architecture (like working 
memory) are where cognitive psychology can be particularly productive. One area where 
individual differences have been particularly controversial has been in imagery research. 
Experience of visual or other imagery varies immensely from person to person, perhaps more than 
any other aspect of conscious experience - the question of imageless thought being one of the 
oldest controversies in psychology (Boring, 1950; Dellarosa, 1988; Hilgard, Leary, & McGuire, 
1991). The problem of imagery experience for cognitive psychology is cognitive psychologists try 
to discover general cognitive processes rather than faculties that are possessed by some 
individuals but not others. The mental models framework avoids this problem by proposing that 
the ability to construct mental models is universal and that the subjective experience of visual or 
other imagery is distinct from this. Thus differences in imagery do not influence deduction with 
spatial mental models, even though some people experience visual imagery during deductive 
reasoning (Evans et al., 1993). 
Until recently individual differences have not been a major focus of the original theory 
of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Mental models, it is argued, predict individual 
differences because of working memory limitations or because they permit people to construct 
mental models which are influenced by real world knowledge. For instance, some people may 
reason differently by adding to the information contained in the premises. In extreme cases real- 
world knowledge is used to reject valid conclusions generated from a mental model (Oakhill & 
Garnham, 1993; Oakhill et al., 1990; Oakhill et al., 1989). Expert-novice differences are also 
often characterized by a shift from reasoning with superficial representations of a problem 
towards reasoning with a detailed, domain-specific mental model (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1981; Kintsch, 1994; Tardieu et al., 1992). Arguably, even novices will construct a mental model, 
but it will rarely be domain-specific and will often be too abstract to reason accurately with. The 
account of memory for spatial mental models offered here goes beyond standard mental model 
accounts by emphasising the importance of different kinds of consultation process on what is 
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remembered. These consultation processes reflect more or less deliberate strategies adopted for a 
specific task or class of problems. This emphasis on strategies adopted in accessing information 
from spatial mental models parallels a growing interest in the strategies adopted in deductive 
and inductive reasoning within the mental models framework (this was discussed in more detail 
at the end of section 6.2.2). One important consideration is that these strategies are not ad hoc 
inventions, because they are all derived from a common assumption - that comprehension and 
reasoning require a representation of the structure of a situation. If people are able to construct 
mental models it follows that they are able to reach valid deductive conclusions if they search 
for counter-examples (Johnson-Laird, 1983). If people are able to construct mental models it 
follows that they can make spatial inferences simply by reading information off from those 
models (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). These strategies are only ad hoc if they are considered in 
isolation from the ability to construct and consult a mental model. 
6.5 Representational issues 
In this section three representational issues of central importance to this thesis and to the mental 
models framework are discussed. The first issue has been addressed at several points in this 
thesis, (notably in Chapters 1 and 3) and concerns the distinction between mental models and 
images. The second issue has been addressed in the interpretation of several of the experiments 
in the thesis and concerns the distinction between schemas and mental models. The third issue is 
the main focus of the thesis - the question of how spatial mental models are or are not 
represented in long-term memory. 
6.5.1 The relationship between images and mental models 
One objection to the idea that people construct and manipulate mental models has been that 
mental models can not be distinguished from images. According to Johnson-Laird (1983) an image 
is a "view" of a mental model. This has been interpreted in this thesis to mean that an image 
corresponds to the perceptual rather than the structural component of a situation. Not all mental 
models are visual or spatial in nature. Reasoning often involves constructing mental models 
which represent negation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Mental models can also be constructed 
to represent procedures (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). In defence of this position the finding that it 
is possible to experience rich visual or other imagery which does not possess structure can be 
cited. This has been most clearly demonstrated in neurophysiology and neuropsychology (Farah, 
1988; Farah et al., 1988). Memory research suggests that complex images derived from 
autobiographical experience do not need to be constructed sequentially like complex images 
derived from semantic memory (Conway, 1983). One explanation of this is that perceptual 
information about the episode can be retrieved directly, while structure has to be generated 
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'piece by piece'. Research by Taylor and Tversky (1992a) has shown that people can construct 
"perspective-free" representations of spatial situations, and their observation that drawing an 
environment tends to reflect the order of spatial mental model construction (rather than a visual 
image) has been confirmed here. This distinction between images and spatial mental models can 
explain why individual differences in visual imagery have a very poor record in accounting for 
differences in reasoning ability (see section 6.4.4 above). Visual imagery ability can only 
influence tasks which require the generation, retrieval or manipulation of perceptual rather 
than structural information. This is very different from arguments which claim that imagery 
experience is epiphenomenal (Pylyshyn, 1973; 1984). Imagery experience may or not play a 
causal role in cognitive processes according to whether those processes can benefit from 
understanding the perceptual characteristics of a situation. 
6.5.2 Schemas and mental models in long-term memory 
A different kind of objection against mental models suggests that mental models are simply an 
alternative term for schemas. This objection is based on the assumption that mental models, like 
schemas, are representations in long-term memory, an assumption which for the mental models 
described by Johnson-Laird at least, is false. A more sophisticated version of this objection is 
made by Brewer (1987). Brewer suggests that mental models are instantiations of long-term 
memory schemas in working memory. 4 Thus a mental model is constructed by filling in slots, 
assigning defaults and so on. 
This view is partially accurate, in that this is one way in which a mental model can be 
constructed, but it is not the only way. The experiments presented in this thesis provide one of 
the clearest demonstrations of this. Memory for mental models and memory for spatial mental 
models is episodic and specific. Spatial relations between entities rarely conform to knowledge 
stored in long-term memory. This is not to say that you cannot have a schema for a typical 
English village or a typical university campus (see Experiments 7 and 8). However, specific 
spatial relations contained in the schema will be next to useless. For example, draw a map of a 
typical university campus and then try and use that map to navigate round a university campus 
you have never been to. A great deal of non-spatial information on the map would be correct (e. g. 
that there is a union building or halls of residence). Nearly all of the spatial information on the 
map will be incorrect (important buildings may tend to be more central, but it extremely unlikely 
that many buildings will be in appropriate spatial relationships to each other). Schemas can 
not explain memory for highly specific situations. In addition the episodic nature of memory for 
4 Brewer does suggest labelling these kinds of mental models episodic mental models. Nevertheless it 
is misleading to suggest they are merely instantiations of Schemas. 
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construction processes is inconsistent with a schema interpretation of memory for spatial mental 
models. Mental models are episodic representations of specific situations which can be 
constructed from discourse, perception or organized knowledge in long-term memory. Mental 
models may interact with schemas, be constructed from schemas and even form the basis of new 
schemas, but this not sufficient to make them schemas or instantiations of schemas. 
6.5.3 The format of spatial mental models in long-term memory 
Earlier in this chapter the idea of a simple 'copy' theory of memory for spatial mental models 
was rejected. Instead a theory based on memory for the processes of constructing and consulting a 
spatial mental model was favoured, and a sketch of such a theory was offered. This approach 
has similarities with theories of imagery or mental models which propose that long-term 
memory is unitary and propositional (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Kosslyn, 1980; Payne, 1993). 
The construction and consultation traces proposed in section 6.2.2 are not, however, described as 
sets of propositions, but as sets of arrays. These arrays can be considered in several different 
ways. One way to consider retrieval from these arrays is that they in some sense reinstate 
conditions in working memory. This view is akin to transfer-appropriate processing (Morris et 
al., 1977; Weldon & Roediger, 1987). A second way to consider them is as high-level 
representations similar to structural descriptions (Johnson-Laird, 1989; Tversky, 1991). Each 
viewpoint captures the main idea behind the construction and consultation trace. This is that the 
spatial or structural information being processed is preserved in the trace. In the former case it is 
preserved because retrieval somehow reinstates the processes acting on the structure of the 
original spatial mental model at some point in its construction or consultation. How exactly this 
kind of reinstatement is achieved is the major problem that faces transfer-appropriate 
processing accounts (Bransford et al., 1979; Craik, 1979). In the latter case the succession of arrays 
or 'structural descriptions' which make up the trace are laid down in long-term memory as 
processing is carried out (Palmer, 1978; Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). 
One of the most difficult questions to answer is whether the traces encoded in long-term 
memory share the same format as those in working memory. An affirmative answer to this 
question requires that the processes acting upon the long-term memory traces do so in the same 
way as the special-purpose processes acting upon spatial mental models in working memory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Palmer, 1978). The tentative response offered here is that retrieval 
involves reinstatement of processes or structures into working memory and hence mental modeling 
per se is confined to working memory. This would be supported if accessing information from the 
trace increases with the complexity or size of the array (this might not be the case if arrays can 
be acted on directly by procedures in long-term memory). In either case working memory mental 
models differ in content from the consultation and especially the construction trace. A working 
memory mental model does not necessarily represent information about the order and process of 
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its construction, unlike the long-term memory traces described here. In some cases, where 
consultation processes are minimal, the long-term memory traces will only encode part of the 
structural information from a working memory mental model. Where consultation processes are 
extensive the long-term memory trace will approximate to the structure of the completed spatial 
mental model. 5 In these cases the long-term memory traces can act as an analog of the completed ' 
spatial mental model in working memory, but they are not a copy of it. 
6.6 Implications for future research 
It is dangerous to assume that representations in working memory are identical to or copies of 
representations in long-term memory. Memory for spatial mental models provides a good 
example of this. In everyday activity people switch between long-term memory and working 
memory almost effortlessly. Working memory is capacity limited, but long-term memory is for 
all practical purposes unlimited. This ability to extend working memory by accessing organized 
structures in long-term memory is a fundamental aspect of human expertise (Chase & Simon, 
1973; Chi et al., 1981). This presents problems for cognitive psychologists. It is not always easy to 
tell where long-term memory begins and working memory ends. Long-term memory reflects 
ongoing, dynamic processing in working memory not just a particular state at a particular point in 
time. One of the challenges for cognitive science is to provide 'unified' accounts of cognitive 
processes (Newell, 1990; 1992). One important step along the way is a better understanding of 
how working memory and long-term memory interact (Baddeley, 1992). Within the mental 
models framework this requires a better understanding of the time course of mental model 
construction and consultation processes. The sketch of memory for spatial mental models 
described in section 6.2.2 is one possible starting point for this. Consultation processes are driven 
by the conscious strategies people adopt for particular tasks and situations. A better 
understanding of these processes thus requires an account of how strategies are developed for 
different kinds of situations. Lastly, the account outlined here for spatial mental models may 
form the basis of a general account of mental modeling processes. This in turn requires an 
understanding of the extent to which spatial mental modeling draws on processes or resources 
which are specific to spatial cognition. Recent research has already begun to address both 
strategy use (Byrne et al., 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1994) and the nature of working memory resources 
involved in constructing and manipulating a mental model (de Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1993; 
Gilhooly et al., 1993; Toms et al., 1993). 
This assumes that spatial mental model construction culminates in a final, complete, static 
representation as in the examples in section 6.2.2. 
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Several of the more speculative aspects of the conclusions reached in this thesis suggest 
further lines of research. The differences in memory for spatial information when verbal 
descriptions are read and when they are heard could be investigated further. If it is true that 
people hearing a verbal description are less likely to deviate from the predicted mental model 
construction order then this should reflected in a stronger relationship between spatial mental 
model construction order and order or probability of recall. It is has also been proposed that the 
construction trace is procedural rather than declarative in nature. People rarely, if ever, 
explicitly mention remembering the process of spatial mental model construction. This in turn 
may be related to the implicit nature of the measures used to test the episodic construction trace 
hypothesis. Payne (personal communication) has noted the similarity between his hypothesis 
and recent implicit memory research. Implicit memory methodologies may provide a useful 
framework for investigating differences between the construction trace and consultation trace. 
One important belief which has driven this research is that spatial mental modeling is 
more similar than dissimilar to mental modeling in other domains. There is already some 
evidence that similar findings have been obtained with the comprehension of picture stories 
(Gernsbacher, 1990; 1991), it would be useful to extend the sketch presented here to account for 
long-term memory on other spatial tasks (such as spatial reasoning or real-world navigation) or 
in other domains (such as understanding temporal or causal relationships). Lastly, several areas 
of the sketch presented here require further investigation. The most important of these is 
probably the relationship between the construction processes and the consultation processes. Two 
ways to investigate the relationship between the construction and consultation trace suggest 
themselves. The first is to systematically vary demands placed on subjects during the initial 
learning or orienting task. Low task demands should make it more likely that people will 
remember only the process of spatial mental model construction. High task demands should make 
it more likely that people will extensively consult a spatial mental model and so remember more 
of the structure of the spatial mental model. The second way is to look at the effects of different 
retention intervals on recognition or recall. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
the structure of a spatial mental model, and hence a consultation trace, can be retained even at 
very long retention intervals. 
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